The basis of morality;

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THE BASIS OF MOKALITY

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

Uranalateft witb ^ntrofeuctfon anb "Hotcs bg
ARTHUR BRODRIOK BULLOCK, M.A.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

LONDON

SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIMITED

PATERNOSTER SQUARE

1903

PRINTED BT

HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY LD.,
LONPOK AND AYLESBURY.

PRIZE ESSAY

ON

THE BASIS OE MORALITY

NOT APPROVED

BY

THE DANISH ROYAL SOCIETY OF SCIENCES,
Copenhagen, 30 Janiiary, 1840.

"To preach Morality is easy, to found it diflBcult." —

(ScHOPENHAUBB : C/e6er den WiUen in der Natur ; p. 128.)

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MATRI CARiSSIMAE.

CONTENTS.

PAGK

translator's preface . . . . . . ix

translator's introduction . . . . . xi

THE QUESTION ........ 1

part I.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAP.

I. THE PROBLEM . . . . . . .5

II. GENERAL RETROSPECT . . . . . .12

IPart II.

CRITIQUE OF KANT'S BASIS OF ETHICS.

I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 23

II. ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS . 28
m. ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OUR-
SELVES IN PARTICULAR . . . . .38
IV. ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. . . 42

NOTE 76

V. ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN

ETHICS 82

VI. ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE

OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS 92

vii

VUl CONTENTS.

CHAP. PAGE

VII. kant's doctrine of conscience . . . .106
VIII. kant's doctrine of the intelligible and em-
pirical CHARACTER. THEORY OF FREEDOM . .115
NOTE .... . 121
IX. FICHTE'S ETHICS AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS FOR THE

ERRORS OF THE KANTIAN . . . . .124

part III.

THE FOUNDING OF ETHICS.

I. CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM . . . .133
II. SCEPTICAL VIEW 135

III. ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES 150

IV. CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH . .161
V. STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL

INCENTIVE 165

VI. THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE 176

VII. THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS . . .198

VIII. THE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE 206

IX. ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER . 237

Ipait IV.

ON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION

OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL

PHAENOMENON.

I. HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD . . 257

II. THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK . . .264

JUDICIUM REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARI 5l SOCIETATIS . 283

TRANSLATOR'S PHEEACE.

This translation was undertaken in the belief that
there are many English-speaking people who feel
more than a merely superficial interest in ethical
research, but who may not read German with suifi-
cient ease to make them care to take up the original.
The present Essay is one of the most important
contributions to Ethics since the time of Kant, and,
as such, is indispensable to a thorough knowledge
of the subject. Moreover, from whatever point of
view it be regarded, — whether the reader find, when
he closes the book, that his conviction harmonises
with the conclusion reached, or not ; it would be
difiicult to find any treatise on Moral Science more
calculated to stimulate thought, and lift it out of
infantile imitation of some prescribed pattern. The
believer in the Kantian, or any other, basis of Ethics,
could hardly measure the strength or the weakness
of his own position more surely than by comparing
it with the Schopenhauerian ; while he who is yet

X translator's preface.

in search of a foundation will find much in the follow-
ing pages to claim his attention.

Those acquainted with the luminous imagery, the
subtle irony, the brusque and penetrating vigour of
the German, will doubtless admit that it is no easy
task to reduce Schopenhauer to adequate English
prose ; and if this has been attempted by the present
writer, no one can be more conscious than he of the
manifold shortcomings discoverable. But such as
it is, the work is heartily offered to all who still
follow the true student's rule, ^'^laWg; iaolbt Jjt larn^
xcnb glaHg hcl§t" with the single hope that it may
help, however slightly, to widen their knowledge,
and ripen their judgment.

My friend, R. E. Candy, Esq., I.C.S., has kindly
given me information concerning several Indian
names.

Rome : June, 1902.

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION.

"Ou 8i 6eo\ TifiSxriv, 6 Koi fia^evfieuos alvf2.

— Theognis : 169.

In 1837 the Danish Royal Society of Sciences pro-
pounded, as subject for a prize competition, the
question with which this treatise opens ; and Schopen-
hauer, who was glad to seize the opportunity of
becoming better known, prepared, and sent to Copen-
hagen, the earliest form of " The Basis of Morality."
In January, 1840, the work was pronounced unsuc-
cessful, though there was no other candidate. In
September of the same year it was published by
the author, with only a few unimportant additions,
but preceded by a long introduction, which, cast
in the form of an exceedingly caustic philippic, is,
in its way, a masterpiece. In 1860, (only a month
before Schopenhauer's death,) the second edition was
printed with many enlargements and insertions, the
short preface, dated August being one of the last
things he wrote.^

The reason why the prize was withheld is not

far to seek, and need not detain us. At that time

the philosophical atmosphere was saturated with

Hegel, and, to a certain extent, with Fichte ; hence

^ He died September 21st.

xii translator's introduction.

it is easy to imagine with what ruffled, not to say,
scandalised feelings the Academy must have risen
from its perusal of the work. Moreover, putting
Hegel and Fichte out of the question, the position
advanced was in 1840 so new, indeed so paradoxical
(as Schopenhauer himself admits) ; there is at times
such an aggressiveness in the style ; the whole essay
is so much more calculated to startle than to con-
ciliate ; that we cannot feel much surprise at the
official decision.

In the Judgment published by the Society three
reasons are given for its unfavourable attitude. The
second is declared to be not only dissatisfaction with
the mode of discussion (ipsa disserendi forma), but
also inability to see that Schopenhauer proves his
case. x\s the third is alleged the " unseemly "
language employed in connection with certain '^summi
philosophV (Hegel and Fichte). These two objec-
tions are of course in themselves perfectly legitimate,
and how far the Academy was right or wrong may
be left for the reader to determine.

But the first reason stated is of a different kind,
and affords as neat an instance of self-stultification
proceeding ex cathedra as can well be found. It is
true that the question is worded vaguely enough, but
if it means anything, it asks where the " philosophiae
moralis fons et fundamentum" — the foundation of
moral science — is to be sought for, i.e., where it is
to be found. Turning to the Judgment we read :
" He " (Schopenhauer) " has omitted to deal with
the essential part of the question, apparently thinking
that he was required to establish some fundamental

TRANSLATORS INTRODUCTION. Xlll

principle of Ethics " : which he was required to do,
unless the Society's Latin is borrowed from NetjjaXo-
KOKKvyia. And then it goes on to declare that he
treated as secondary, indeed as an opus supererogationis,
the very thing which the Academy intended should
occupy the first place, namely, the connection between
Metaphysics and Ethics.^ But the " metaphysicae et
etkicae nexus,^' so far from being formulated in the
question as the chief point to be considered, is not
even mentioned ! The Society thus denies having
asked what it actually did ask, while the discussion,
which it asserts was specially indicated, is not
suggested by a single word. Its embarrassment is
sufficiently shown by this unworthy shifting, to
enlarge upon which would here be out of place.^

It is not intended to offer any criticism either
on Schopenhauer's main position in this essay, or
on the various side-issues involved. The reader is
supposed to be accurately acquainted with the funda-
mentals of his philosophy, as contained in Die Welt
als Wille unci Vorstellmiff, and is invited to be
the critic himself. But perhaps a few remarks on
the structure and general trend of the work may
not be amiss.

After preliminary considerations, partly to show

' It should be noticed that this " essential part of the
question," a few lines before, is said to have been passed over
altogether (pmisso enim eo, quod }X)tissimum posttdabatur).

* Any one who cares to see how this Judgment, the Danish
Royal Society of Sciences, Hegel, Fichte, and " Professors of
Philosophy" in general, are all pulverised together under
our sage's withering wrath and trenchant irony, should read
his Introduction to each Edition.

xiv translator's introduction.

the difficulty of the subject, partly to clear the ground
(Part I.), the treatise opens with a searching critique
of Kant's Ethical Basis, of the Leading Principle of
his system, and of its derived forms. (Part II.,
Chapters I. -VI.) ^ Schopenhauer's conclusion is that
the Categorical Imperative is a very cleverly woven
web, yet in reality nothing but the old theological
basis in disguise, the latter being the indispensable,
if invisible, clothes' peg for the former ; and that
Kant's tou7- de main of deducing his Moral Theology
from Ethics is like inverting a pyramid. The theory of
Conscience is next discussed (Chapter VII.). The half-
supernatural element which Kant introduced under
the highly dramatic form of a court of justice holding
ing secret session in the breast, is examined, and
eliminated ; and Conscience is defined as the know-
ledge that we have of ourselves through our acts.

But if, so far, the result obtained is distinctly
unfavourable to Kant, Schopenhauer is glad to agree
with him on one point, namely, the theory of Freedom,
to a brief notice of which he now passes (Chapter
VIII.). He points out that the solution of this question
is found in the doctrine of the coexistence of Liberty
and Necessity : according to which the basis of our
nature, the so-called Intelligible Character, that lies
outside the forms attaching to phaenomena, namely.
Time, Space, and Causality, is transcendentally free ;
while the Empirical Character, together with the whole

' Incidentally (Chapter III.), duties towards ourselves,
properly so called, are shown to be non-existent from the
Schopenhauerian standpoint. Cf. the definition of Duty in
Part III., Chapter VI.

translator's introduction. XV

person, being, as a phaenomenon, the transient objecti-
vation of the Intelligible Character, nnder the laws of
the principium individuationis, is strictly determined.^
Part II. closes with a sufficiently amnsing examina-
tion of Fichte (Chapter IX.). His proper function is
shown to be that of a magnifying glass for Kant.
By means of this powerful human lens we can see
the monstrous shapes into which the Kantian pet
creations are capable of developing. Thus we find the
Categorical Imperative become a Despotic Imperative,
the " Absolute Ought " grown into a fathomless in-
scrutable Elfjiap/jbivr}, etc.

With Part III. we reach the positive part of the
work. Schopenhauer begins (Chapter I.) by em-
phasising the necessity of finding a basis for Ethics
that appeals, not to the intellect, but to the intuitive
perception. Such (he says) can never be any
artificial formula, which surely crumbles to powder
beneath the rough touch of real life ; rather must
it be something springing out of the heart of things,
and therefore lying at the root of man's nature. But
is there, he asks (Chapter II.), after all, such a thing
as natural morality ? Is anything good ever done
absolutely without an egoistic motive? The con-
clusion arrived at is that, although much may be,
and has been, at all times, said in favour of the
Sceptical View, and although this 'view is in fact

^ Schopenhauer treated this subject exhaustively in his
Essay on " The Freedom of the Will," which, written immedi-
ately before, and more fortunate than, the present treatise,
was awarded the prize by the Royal Norwegian Society of
Sciences in January, 1839.

xvi tkanslator's introduction.

true as regards the greater number of apparently
unselfish acts, yet there can be no doubt that truly
moral conduct does occur, that deeds of justice and
loving-kindness are occasionally performed without
the smallest hope of reward, or fear of punishment
involved in their omission. The last paragraph of
this chapter is important because it puts in the
clearest light what, according to Schopenhauer, is
the end of Ethics. Its aim, he says, is not to treat
of that which people ought to do (for " ought " has no
place except in theological Morals, whether explicit,
or implicit) ; but '•' to point out all the varied moral
lines of human conduct ; to explain them ; and to
trace them to their ultimate source." This definition,
which assigns no educative function to Ethics, strictly
agrees with the doctrine of the unchangeableness
of character. (F. Chapter IX. of this Part.)

Our philosopher then proceeds to show (Chapter III.)
that there are two fundamental " antimoral " in-
centives in man's nature : Egoism and Malice. Be
it, however, here remarked that a still simpler
classification would reduce these two to one. Malice
may well be regarded as nothing but Egoism carried
to its extreme, developed to gigantic proportions. It
is a distinct source of gratification to certain natures
to witness the sufi'ering of another ; because a diminu-
tion of the lattef's capacity for action, whether efiiected
by itself, or not, is regarded by an ego of this kind
as an increase of its own power to do as it likes, — as
an enhancement of its own glorification.

In Chapter IV. the ultimate test of truly moral
conduct is explained to be the absence of all egoistic

translator's introduction. xvii

motivation ; and in Chapters V.-VII., by a process
of careful reasoning, every human act is traced to
one of three original springs, namely, (1) Egoism,
(2) Malice, and (3) Compassion ; or to a combination
of (1) and (3), or (1) and (2y Of these the third
is shown to be the only connter-motive to the first
and second, and in fact the sole source of the two
cardinal virtues, justice and loving-kindness, which
are explained as the manifestation of Compassion
in a lower, and a higher, degree, respectively. In
the course of the demonstration the question as to
how far a lie is legitimate comes incidentally under
discussion ; as also the theory of Duty ; duties being
defined as "actions, the simple omission of which
constitutes a wrong." (Cf. Part II., Chapter III.)

The position now reached, namely, that Compassion
is the one and only fount of true morality, because
it is the sole non-egoistic source of action, is (says
Schopenhauer) a strange paradox ; hence the testimony
of experience and of universal human sentiment is
appealed to, in confirmation of it, under nine diff'erent
considerations (Chapter VIII.). They are as follows : —

(1) An imaginary case.

' If, as above suggested, ^lalice be taken as a form of
Egoism, we may simplify as follows : —

Egoism. Compassion.

(a) Lower power : seen in (a) Lower power : seen in
selfishness, covetousness, etc. justice.

(b) Higher power : seen in (b) Higher power : seen in
malice, cruelty, etc. loving-kindness.

Egoism (not in its higher power) may be simultaneously
operative with Compassion in every possible proportion.

XVlll TRANSLATOR S INTRODUCTION.

(2) Cruelty, which means the maximum deficiency
in Compassion, is the mark of the deepest moral
depravity. Therefore the real moral incentive must
Ipe Compassion.

(3) Compassion is the only thoroughly eiFective
spring of moral conduct.

(4) Limitless Compassion for all living things i&
the surest and most certain token of a really good
man.

(6) The evidence of separate matters of detail.

(6) Compassion is more easily discerned in its higher
power ; it is more obviously the root of loving-kindness,
than of justice.

(7) Compassion does not stop short with men ;
it includes all living beings.

(8) Considered simply from the empirical point of
view. Compassion is the best possible antidote to
Egoism, no less than the most soothing balsam for
the world's inevitable suffering.

(9) Rousseau's testimony is quoted, as well as
passages from the Panca-tantra, Pausanias, Lucian»
Stobaeus, and Lessing ; and reference is made to
Chinese Ethics and Hindu customs.

Part III. closes (Chapter IX.) with an inquiry into
the Ethical Difference of Character. The theory that
this difference is innate and immutable is supported
by numerous extracts from various writers of all
periods, and illustrated in many ways. But all the
evidence accumulated hardly amounts to more than
so many hints and indications, and the matter (says
Schopenhauer) was only satisfactorily explained by
Kant's doctrine of the Intelligible and Empirical

TRANSLATOR S INTRODUCTION. XIX

Character. (Cf. Part II., Chapter VIII.) According
to this, the ethical difference between man and man
is an original and ultimate datum, caused by the
transcendental ly free act of the Intelligible Character,,
that is, the Will, as Thing in itself, outside phaeno-
mena ; the Empirical Character being, so to say,
the reflection of the Intelligible, mirrored through
the functions of our perceptive faculty, namely, Time,.
Space, and Causality. Hence the former, while
manifested in plurality and difference of acts, yet
necessarily always wears the same unchangeable
features, inasmuch as it is but the appearance-form
of the unity behind. If the reader asks why " the
essential constitution of the Thing in itself under-
lying the phaenomenon " is so enormously different
in different individuals, it can only be said that our
intellect, conditioned, as it is, by the laws of Causality,
Space, and Time, has no power to deal with noumena^
its range being limited to phaenomena ; and that
therefore this question is one of those which have
no conceivable answer. (Cf. Die Welt als Wille und
VorstelluJig , vol. ii., chap. 50., Epiphilosophie.) ^

' V. Also the Neve Paralipomena, chap. vii. ; Zur Ethik,.
§ 248, where Schopenhauer calls this "the hardest of all
problems.'' On the one hand, we have the metaphysical unity
of the Will, as Thing in itself, which, as the Intelligible
Character, is present, whole and undivided, in all phaenomena,
in every individual ; on the other hand, we find, as a fact
of experience, the widest possible difference in the Empirical
Character, no less of animals than of men. That is to say,
*^ difference'^ must be predicated of the Thing in itself! It
is obvious that we here touch a contradiction, which, for
the rest, lies at the root of the Schopenhauerian doctrine of
the Will.

XX TRANSLATORS INTRODUCTION.

The discussion now terminated points to the
conclusion that nine-tenths, or perhaps nineteen-
twentieths, of what we do is, more or less, due
to Egoism, conscious or unconscious ; while acts of
real morality, that is, of unselfish justice and pure
loving-kindness (admitting that they occur) are to
be attributed to Compassion, that is, the sense of
suflfering with another. Nor is the principle of
Altruism new. It is as old as man himself All
the rare and sensitive natures in the world have
given utterance to it, each in his own way. Like a
golden thread it runs from the earliest Indian literature
to George Eliot, to Tolstoi ; and every day, for un-
numbered ages, " from youth to eld, from sire to
son," in lowly dwellings and in princes' palaces, it
has been unawares translated into action.

And if we may forecast the future from the past,
it would appear that in all the stormy seas yet to
be traversed by the human race, before its little day
is spent. Compassion will ever be the surest guide
to better things ; and that the light of knowledge
illuminating the path, whereby the world may become
relatively happier, will always vary directly as man's
susceptibility to its promptings : for " Durch Mitleid
wissend " is not truer of Parsifal than of all other
saviours.

In the fourth Part of the treatise Schopenhauer
attempts the metaphysical explanation of Compassion,
which for those, who still think that Metaphysics is
something more than a pseudo-science of the past
— like Alchemy or Astrology — will have special
interest.

TRANSLATOR S INTRODUCTTION. XXk

It shonld be observed (as is pointed out in our author's
Preface to the first edition) that the line of thought
followed does not belong to any particular meta-
physical school, but to many ; being in fact a principle
at the root of the oldest systems in the world, and
traceable in one form or another down to Kant. As
in the dawn of history it was our own Aryan fore-
fathers, who divined with subtle intuition the ideality
of Time and Space ; so in the fulness of the ages
it was reserved for another Aryan of Scotch descent
to formulate the same in exact language. Now, by
the vast majority of men the ideality of the principium
individuationis is undoubtedly either not consciously
realised at all, or else but dimly perceived under
the form of allegories and mythologies. Yet, if this
theory be true, if individuation be only a phaenomenon
depending on the subjectivity of Time and Space,
then Compassion, and its external expression, the
ar/dinfj that is greater than Faith and Hope, receive
their final explanation. And every evdavaaia ; every
word that vibrates in harmony with the inspired
rhapsody of 1 Corinthians xiii. ; every act of genuine
justice, or of true loving-kindness, done by man to
man, as well as the uplifting emotion which stirs
our hearts at the sight of such conduct : — all these
things become fraught with a new and luminous
significance : the secret writing is interpreted, its
deepest meaning disclosed.

Moreover, the " thou shalt," and the " thou shalt
not," no less of the various theologies than of the
Categorical Imperative, may from this point of view
be accounted for, on the ground of the identity of

xxii translator's introduction.

man, so far as he is noumenal, with the transcendental
Reality behind phaenomena. The crude threats of
punishment and promises of reward, the stern Moral
Law, poised in mid air, — these hypotheses, and all
their varieties (whose function is in reality nothing
else but to check Egoism), are seen to be due to the
intellect's imperfect comprehension of, or rather,
its vague groping after, the transcendental unity of
life, however individualised and differentiated as a
phaenomenon in Time and Space.^ It thus becomes
apparent that the position developed by Schopenhauer
in the third and fourth parts of the Essay is not so
much destructive, as explanatory, of the usual theories,
which, if once the former be fully grasped, lose
themselves in it as stars and moon in the light of
day. They are at once interpreted, and shown to
be no longer of importance. Similarly, all the
religions of the world, " which are the Metaphysics
of the people," find their raison (Tetre in the same
doctrine. The theory of an external Srj/xiovpyo'; takes
its place as the natural mode of denoting, in children's
language, the internal metaphysical Entity, whose
appearance-form, in terms of our consciousness, is
called the Universe. The circle is completed ; the
discords vanish, and an ultimate harmony is reached.
And so over the thrice-tangled skein of phaenominal

' The reader will remember the fine poetic presentment of
this view of things, which Goethe with intuitive perception
gives in the Faust, Part I., where the Erdgeist says :

"So schaff' ich am sazcseTiden Webstlthl dee Zeit,
Und wirke dee Gottheit lebendiges Kleid."

translator's introduction. xxiii

-existence a simplifying and integrating light is shed,
showing that the irav is but the reflection of the
4v, under the forms of our faculty of perception,
namely, Time, Space, and Causality — forms, which
necessarily imply plurality and change, on which,
again, in the last resort the Welt-Schmerz depends.

" The One remains, the many change and pass ;

Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity,
Until Death tramples it to fragments."

" What an unspeakable gain," says Richard
Wagner,^ " we should bring to those who are terrified
by the threats of the Church, and, on the other hand,
to those who are reduced to despair by our physicists,

V. Gesammelte Schriften und Dichtungen von Richard
Wagner. Zweite Auflage, vol. x. " Was niitzt diese
Erkenntnis 1 " p. 361 : — Welchen unsdglichen Gewinn wiirden
ivir aber den einerseits von den Drohungen der Kirche
Erschreckten, ander^erseits den durch unsere Physiker zur
Verzweiflung Gebrachten zufiihren^ wenn wir dem erhahenen
Gebdvde von " Liebe, Glaube und Hoffnung " eine deutliche
Erkenntniss der, durch die unserer Wahrnehmung einzig zu
Orunde liegenden Gesetze des Rauvies und der Zeit bedingten,
Idealitdt der Welt einfiigen konnten, durch welche dann alle
die Fragen des bedngstigten GemHthes nach einem " Wo " und
" Wann " der " anderen Welt " als nur durch ein seliges
Lacheln beantwortbar erkannt werden miissten? Denn, giebt
€S auf diese, so grenzenlos wichtig diinkenden Fragen eine
Antwort, so hat sie unser Philosoph, mit xmubertrefflicher
Prdzision und Schonheit, mit diesem, geivissermaassen nur
der Definition der Idealitdt von Zeit und Raum beigegebenen
Aussjtrucke ertheilt : " Frieda, Ruhe, und Glilckseligkeit wohnt
allein da, wo es kein wo und kein wann giebt."

xxiv translator's introduction.

if we could quicken the noble edifice of ' Love, Faith^
and Hope,' with a cle.ar consciousness of the ideality
of the world, conditioned by the laws of Space and
Time, which form the sole basis of our perceptive
capacity ! In that case all anxious inquiries as to a
' Where ' and ' When ' of the ' other world ' would
be understood to be only answerable by a blissful
smile. For, if there is a solution to these questions,
which seem of such boundless importance, our philo-
sopher has given it with incomparable precision and
beauty in the following sentence, which, to a certain
extent, is only a corollary to the definition of the
ideality of Time and Space : ' Peace, Eest, and
Bliss dwell only there where there is no where, and
no when.'" (F. Schopenhauer : Parerga and Parali-
pomena, vol. ii., chap. 3, § 30 bis.)

THE QUESTION

Tre question advanced by the Royal Society, together
with the considerations leading np to it, is as follows: —

Quum primitiva moralitatis idea, sive de summa
lege morali principalis notio, sua quadam 'propria
eaque minim e logica necessitate, twm in ea disciplina
appareat, cui proposituTii est cognitionem rod tjOlkov
explicare, tum in vita, partim in conscientiae judicio
de nostris actionibus, partim in censura m,orali de
actionibus aliorum hominum ; quumque complures,
quae ab ilia ider inseparabiles sunt, eamque tanquam
origine'tn respiciunt, notiones principales ad to r^OiKov
spectantes, velut offi,cii notio et imputationis, eadem
necessitate eodemque ambitu vim suam exserant, —
et tamen inter eos cursus viasque, quas nostrae aetatis
m^editatio philosophica persequitur, magni momenti
esse videatur, hoc argumentum, ad disputationem,
revocare, — cupit Societas, ut accurate haec quaestio
perpendatur et pertractetur :

Philosophiae moral is fans etfundamentum uti^m in
idea moralitatis, quae immediate conscientia con-
tineatur, et ceteris notionibus fundamentalibus, quae
ex ilia prodeant, explicandis quaerenda sunt, an in
alio cognoscendi principio ?

(The original idea of morality, or the leading conception of
the supreme moral law, occurs by a necessity which seems

1

2 - THE QUESTION.

peculiar to the subject, but which is by no means a logical
one, both in that science, whose object it is to set forth the
knowledge of what is moral, and also in real life, where it
shows itself partly in the judgment passed by conscience on
our own actions, partly in our moral estimation of the actions
of others ; moreover, most of the chief conceptions in Ethics,
springing as they do out of that idea, and inseparable
from it (as, for instance, the conception of duty, and the
ascription of praise or blame) assert themselves with the
same necessity, and under the same conditions. In view
of these facts and because it appears highly desirable, con-
sidering the trend of philosophic investigation in our time,
to submit this matter to further scrutiny ; the Society desires
that the following question be carefully considered and
discussed : —

Is the fountain and basis of Morals to he sought for in
an idea of morality which lies directly in the consciousness (or
conscience), and in the analysis of the other leading ethical
conceptions which arise from it ? or is it to be found 'in some
other source of knowledge?)

Ipart L
INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE PROBLEM.

" Why do philosophers diflfer so widely as to the
first principles of Morals, but agree respecting the
conclusions and duties which they deduce from those
principles ? "

This is the question which was set as subject for
a prize essay by the Royal Society of Holland at
Harlem, 1810, and solved by J. C. F. Meister ; and
in comparison with the task before us, the inquiry
presented no extraordinary difficnlty. For : —

(1) The present question of the Royal Society has
to do with nothing less important than the objectively
true basis of morals, and consequently of morality.
It is an Academy, be it observed, which invites this
inquiry ; and hence, from its position, it has no
practical purpose in view ; it asks for no discourse
inculcating the exercise of uprightness and virtue,
with arguments based on evidence, of which the
plausibility is dwelt on, and the sophistry evaded, as
is done in popular manuals. Rather, as its aim is
not practical, but only theoretical, it desires nothing
but the purely philosophical, that is, the objective,
undisguised, and naked exposition of the ultimate
basis of all good moral conduct, independent of

5

6 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

every positive law, of every unproved assumption,
and hence free from all groundwork, whether meta-
physical or mythical. This, however, is a problem
whose bristling difficulties are attested by the circum-
stance that all philosophers in every age and land
have blunted their wits on it, and still more by the
fact that all gods, oriental and occidental, actually
derive their existence therefrom. Should therefore
this opportunity serve to solve it, assuredly the Royal
Society will not have expended its money amiss.

(2) Apart from this, a peculiar disadvantage will
be found to attach to any theoretical examination of
the basis of morals, because such an investigation
is suspiciously like an attempt to undermine, and
occasion the collapse of, the structure itself. The fact
is, that in this matter we are apt to so closely
associate practical aims with theory, that the well-
meant zeal of the former is with difficulty restrained
from ill-timed intervention. Nor is it within the
power of every one to clearly dissociate the purely
theoretical search for objective truth, purged of all
interest, even of that of morality as practised, from
a shameless attack on the heart's sacred convictions.
Therefore he, who here puts his hand to the plough,
must, for his encouragement, ever bear in mind that
from the doings and affairs of the populace, from the
turmoil and bustle of the market-place, nothing is
further removed than the quiet retreat and sanctuary
of the Academy, where no noise of tlie world may
enter, and where the only god raised on a pedestal
is Truth, in solitary, naked sublimity.

The conclusion from these two premises is that

THE PKOBLEM. 7

I mnst be allowed complete freedom of speech, as
well as the right of questioning everything ; and
furthermore, that if I succeed in really contributing
something, however small, to this subject, then that
contribution will be of no little importance.

But there are still other difficulties obstructing
my path. The Royal Society asks for a short mono-
graph setting forth the basis of Ethics entirely by
itself; which means to say, independent of its con-
nection with the general system, i.e., the actual
metaphysics of any philosophy. Such a demand
must not only render the accomplishment of the
task more difficult, but necessarily make it imper-
fect. Long ago Christian Wolff, in his Philosophia
Practica (P. II., § 28) observed : " Tenebrae in
philosophia practica nan dispelluntur, nisi luce meta-
physica effulgente^'' (Darkness in practical philo-
sophy is only dispersed, when the light of meta-
physics shines on it ;) and Kant in the Preface to
his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten remarks :
" Metaphysics must precede, and is in every case
indispensable to, moral philosophy." For, just as
every religion on earth, so far as it prescribes
morality, does not leave the latter to rest on itself,
but backs it by a body of dogmas (the chief end
of which is precisely to be the prop of the moral
sense) ; so with philosophy, the ethical basis, what-
ever it be, must itself attach to, and find its support
in, one system of metaphysics or another, that is
to say, iu a presupposed explanation of the world,
and of existence in general. This is so, because the
ultimate and true conclusion concerning the essential

8 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

nature of tlie Universe must necessarily be closely
connected with that touching the ethical significance
of human action ; and because, in any case, that
which is presented as the foundation of morality, if
it is not to be merely an abstract formula,, floating
in the clouds, and out of contact with the real world,
must be some fact or other discoverable either in the
objective kosmos, or else in man's consciousness ;
but, as such, it can itself be only a phaenomenon ;
and consequently, like all other phaenomena, it
requires a further explanation ; and this explanation
is supplied by Metaphysics. Philosophy indeed is
such a connected whole that it is impossible to
exhaustively discuss any one part without all the
others being involved. Thus Plato says quite
correctly : Wv)(rj'i ovv (f>vai,v afiw? Xoyov Karavoijaac
oiei BvvaTov elvai, dveu t% tov 6\ov (f)va€Q)<i ; (Phaedr.,
p. 371, Ed. Bip.) (Do you think then it is possible
to understand at all adequately the nature of the
soul, without at the same time understanding the
nature of the Whole, i.e., the totality of things?)
The metaphysics of nature, the metaphysics of morals,
and the metaphysics of the beautiful mutually pre-
suppose each other, and only when taken as connected
together do they complete the explanation of things
as they really are, and of existence in general. So
that whoever should exactly trace one of these three
to its ultimate origin, would be found to have neces-
sarily brought the others into his solution of the
problem ; just as an absolutely clear and exhaustive
understanding of any single thing in the world would
imply a perfect comprehension of everything else.

THE PROBLEM. 9

Now if we were to start from a given system of
metaphysics, which is assumed to be trne, we should
reach synthetically a basis of morals, and this basis,
being, so to say, built up from below, would provide
the resulting ethical structure with a sure foundation.
But in the present case, since the terms of the question
enforce the separation of ethics from all metaphysics,
there remains nothing but the analytic method, which
proceeds from facts either of external experience, or
of consciousness. It is true that thus the ultimate
origin of the latter may be traced back to the human
spirit, a source which then, however, must be taken
as a fundamental fact, a primary phaenomenon, un-
derivable from anything else, with the result that the
whole explanation remains simply a psychological one.
At best its connection with any general metaphysical
standpoint can only be described as accessory. On
the other hand, the fundamental datum, the primary
phaenomenon of Ethics, so found in man's nature, could
itself in its turn be accounted for and explained, if
we might first treat of metaphysics, and then by the
synthetic method deduce Ethics from it. This would
mean, however, nothing less than the construction of
a complete system of philosophy, whereby the limits
of the given question would be far exceeded. I am,
therefore, compelled to answer it within the lines
which its own isolated narrowness has laid down.

And lastly, there is the following consideration. The
basis on which it is here intended to place Ethics will
prove to be a very small one ; and the consequence is
that of the many lawful, approvable, and praiseworthy
actions of mankind, only the minority will be found to

10 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

spring from purely moral motives, while the majority
will have to be attributed to other sources. This
gives less satisfaction, has not such a specious glitter
as, let ns say, a Categorical Imperative, which always
stands ready for commands, only that itself in its tarn
may command what ought to be done, and what ought
to be left undone ; ^ not to mention other foundations
that are entirely material.

I can only, therefore, remind the reader of the
saying in Ecclesiastes (iv. 6) : " Better is an handful
with quietness, than both the hands full with travail
and vexation of spirit." In all knowledge the
genuine, proof-resisting, indestructible coefficient is
never large ; just as in the earth's metallic strata a
hundredweight of stone hides but a few ounces of
gold. But whether others will prefer — as I do — the
assured to the bulky possession, the small quantity
of gold which remains in the crucible to the big
lump of matter that was brought along with it; or
whether I shall rather be charged with having re-
moved from Ethics its basis, instead of providing one,
in so far as I prove that the lawful and commendable
actions of mankind often do not contain a particle
of pure moral worth, and in most cases only a very
little, resting, as they do, otherwise on motives, the
sufficiency of which must ultimately be referred to
the egoism of the doer ; all this I must leave un-
decided; and I do so, not without anxiety, nay, rather

^ That is, the Categorical Imperative appears at first as
your " obedient humble servant," ready to perform any useful
service, e.g., the solving of ethical riddles ; while it ends by
gaining the upper hand, and commanding. — {Translator.)

THE PROBLEM. 11

with resignation, becanse I have long since been of
the same mind as Johann Georg von Zimmermann,
when he said : " Rest assured until your dying day,
that nothing in the world is so rare as a good judge."
{Ueber die Einsamkeit ; Pt. I,, Ch. iii., p. 93.)

For all true and voluntary righteousness, for all
lovingkindness, for all nobleness, wherever these
qualities may be found, my theory can only point
to a very small foundation ; whereas my opponents
confidently construct broad bases for Morals, which
are made strong enough for every possible burden,
and are at the same time thrust upon every doubter's
conscience, accompanied with a threatening side-glance
at his own morality. As contrasted with these,
my own position is indeed in sore and sorry plight.
It is like that of Cordelia before King Lear, with
her weakly worded assurance of dutiful affection,
compared with the effusive protestations of her more
eloquent sisters. So that there seems to be need of
a cordial that may be furnished by some maxim
taken from intellectual hunting grounds, such as,
Magna est vis veritatis, et praevalebit. (Great is the
strength of truth, and it will prevail.) But to a man
who has lived and laboured even this fails to give
much encouragement. Meanwhile, I will for once
make the venture with truth on my side ; and what
opposes me will at the same time oppose truth.

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL RETROSPECT.

For the people morality comes through, and is
fonnded on, theology, as the express will of God.
On the other hand, we see philosophers, with few
exceptions, taking special pains to entirely exclude
this kind of foundation ; indeed, so they may but
avoid it, they prefer even to find a refuge in sophistry.
Whence comes this antithesis ? Assuredly no more
efficient basis for Ethics can be imagined than the
theological ; for who would be so bold as to oppose
the will of the Almighty and the Omniscient ?
Unquestionably, no one ; if only this will were pro-
claimed in an authentic, official manner (if one may
say so), whereby no possible room for doubt could
be left. This, however, is precisely the condition
which does not admit of being realised. It is rather
the inverse process which is attempted. The law
declared to be the will of God men try to accredit
as such, by demonstrating its agreement with our
own independent, and hence, natural moral views,
and an appeal is consequently made to these as being
more direct and certain. But this is not all. We
perceive that an action performed solely through
threat of punishment and promise of reward would

12

GENERAL RETROSPECT. 13

be moral mach more in appearance than in reality ;
since, after all, it would have its root in Egoism,
and in the last resort the scale would be turned
by the greater or less amount of credulity evinced
in each case. Now it was none other than Kant who
destroyed the foundations of Speculative Theology,
which up to his time were accounted unshakable.
Speculative Theology had hitherto sustained Ethics,
and in order to procure for the former an existence
of some sort, if only an imaginary one, his wish
was to proceed inversely, and make Ethics sustain
Speculative Theology. So that it is now more than
ever impossible to think of basing Ethics on Theology ;
for no one knows any longer which of the two is to
be the supporter, and which the supported, and the
consequence is a cir cuius vitiosus.

It is precisely through the influence of Kant's
philosophy ; through the contemporaneous effect of
the unparalleled progress made in all the natural
sciences, with regard to which every past age in
comparison with our own appears childish ; and lastly,
through the knowledge of Sanskrit literature, and
of those most ancient and widest spread faiths,
Brahmanism and Buddhism, which, as far as time
and space go, are the most important religious
systems of mankind, and, as a matter of fact, are
the original native religious of our own race, now
well known to be of Asiatic descent — our race, to
which in its new strange home they once more send
a message across the centuries ; — it is because of
all this, I say, that the fundamental philosophical
convictions of learned Europe have in the course

14 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

of the last fifty years undergone a revolution, which
perhaps many only reluctantly admit, but which
cannot be denied. The result of this change is that
the old supports of Ethics have been shown to be
rotten, while the assurance remains that Ethics
itself can never collapse ; whence the conviction
arises that for it there must exist a groundwork
difierent from any hitherto provided, and adaptable
to the advanced views of the age. The need of such
is making itself felt more and more, and in it we
undoubtedly find the reason that has induced the
Royal Society to make the present important question
the subject of a prize essay.

In every age much good morality has been preached ;
but the explanation of its raison d'etre has always
been encompassed with difficulties. On the whole
we discern an endeavour to get at some objective
truth, from which the ethical injunctions could be
logically deduced ; and it has been sought for both
in the nature of things, and in the nature of man ;
but in vain. The result was always the same. The
will of each human unit was found to gravitate
solely towards its own individual welfare, the idea
of which in its entirety is designated by the term
" blissfulness " {GluckseligkeiC) ; and this striving
after self-satisfaction leads mankind by a path very
difi'erent to the one morality would fain point out.
The endeavour was next made now to identify " bliss-
fulness " with virtue, now to represent it as virtue's
consequence and efi'ect. Both attempts have always
failed ; and this for no want of sophistry. Then
recourse was had to artificial formulas, purely ob-

GENERAL RETROSPECT. 15

jective and abstract, as well a posteriori as a
priori, from which correct ethical conduct undoubtedly
admitted of being deduced. But there was nothing
found in man's nature to afford these a footing, where-
by they might have availed to guide the strivings
of his volition, in face of its egoistic tendency. It
appears to me superfluous to verify all this by
describing and criticising every hitherto existing
foundation of morality ; not only because I share
Augustine's opinion, non est pro magno habendum
quid homines senserint, sed quae sit rei Veritas (It
is the truth about a thing, not men's opinions
thereon, that is of importance) ; but also because
it would be like <y\avKa^ et9 'A6r)va<; KOfii^eiv (i.e.,
carrying coals to Newcastle) ; for previous attempts
to give a foundation to Ethics are sufficiently well-
known to the Royal Society, and the very question
proposed shows that it is also convinced of their
inadequateness. Any reader less well-informed will
find a careful, if not complete, presentment of the
attempts hitherto made, in Garve's Uebersicht der
vornehmsten Principien der Sittenlehre, and again,
in Staudlin's Geschichte der Moralphilosophie. It is
of course very disheartening to reflect that Ethics,
which so directly concerns life, has met with the
same unhappy fate as the abstruse science of Meta-
physics, and that its first principle, though perpetually
sought for ever since the time of Socrates, has still
to be found. Moreover, we must remember that in
Ethics, much more than in any other science, what
is essential is contained in its fundamental propo-
sitions ; the deductions are so simple that they come

16 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

of themselves. For all are capable of drawing a
conclusion, but few of judging. And this is exactly
the reason why lengthy text-books and dissertations
on Morals are as superfluous as they are tedious.
Meantime, if I may postulate an acquaintance with
all the former foundations of Ethics, my task will
be lightened. Whoever observes how ancient as
well as modern philosophers (the Church creed
sufficed for the middle ages) have had recourse to
the most diverse and extraordinary arguments, in
order to provide for the generally recognised require-
ments of morality a basis capable of proof, and how
notwithstanding they admittedly failed ; he will be
able to measure the difficulty of the problem, and
estimate my contribution accordingly. And he w^c
has learned to know that none of the roads hitherto
struck on lead to the goal, will be the more willing
to tread with me a very different path from these —
a path which up to now either has not been noticed,
or else has been passed over with contempt ; perhaps
because it was the most natural one. ^ As a matter
of fact my solution of the question will remind many
of Columbus' egg.

* lo dir non vi saprei per qual sventura,
piuttosto per qual fatalita,
Da noi credito ottien piu V impostura,
Che la semplice e nuda verita.

Casti.

[I cannot tell what mischief sly,

Or rather what fatality,
Leads man to credit more the lie

Than truth in naked purity.]

{Translator.)

GENERAL RETROSPECT. 17

It is solely to the latest attempt at giving a basis to
Ethics — I mean the Kantian — that a critical examina-
tion will be devoted. I shall make it all the more
exhaustive, partly because the great ethical reform
of Kant gave to this science a foundation having
a real superiority to previous ones ; and partly be-
cause it still remains the last important pronounce-
ment in this domain ; for which reason it has obtained
general acceptance up to the present day, and is
universally taught, although differently garnished by
certain changes in the demonstration and in the ter-
minology. It is the ethical system of the last sixty
years, which must be removed ere we enter on another
path. Furthermore, my criticism of the Kantian basis
will give me occasion to examine and discnss most
of the fundamental conceptions of Ethics, and the
outcome of this investigation I shall later on be
able to postulate. Besides, inasmuch as opposites
illustrate each other, it is exactly this course which
will be the best preparation and guide, indeed the
direct way, to my own position, which in its essential
points is diametrically opposed to Kant's. It would
therefore be a very perverse beginning to skip the
following criticism, and turn at once to the positive
part of my exposition, which then would remain only
half intelligible.

In any case the time has assuredly arrived for
once to cite Ethics before the bar of a searching
scrutiny. During more than half a century it has
been lying comfortably on the restful cushion which
Kant arranged for it — the cnshion of the Categorical
Imperative of Practical Reason. In our day this

2

18 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

Imperative is mostly introduced to us under a name
which, being smoother and less ostentations, has
obtained more currency. It is called " the Moral
Law " ; and thus entitled, with a passing bow to
reason and experience, it slips through unobserved
into the house. Once inside, there is no end to
its orders and commands ; nor can it ever afterwards
be brought to account. It was proper, indeed in-
evitable, that Kant, as the inventor of the thing,
should remain satisfied with his creation, particularly
as he shelved by its means errors still more glaring.
But to be obliged to look on and see asses disporting
themselves on the comfortable cushion which he
prepared, and which since his time has been more
and more trampled on and flattened out — this truly
is hard. I allude to the daily hackney compilers,
who, with the ready confidence born of stupidity,
imagine that they have given a foundation to Ethics,
if they do but appeal to that " Moral Law " which
is alleged to be inherent in our reason ; and then
they complacently weave upon this such a confused
and wide-reaching tissue of phrases that they succeed
in rendering unintelligible the clearest and simplest
relations of life : and all this, without ever once
seriously asking themselves whether in point of
fact there really does exist such a " Moral Law," as
a convenient code of morality, graven in our heads
or hearts.

Hence I admit the especial pleasure I feel in
proceeding to remove from Ethics its broad cushion
of repose, and I unreservedly declare my intention
of proving that Kant's Practical Reason and Gate-

GENERAL RETROSPECT. 19

gorical Imperative are completely unwarrantable,
baseless, and fabricated assumptions ; and I shall
further show that Kant's whole system, like those
of his predecessors, is in want of a solid foundation.
Consequently Ethics will again be consigned to its
former entirely helpless condition, there to remain,
until I come to demonstrate the true moral principle
of human nature — a principle which is incontestably
efficient, and has its root in our very being. The
latter, however, has no such broad basis to offer as
the above-mentioned cushion ; so that, doubtless, those
who are accustomed to take things easily, will not
abandon their comfortable old seat, before they are
thoroughly aware how deeply the ground on which
it stands is undermined

|>art II»

CRITIQUE OE KANT'S BASIS OE
ETHICS.

21

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

It is Kant's great service to moral science that he
purified it of all Eudaemonism. With the ancients,
Ethics was a doctrine of Eudaemonism ; with the
moderns for the most part it has been a doctrine of
salvation. The former wished to prove that virtue
and happiness are identical ; but this was like having
two figures which never coincide with each other, no
matter how they may be placed. The latter have
endeavoured to connect the two, not by the principle
of identity, but by that of causation, thus making
happiness the result of virtue ; but to do this, they
were obliged to have recourse to sophisms, or else to
assume the existence of a world beyond any possible
perception of the senses.

Among the ancients Plato alone forms an ex-
ception : his system is not eudaemonistic ; it is
mystic, instead. Even the Ethics of the Cynics and
Stoics is nothing but a special form of Eudaemonism,
to prove which, there is no lack of evidence and
testimony, but the nature of my present task forbids
the space.^

^ For a complete demonstration v. Die Welt ah Wille und
Vorstellung, Vol. I., § 16, p. 103, sqq., and Vol. II., Chap. 16,
p. 166, sqq. of the third edition. [Die Welt als Wille und

23

24 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

The ancients, then, equally with the moderns, Plato
being the single exception, agree in making virtue
only a means to an end. Indeed, strictly speaking,
even Kant banished Eudaemonism from Ethics more
in appearance than in reality, for between virtue and
happiness he still leaves a certain mysterious con-
nection ; — there is an obscure and difficult passage in
his doctrine of the Highest Good, where they occur
together ; while it is a patent fact that the course of
virtue runs entirely counter to that of happiness.
But, passing over this, we may say that with Kant
the ethical principle appears as something quite in-
dependent of experience and its teaching ; it is trans-
cendental, or metaphysical. He recognises that human
conduct possesses a significance that oversteps all
possibility of experience, and is therefore actually the
bridge leading to that which he calls the "intel-
ligible " ^ world, the mundus noumenon^ the world of
Things in themselves.

The fame, which the Kantian Ethics has won, is
due not only to this higher level, which it reached,

Vorstellung, that is, The World as Will and Idea ; " Idea "
being used much as eibaXov sometimes is (cf. Xen. Sym.,
4, 21), in the sense of " an image in the mind," " a mental
picture." — {Translator.)]

' It seems better to keep this technical word than to
attempt a cumbrous periphrasis. The meaning is perfectly
clear. The sensibilia {phaenomena) are opposed to the in-
telligihilia (nou7nena), which compose the transcendental
world. So the individual, in so far as he is a phaenomenon,
has an empirical character ; in so far as he is a noumenon,
his character is intelligible {intelligibilis). The mundus in-
telligibilis, or mundus noumendn is the Kocrfxos vorjros of
New Platonism. — (IVanslator.)

PRELIMINAKY REMARKS. 25

but also to the moral purity and loftiness of its
conclusions. It is by the latter that most people
have been attracted, without paying much attention
to the foundation, which is propounded in a very
complex, abstract and artificial form ; and Kant him-
self required all his powers of acumen and synthesis
to give it an appearance of solidity. Fortunately, he
separated his Ethics from the exposition of its basis,
devoting to the latter a special work entitled the
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, the theme of
which will be found to be precisely the same as that
of our prize essay. For on page xiii of the preface
he says : " The present treatise is nothing else but
an attempt to find out and establish the supreme
principle of morality. This is an investigation, whose
scope is complete in itself, and which should be
kept apart from all other moral researches." It
is in this book that we find the basis, that is to say,
the essentials of his Ethics set forth with an acute
penetration and systematic conciseness, as in no other
of his writings. It has, moreover, the great advantage
of being the first of Kant's moral works, appearing,^
as it did, only four years later than the Kritik der
Reinen Vernunftj and consequently it dates from the
period when, although he was sixty-one, the detri-
mental eff'ect of old age on his intellect was not yet
perceptible. On the other hand, this is distinctly trace-
able in the Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft^ which
was published in 1788, or one year later than the
unhappy XQvtiO^QWmg oithQ Kritik der Reinen Vernunft

^ It was published in 1785 : The Kritik der Meinen Vernunft,
first edition, in 1781. — {Translator.)

26 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

in the second edition, whereby the latter, his immortal
master-piece, was obviously marred. An analysis of
this question is to be found in the preface to the
new edition by Rosenkranz,^ from which my own
investigation makes it impossible for me to dissent.
The Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft contains in its
essentials the same material as the above-mentioned
Grundlegung ; only the latter has a more concise and
rigorous form, while in the former the subject is handled
with greater prolixity, interspersed with digressions,
and even padded with some pieces of moral rhetoric,
to heighten the impression. When Kant wrote it, he
had at last, and late in life, become deservedly famous ;
hence, being certain of boundless attention, he allowed
greater play to the garrulity of old age.

But the Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft contains
two sections which are peculiar to itself. First : the ex-
position of the relation between Freedom and Necessity
(pp. 169-179 of the fourth edition, and pp. 223-231
in Rosenkranz). This passage is above all praise, and
undoubtedly was framed earlier in his life, as it is
entirely in harmony with his treatment of the same
subject in the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (pp. 560-
586 ; Rosenkranz, p. 438, sqq.). And secondly : the
Moraltheologie, which will more and more come to be
recognised as the real object Kant had in view. In
his Metapkysische AnfangsgrUnde der Tugendlehre
this pendant to the deplorable Rechtslehre, written in
1797, the debility of old age is at length fully pre-
ponderant. For all these reasons the present criticism

' His analysis is really derived from myself, but in this
place I am speaking incognito.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS. 27

will mainly deal with the treatise first mentioned, viz.^
the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, and the
reader will please understand that all the page
numbers given by themselves refer to it. Both the
other works will only be considered as accessory and
secondary. For a proper comprehension of the present
criticism, which, in probing the Kantian Ethics to
its depths, bears directly and principally on this
Grundlegung, it is very desirable that the latter be
carefully read through again, so that the mind may
have a perfectly clear and fresh presentment of what
it contains. It is but a matter of 128 and xiv pages
(in Rosenkranz only 100 pages altogether). I shall
quote from the third edition of 1792, adding the
page number of the new complete publication by
Rosenkranz, with an R. prefixed.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

Kant's irpcoTov ^jrevSo'i (first false step) lies in his
conception of Ethics itself, and this is found very
clearly expressed on page 62 (R., p. 54) : " In a
system of practical philosophy we are not concerned
with adducing reasons for that which takes place,
but with formulating laws regarding that which
ought to take place, even if it never does take
place." This is at once a distinct petitio principii.
Who tells you that there are laws to which our
conduct ought to be subject ? Who tells you that
that ought to take place, which in fact never does
take place ? What justification have you for making
this assumption at the outset, and consequently
for forcing upon us, as the only possible one, a
system of Ethics couched in the imperative terms of
legislation ? I say, in contradistinction to Kant, that
the student of Ethics, and no less the philosopher
in general, must content himself with explaining and
interpreting that I'S^hich is given, in other words,
that which really is, or takes place, so as to obtain
an understanding of it, and I maintain • furthermore
that there is plenty to do in this direction, much
more than has hitherto been done, after the lapse

28

THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 29

of thousands of years. Following the above petitio
principii, Kant straightway, without any previous
investigation, assumes in the preface (which is en-
tirely devoted to the subject), that purely moral
laws exist ; and this assumption remains thenceforth
undisturbed, and forms the very foundation of his
whole system. We, however, prefer first of all to
examine the conception denoted by the word " law."
The true and original meaning of the term is limited
to law as between citizens ; it is the lex, v6/iio<i, of
the Romans and Greeks, a human institution, and
depending on human volition. It has a secondary,
derived, figurative, metaphorical meaning, when
applied to Nature, whose operations, partly known
a pi'iori. partly learnt by experience, and which
are always constant, we call natural laws. Only
a very small portion of these natural laws can
be discerned a priori, and with admirable acute-
ness, Kant set them apart, and classed them
under the name " Metaphysics of Nature." There
is also undoubtedly a law for the human will, in
so far as man belongs to Nature ; and this law
is strictly provable, admits of no exception, is
inviolable, and immovable as the mountains, and
does not, like the Categorical Imperative, imply
a quasi-necessity, but rather a complete and abso-
lute one. It is the law of motivation, a form of
the law of causation ; in other words, it is the
causation which is brouglit about by the medium
of the understanding. It is the sole demonstrable
law to which the human will as such is subject.
It means that every action can only take place in

30 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

consequence of a sufficient motive. Like causality
in general, it is a natural law. On the other
hand, moral laws, apart from human institution,
state ordinance, or religious doctrine, cannot rightly
be assumed as existing without proof. Kant, there-
fore, by taking such laws for granted, is guilty
of a petitio principii, which is all the bolder, in
that he at once adds (page vi of the preface) that
a moral law ought to imply "absolute necessity."
But " absolute necessity " is everywhere characterised
by an inevitable chain of consequence ; how, then,
can such a conception be attached to these alleged
moral laws (as an instance of which he adduces
" thou shalt not lie " ^) ? Every one knows, and
he himself admits, that no such consecution for
the most part takes place ; the reverse, indeed, is
the rule.

In scientific Ethics before we admit as controlling
the will other laws besides that of motivation —
laws which are original and independent of all
human ordinance — we must first prove and deduce
their existence ; that is, provided in things ethical
we are concerned not merely with recommending
honesty, but with practising it. Until that proof
be furnished, I shall recognise only one source to
which is traceable the importation into Ethics of
the conception Law, Precept, Obligation. It is one
which is foreign to philosophy. I mean the Mosaic
Decalogue. Indeed the spelling " du sollt " ^ in the

* Du sollt {sic) nicht liigen.

" Sollt is the old form for "sollst" Cf. Eng., shalt: Icel.
gJpcilt.—{!rranslator.)

THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 31

above instance of a moral law, the first put forward
by Kant, naively betrays this origin. A conception,
however, which can point to no other source than
this, has no right, without undergoing further scrutiny,
thus to force its way into philosophical Ethics. It
will be rejected, until introduced by duly accredited
proof. Thus on the threshold of the subject Kant
makes his first petitio principii, and that no small one.
Our philosopher, then, by begging the question
in his preface, simply assumes the conception of
Moral Law as given and existing beyond all doubt ;
and he treats the closely related conception of Duty
(page 8, R, p. 16) exactly in the same way. Without
subjecting it to any further test, he admits it forth-
with as a proper appurtenance of Ethics. But here,
again, I am compelled to enter a protest. This
conception, equally with the kindred notions of Law,
Gommaiid, Obligation, etc., taken thus uncondition-
ally, has its source in theological morals, and
it will remain a stranger to philosophical morals, so
long as it fails to furnish sufficient credentials drawn
either from man's nature, or from the objective world.
Till then, I can only recognise the Decalogue as
the origin of all these connected conceptions. Since
the rise of Christianity there is no doubt that
philosophical has been unconsciously moulded by
theological ethics. And since the latter is essentially
dictatorial, the former appears in the shape of pre-
cepts and inculcation of Duty, in all innocence, and
without any suspicion that first an ulterior sanction
is needful for this role ; rather does she suppose it
to be her proper and natural form. It is true that

32 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

all peojiles, ages, and creeds, and indeed all philo-
sophers (with the exception of the materialists proper)
have undeniably recognised that the ethical significance
of human conduct is a metaphysical one, in other
words, that it stretches out beyond this phaenomenal
existence and reaches to eternity ; but it is equally
true that the presentment of this fact in terms of
Command and Obedience, of Law and Duty, is no
part of its essence. Furthermore, separated from
the theological hypotheses whence they have sprung,
these conceptions lose in reality all meaning, and
to attempt a substitute for the former by talking
with Kant of absolute obligation and of unconditioned
duty, is to feed the reader with empty words, nay
more, is to give him a contradictio in adjecto^ to
digest.

Every obligation derives all sense and meaning
simply and solely from its relation to threatened
punishment or promised reward. Hence, long before
Kant was thought of, Locke says : " For since it
would be utterly in vain, to suppose a rule set to
the free actions of man, without annexing to it some
enforcement of good and evil to determine his will ;
we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also
some reward or punishment annexed to that law
{Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II., ch. 33,
§ 6). What ought to be done is therefore necessarily
conditioned by punishment or reward ; consequently,
to use Kant's language, it is essentially and inevitably

* A contradiction in the adjective. This occurs when the
epithet applied to a noun contradicts its essential meaning.—
{Translator.)

THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 33

hypothetical, and never, as lie maintains, categorical.
If we think away these conditions, the conception
of obligation becomes void of sense ; hence absolute
obligation is most certainly a contradictio in adjecto.
A commanding voice, whether it come from within,
or from without, cannot possibly be imagined except
as threatening or promising. Consequently obedience
to it, which may be wise or foolish according to
circumstances, is yet always actuated by selfishness,
and therefore morally worthless.

The complete unthinkableness and nonsense of
this conception of an unconditioned obligation, which
lies at the root of the Kantian Ethics, appears
later in the system itself, namely in the Kritik der
Praktiscken Vernunft : just as some concealed poison
in an organism cannot remain hid, but sooner or later
must come out and show itself. For this obligation,
said to be so unconditioned, nevertheless postulates
more than one condition in the background ; it assumes
a rewarder, a reward, aud the immortality of the
person to be rewarded.

This is of course unavoidable, if one really makes
Duty and Obligation the fundamental conception of
Ethics ; for these ideas are essentially relative, and
depend for their significance on the threatened penalty
or the promised reward. The guerdon which is
assumed to be in store for virtue shows clearly enough
that only in appearance she works for nothing. It
is, however, put forward modestly veiled, under the
name of the Highest Good, which is the union of
Virtue and Hajipiness. But this is at bottom nothing
else but a morality that derives its origin from

3

34 THE BASIS OF MORALITY,

Happiness, which means, a morality resting on selfish-
ness. In other words, it is Eudaemonism, which
Kant had solemnly thrust out of the front door of
his system as an intruder, only to let it creep in
again by the postern under the name of the Highest
Good. This is how the assumption of unconditioned
absolute obligation, concealing as it does a contra-
diction, avenges itself. Conditioned obligation, on
the other hand, cannot of course be any first principle
for Ethics, since everything done out of regard for
reward or punishment is necessarily an egoistic
transaction, and as such is without any real moral
value. All this makes it clear that a nobler and
wider view of Etliics is needed, if we are in earnest
about our endeavour to truly account for the signi-
ficance of human conduct — a significance which
extends beyond phaenomena and is eternal.

As all obligation is entirely dependent on a con-
dition, so also is all duty. Both conceptions are very
closely related, indeed almost identical. The only
difference between them might be said to be that
obligation in general may rest on mere force, whereas
duty involves the sense of obligation deliberately
undertaken, such as we see between master and
servant, principal and subordinate, rulers and the
ruled. And since no one undertakes a duty gratis,
every duty implies also a right. The slave has no
duties, because he has no rights ; but he is subject
to an obligation which rests on sheer force. In the
following Part I shall explain the only meaning
which the conception " Duty " has in Ethics.

If we put Ethics in an imperative form, making

THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 35

it a Doctrine of Duties, and regard the moral worth
or worthlessness of human conduct as the fulfilment
or violation of duties, we must remember that this
view of Duty, and of Obligation in general, is un-
deniably derived solely from theological Morals, and
primarily from the Decalogue, and consequently that
it rests essentially and inseparably on the assumption
of man's dependence on another will which gives
him commands and announces reward or punishment.
But the more the assumption of such a will is in
Theology positive and precise, the less should it
be quietly and unsuspectingly introduced into philo-
sophical Morals. Hence we have no right to assume
beforehand that for the latter the imperative Form,
the ordaining of commands, laws, and duties is an
essential and a matter of course ; and it is a very
poor shift to substitute the word " absolute " or
" categorical " for the external condition which is
indissolubly attached to such conceptions by their
very nature : for this gives rise, as explained above,
to a contradictio in adjecto.

Kant, then, without more ado or any close ex-
amination, borrowed this imperative Form of Ethics
from theological Morals. The hypotheses of the
latter (in other words. Theology) really lie at the
root of his system, and as these alone in point of
fact lend it any meaning or sense, so they cannot be
separated from, indeed are implicitly contained in,
it. After this, when he had expounded his position
the task of developing in turn a Theology out of
his Morals — the famous Moraltheologie — was easy
enough. For the conceptions which are implicitly

36 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

involved in his Imperative, and which lie hidden at
the base of his Morals, only required to be brought
forward and expressed explicitly as postulates of
Practical Reason. And so it was that, to the world's
great edification, a Theology appeared depending
simply on Ethics, indeed actually derived therefrom.
But this came about because the ethical system itself
rests on concealed theological hypotheses. I mean
no derisive comparison, but in its form the process
is analogous to that whereby a conjurer prepares
a surprise for us, when he lets us find something
where he had previously employed his art to place
it. Described in the abstract, Kant's procedure is
this : what ought to have been his first principle,
or hypothesis {viz., Theology) he made the conclusion,
and what ought to have been deduced as the con-
clusion (viz., the Categorical Command) he took as
his hypothesis.^ But after he had thus turned the
thing upside down, nobody, not even he himself,
recognised it as being what it really was, namely the
old well-known system of theological Morals. How
this trick was accomplished we shall consider in the
sixth and seventh chapters of the present Part.

Ethics was of course frequently put in the im-
perative form, and treated as a doctrine of duties
also in pre-Kantian philosophy ; but it was always
then based upon the will of a God whose existence
had been otherwise proved, and so there was no

' Like the converse of a geometrical proposition, this Kantian
inversion is not necessarily true ; its validity, in fact, depends
on the conclusion being implicitly contained in the hypothesis.
— {Translator.)

THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 37

inconsequence. As soon, however, as the attempt
was made, as Kant attempted, to give a foundation
to Ethics independent of this will, and establish it
without metaphysical hypotheses, there was no longer
any justification for taking as its basis the words
" thou shalt," and " it is thy duty " (that is, the
imperative form), without first deducing the truth
thereof from some other source.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES
IN PARTICULAR.

This form of the doctrine of duties was very accept-
able to Kant, and in working out his position he
left it untouched ; for, like his predecessors, along
with the duties towards others he ranged also duties
towards ourselves. I, however, entirely reject this
assumption, and, as there will be no better oppor-
tunity, I shall here incidentally explain my view.

Duties towards ourselves must, just as all others,
be based either on right or on love. Duties towards
ourselves based on right are impossible, because of
the self-evident fundamental principle volenti non Jit
injuria (where the will assents, no injury is done).
For what I do is always what I will ; consequently
also what I do to myself is never anything but what
I will, therefore it cannot be unjust. Next, as
regards duties towards ourselves based on love.
Ethics here finds her work already done, and comes
too late. The impossibility of violating the duty
of self-love is at once assumed by the first law of
Christian Morals : " Love thy neighbour as thyself."
According to this, the love which each man cherishes
for himself is postulated as the maximum, and as

38

THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES. 39

the condition of all other love ; while the converse,
" Love thyself as thy neighbour " is never added ; for
every one would feel that the latter does not claim
enough. Moreover, self-love would be the sole duty
regularly involving an opus supererogationis, Kant
himself says in the Metaphysische Anfangsgr-iinde
zur Tugendlehre, p. 13 (R., p. 230) : " That which
each man inevitably wills of himself, does not belong
to the conception of Duty." This idea of duties
towards ourselves is nevertheless still held in repute,
indeed it enjoys for the most part special favour ;
nor need we feel surprise. But it has an amusing
effect in cases where people begin to show anxiety
about their persons, and talk quite earnestly of the
duty of self-preservation ; the while it is sufficiently
clear that fear will lend them legs soon enough, and
that they have no need of any law of duty to help
them along.

First among the duties towards ourselves is gener-
ally placed that of not committing suicide, the line
of argument taken being extremely prejudiced and
resting on the shallowest basis. Unlike animals,
man is not only a prey to bodily pain limited to
the passing moment, but also to those incomparably
greater mental sufferings, which, reaching forwards
and backwards, draw upon the future and the past;
and nature, by way of compensation, has granted
to man alone the privilege of being able to end
his life at his own pleasure, before she herself sets
a term to it ; thus, while animals necessarily live so
long as they can, man need only live so long as
he will.

40 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

Whether he ought on ethical grounds to forego
this privilege is a difficult question, which in any
case cannot be decided by the usual superficial
reasoning. The arguments against suicide which
Kant does not deem unworthy of adducing (p. 53,
R., p. 48 and p. 67, R., p. 57), I cannot conscien-
tiously describe as other than pitiable, and quite
undeserving of an answer. It is laughable indeed
to suppose that reflections of such a kind could have
wrested the dagger from the hands of Cato, of Cleo-
patra, of Cocceius Nerva (Tac, Ann., vi. 26) or of
Arria the wife of Paetus (Plin., Ep., iii. 16). If
real moral motives for not committing suicide actually
exist, it is certain that they lie very deep, and cannot
be reached by the plummet of ordinary Ethics. They
belong to a higher view of things than is adaptable
even to the standpoint of the present treatise.^

That which generally comes next on the rul)ric of
duties towards ourselves may be divided partly into
rules of worldly wisdom, partly into hygienic pre-
scriptions ; but neither class belongs to Morals in
the proper sense. Last on the catalogue comes the
prohibition of unnatural lust — onanism, jyaederastia,
and bestiality. Of these onanism is mainly a vice
of childhood, and must be fought against much more
with the weapon of dietetics than with that of ethics ;
hence we find that the authors of books directed
against it are physicians {e.g., Tissot and others)
rather than moralists. After dietetics and hygiene

^ There are ascetic reasons, which may be found in the Fourth
Book, Vol. I., § 69, of my chief work {Die Welt ah Wille und
Vorstellung).

THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES. 41

have done their work, and struck it down by irre-
futable reasoning, if Ethics desires to take up the
matter, she finds little left for her to do. Bestiality,
again, is of very rare occurrence ; it is thoroughly
abnormal and exceptional, and, moreover, so loath-
some and foreign to human nature, that itself,
better than all arguments of reason, passes judg-
ment on itself, and deters by sheer disgust. For
the rest, as being a degradation of human nature, it
is in reality an offence against the species as such,
and in the abstract ; not against human units. Of
the three sexual perversions of which we are speaking
it is consequently only with paederastia that Ethics
has to do, and in treating of Justice this vice finds
its proper place. For Justice is infringed by it, in
face of which fact, the dictum volenti nonfit injuria is
unavailing. The injustice consists in the seduction
of the younger and inexperienced person, who is
thereby ruined physically and morally.

CHAPTER lY.

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

With the imperative Form of Ethics, which in
Chapter II. we proved to be a petitio principii, is
directly connected a favourite idea of Kant's, that
may be excused, but cannot be adopted. Sometimes
we see a physician, after having employed a certain
remedy with conspicuous success, henceforth prescrib-
ing it for almost all diseases ; to such a one Kant
may be likened. By separating the a priori from
the a posteriori in human knowledge he made the
most brilliant and pregnant discovery that Metaphysics
can boast of. What wonder then that thereafter he
should try to apply this method, this sundering of
the two forms, everywhere, and should consequently
make Ethics also consist of two parts, a pure, i.e.,
an a priori knowable part, and an empirical ? The
latter of these he rejects as unreliable for the purpose
of founding Ethics. To trace out the former and
exhibit it by itself is his purpose in the Grundlegiing
der Metaphysik der Sitten, which he accordingly
represents as a science purely a priori, exactly in
the same way as he sets forth the Metaphysische
Anfangsgrunde der Naturivissenschaft. He asserts
in fact that the Moral Law, which without warrant,

42

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 43

without deduction, or proof of any sort, he postulates
as existing, is furthermore a Law knowable a priori
and independent of all internal or external experience ;
it " rests " (he says) " solely on conceptions of pure
Eeason ; and is to be taken as a synthetic proposition
a priori " (^Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft : p. 56
of fourth Edition ; R., p. 142). But from this defini-
tion the implication immediately follows that such a
Law can only be formal, like everything else known
a priori, and consequently has only to do with the
Form of actions, not with their Essence. Let
it be thought what this means ! He emphatically
adds (p. vi of the preface to the Grundlegung ;
R., p. 5) that it is " useless to look for it either
subjectively in man's nature, or objectively in the
accidents of the external world," and (preface of
the same, page vii ; R., p. 6) that " nothing whatever
connected with it can be borrowed from knowledge
relating to man, i.e., from anthropology." On page
59 (R., p. 52) he repeats, " That one ought on no
account to fall into the mistake of trying to derive
one's principle of morality from the special constitu-
tion of human nature " ; and again, on page 60
(R., p. 52), he says that, " Everything derived from
any natural disposition peculiar to man, or from
certain feelings and propensities, or indeed from any
special trend attaching solely to human nature, and
not necessarily to be taken as the Will of every
rational being," is incapable of affording a foundation
for the moral law. This shows beyond all possibility
of contradiction that Kant does not represent the
alleged moral law as a fact of consciousness, capable

44 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

of empirical proof — which is how the later would-
be philosophers, both individnally and collectively,
wish to pass it off. In discarding every empirical
basis for Morals, he rejects all internal, and still more
decidedly all external, experience. Accordingly he
founds — and I call special attention to this — his moral
principle not on any provable fact of consciousness,
such as an inner natural disposition, nor yet upon
any objective relation of things in the external world.
No ! That would be an empirical foundation. Instead
of this, pure conceptions a priori, i.e., conceptions,
which so far contain nothing derived from internal
or external experience, and thus are simply shells
without kernels — these are to be made the basis of
Morals. Let us consider the fall meaning* of such
a position. Human consciousness as well as the
whole external world, together with all the experience
and all the facts they comprise, are swept from under
our feet. We have nothing to stand upon. And
what have we to hold to ? Nothing but a few entirely
abstract, entirely unsubstantial conceptions, floating
in the air equally with ourselves. It is from these,
or, more correctly, from the mere form of their
connection with judgments made, that a Law is
declared to proceed, which by so-called absolute
necessity is supposed to be valid, and to be strong
enough to lay bit and bridle on the surging throng of
human desires, on the storm of passion, ou the giant
might of egoism. We shall see if such be the case.

With this preconceived notion that the basis of
Morals must be necessarily and strictly a priori, and
entirely free from everything empirical, another of

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 45

Kant's favourite ideas is closely connected. The
moral principle that he seeks to establish is, he says,
a synthetic proposition a priori, of merely formal
contents, and hence exclusively a matter of Pure
Reason ; and accordingly, as such, to be regarded as
valid not only for men, but for all possible rational
beings ; indeed he declares it to hold good for man
" on this account alone," i.e., because per accidens
man comes under the category of rational beings.
Here lies the cause of his basing the Moral principle
not on any feeling, but on pnre Reason (which knows
nothing but itself and the statement of its antithesis).
So that this pure Reason is taken, not as it really
and exclusively is — an intellectual faculty of man —
but as a self-existent hypostatic essence, yet with-
out the smallest authority ; the pernicious effects
of such example and precedent being sufficiently
shown in the pitiful philosophy of the present day.
Indeed, this view of Morals as existing not for
men, as men, but for all rational beings, as such, is
with Kant a principle so firmly established, an idea
so favourite, that he is never tired of repeating it
at every opportunity.

I, on the contrary, maintain that we are never
entitled to raise into a genus that which we only
know of in a single species. For we could bring
nothing into our idea of the genus but what we had
abstracted from this one species ; so that what we
should predicate of the genus could after all only be
understood of the single species. While, if we should
attempt to think away (without any warrant) the
particular attributes of the species, in order to form

46 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

our genus, we should perhaps remove the exact,
condition whereby the remaining attributes, hypo-
statised as a genus, are made possible. Just as we
recognise intelligence in general to be an attribute of
animal beings alone, and are therefore never justified
in thinking of it as existing outside, and independent,
of animal nature ; so we recognise Reason as the
exclusive attribute of the human race, and have not
the smallest right to suppose that Reason exists
externally to it, and then proceed to set up a genus
called " Rational Beings," diflPering from its single
known species " Man " ; still less are we warranted
in laying down laws for such imaginary rational
beings in the abstract. To talk of rational beings
external to men is like talking of heavy beings
external to bodies. One cannot help suspecting
that Kant was thinking a little of the dear cherubim,
or at any rate counted on their presence in the
conviction of the reader. In any case this doctrine
contains a tacit assumption of an anima rationalis,
which as being entirely different from the anima
sensitiva, and the anima vegetativa, is supposed
to persist after death, and then to be indeed nothing
else but rationalis. But in the Kritik der Reinen
Vernunft Kant himself has expressly and elabor-
ately made an end of this most transcendent hypo-
stasis. Nevertheless, in his ethics generally, and in
the Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft especially, there
seems always to hover in the background the thought
that the inner and eternal essence of man consists
of Reason. In this connection, where the matter
only occurs incidentally, I must content myself with

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 47

simply asserting the contrary. Reason, as indeed
the intellectual faculty as a whole, is secondary, is
an attribute of phaenomena, being in point of fact
conditioned by the organism ; whereas it is the Will
in man which is his very self, the only part of him
which is metaphysical, and therefore indestructible.

The success with which Kant had applied his
method to the theoretical side of philosophy led him
on to extend it to the practical. Here also he
endeavoured to separate pure a 'priori from empirical
a "posteriori knowledge. For this purpose he assumed
that just as we know a priori the laws of Space,
of Time, and of Cansality, so in like manner, or at
any rate analogously, we have the moral phimbline
for our conduct given us prior to all experience, and
revealed in a Categorical Imperative, an absolute
" Ought." But how wide is the diflFerence between
this alleged moral law a priori, and our theoretical
knowledge a priori of Space, Time, and Causality !
The latter are nothing but the expression of the forms,
i.e., the functions of our intellect, whereby alone we
are capable of grasping an objective world, and
wherein alone it can be mirrored ; so that the world
(as we know it) is absolutely conditioned by these
forms, and all experience must invariably and exactly
correspond to them — ^just as everything that I see
through a blue glass must appear blue. While the
former, the so-called moral law, is something that
experience pours ridicule on at every step ; indeed,
as Kant himself says, it is doubtful whether in
practice it has ever really been followed on any single
occasion. How completely unlike are the things

48 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

which are here classed together under the conception
of apriority ! Moreover, Kant overlooked the fact
that, according to his own teaching, in theoretical
philosophy, it is exactly the Apriority of our know-
ledge of Time, Space, and Causality — independent
as this is of experience— that limits it strictly to
phaenomena, i.e., to the i)icture of the world as re-
flected in our consciousness, and makes it entirely
invalid as regards the real nature of things, i.e., as
regards whatever exists independently of our capacity
to grasp it.

Similarly, when we turn to practical philosoi)liy,
his alleged moral law, if it have an a prioi^i oiigin
in ourselves, must also be only phaenomenal, and
leave entirely untouched the essential nature of things.
Only this conclusion would stand in the sharpest
contradiction as much to the facts themselves, as to
Kant's view of them. For it is precisely the moral
principle in us that he everywhere {e.g.. Kritik der
Praktischen Vernunj't, p. 175 ; 1{., p. 228) represents
as being in the closest connection with the real essence
of things, indeed, as directly in contact with it ; and
in all passages in the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,
where the mysterious Thing in itself comes forward
a little more clearly, it shows itself as the moral
principle in us, as Will. But of this he failed to
take account.

In Chapter II. of this Part, I explained how Kant
took over bodily from theological Morals the imperative
form of Ethics, i.e., the conception of obligation, of
law, and of duty ; and how at the same time he was
constrained to leave behind that which in the realm

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 49

of theology alone lends force and significance to these
ideas. But he felt the need of some basis for them,
and accordingly went so far as to require that the
conception of duty itself should be also the ground
of its fulfilment ; in other words, that it should itself
be its own enforcement. An action, he says (p. 11 ;
K, p. 18), has no genuine moral worth, unless it be
done simply as a matter of duty, and for duty's sake,
without any liking for it being felt ; and the character
only begins to have value, if a man, who has no
sympathy in his heart, and is cold and indifferent to
others' sufferings, and who is not by nature a lover
of his kind, is nevertheless a doer of good actions,
solely out of a pitiful sense of duty. This assertion,
which is revolting to true moral sentiment ; this
apotheosis of lovelessness, the exact opposite, as it is,
of the Christian doctrine of Morals, which places love
before everything else, and teaches that without it
nothing profiteth (1 Cor. xiii. 3) ; this stupid moral
pedantry has been ridiculed by Schiller in two
apposite epigrams, entitled Gewusensskrupel (Scruples
of Conscience) and Entscheidaiig (Decision),^

It appears that some passages in the Kritik der Prak-
tischen Vernunftj which exactly suit this connection,
were the immediate occasion of the verses. Thus, for
instance, on p. 150 (R., p. 211) we find : "Obedience
to the moral law, which a man feels incumbent on
him, is based not on voluntary inclination, nor on en-
deavour willingly put forth, without any authoritative

' These epigrams form the close of Schiller's poem "Die
Philosophen," which is worth reading in this connection. —
{Translator.)

4

50 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

command, but on a sense of duty." Yes, it must be
commanded ! What slavish morality ! And again
on p. 213 (R., p. 257): "Feelings of compassion,
and of tender-hearted sympathy would be actually
troublesome to persons who think aright, because
through such emotions their well weighed maxims
would become confused, and so the desire would grow
up to be rid of them, and to be subject solely to the
lawgiver — Reason." Now I maintain without hesita-
tion that what opens the hand of the above-described
(p. 11 ; R., p. 18) loveless doer of good, who is
indifferent to the sufferings of other people, cannot
(provided he have no secondary motives) be anytliing
else than a slavish Beca-iSai/xovia (fear of the gods),
equally whether he calls his fetich " Categorical
Imperative " or Fitzlipuzli.^ For what but fear can
move a hard heart ?

Furthermore, on p. 13 (R., p. 19), in accordance
with the above view, we find that the moral worth
of an action is supposed to lie, by no means in the
intention which led to it, but in the maxim which
was followed. Whereas I, on the contrary, ask the
reader to reflect that it is the intention alone which
decides as to the moral worth, or worthlessness, of
an action, so that the same act may deserve con-
demnation or praise according to the intention which
determined it. Hence it is that, whenever men dis-
cuss a proceeding to which some moral importance is
attached, the intention is always investigated, and by
this standard alone the matter is judged ; as, like-
wise, it is in the intention alone that every one seeks
' More correctly, Huitzilopochtli : a Mexican deity.

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 61

justification, if he see his conduct misinterpreted,
or excuse, if its consequence be mischievous.

On p. 14 (R., p. 20) we at last reach the definition
of Duty, which is the fundamental conception of
Kant's entire ethical system. It is : " The necessity
of an action out of respect for the law." But what
is necessary takes place with absolute certainty ;
while conduct based on pure duty generally does not
come off at all. And not only this ; Kant himself
admits (p. 25 ; R., p. 28) that there are no certain
instances on record of conduct determined solely by
pure duty ; and on p. 26 (R., p. 29) he says : " It is
utterly impossible to know with certainty from ex-
perience whether there has ever really been one single
case in which an action, however true to duty, has
rested simply on its idea." And similarly on p. 28
(R., p. 30) and p. 49 (R., p. 50). In what sense
then can necessity be attributed to such an action ?
As it is only fair always to put the most favourable
interpretation on an author's words, we will suppose
him to mean that an act true to duty is objectively
necessary, but subjectively accidental. Only it is
precisely this that is more easily said than thought ;
for where is the Object of this objective necessity, the
consequence of which for the most part, perhaps indeed
always, fails to be realised in objective reality ?
With every wish to be unbiassed, I cannot but
think that the expression — necessity of an action —
is nothing but an artificially concealed, very forced
paraphrase of the word " ought." ^ This will become

' Or "shall," as in the "thou shalt" of the Decalogue,
— {Translator,)

52 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

clearer if we notice that in the same definition
the word Achtung (respect) is employed, where
Gehorsam (obedience) is meant. Similarly in the
note on p. 16 (R., p. 20) we read : " Achtung signifies
simply the subordination of my will to a law. The
direct determination of the will by a law, and the
consciousness that it is so determined — this is what
is denoted by Achtung^ In what language ? In
German the proper term is Gehorsam. But the word
Achtung, so unsuitable as it is, cannot without a
reason have been put in place of the word Gehorsam.
It must serve some purpose ; and this is obviously
none other than to veil the derivation of the im-
perative form, and of the conception of duty, from
theological Morals ; just as we saw above that the
expression " necessity of an action," which is such a
forced and awkward substitute for the word " shall,"
was only chosen because " shall " is the exact
language of the Decalogue. The above definition :
" Duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for
the law," would therefore read in natural, undisguised,
plain language : " Duty signifies an action which
ought to be done out of obedience to a law." This is
" the real form of the poodle." ^

But now as to the Law, which is the real founda-
tion stone of the Kantian Ethics. What does it
contain ? And where is it inscribed ? This is the chief

' " Des Pvdeh Kern " ; V. Goethe's Faiist, Part I. Stvdir-
zimmer. Schopenhauer means that his analysis has forced the
real meaning out of Kant's language, just as Faust by his
exorcism compels Mephistopheles, who was in the form of a
poodle, to resume his true form. — {Translator.)

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 53

point of inquiry. In the first place, be it observed
that we have two questions to deal with : the
one has to do with the Principle, the other with
the Basis of Ethics — two entirely different things,
although they are frequently, and sometimes indeed
intentionally, confused.

The principle or main proposition of an ethical
system is the shortest and most concise definition
of the line of conduct which it prescribes, or, if it
have no imperative form, of the line of conduct to
which it attaches real moral worth. It thus contains,
in the general terms of a single enunciation, the direc-
tion for following the path of virtue, which is derived
from that system : in other words, it is the o,ti^
of virtue. Whereas the Basis of any theory of Ethics
is the Slotc^ of virtue, the reason of the obligation
enjoined, of the exhortation or praise given, whether
it be sought in human nature, or in the external
conditions of the world, or in anything else. As
in all sciences, so also in Ethics the o,ti must be
clearly distinguished from the Bcoti. But most
teachers of Morals wilfully confound this difference :
probably because the o,ti, is so easy, the Stort, so
exceedingly difficult, to give. They are therefore
glad to try to make up for the poverty on the one
hand, by the riches on the other, and to bring about
a happy marriage between Uevla (poverty) and n6po<i
(plenty), by putting them together in one proposition.^

* o,Ti : i.e., the " what " a thing is ; its principle, or essence. —
(Translator.)

^ bioTi : i.e., the " wherefore " of a thing ; its raison d'etre,
its underlying cause. — {Translator.)

* Schopenhauer was doubtless thinking of the famous

64 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

This is generally done by taking the familiar 6,tl
out of the simple form in which it can be expressed,
and forcing it into an artificial formula, from which
it is only to be deduced as the conclusion of given
premises ; and the* reader is led by this performance
to feel as if he had grasped not only the thing, but
its cause as well. We may easily convince ourselves
of this by recalling all the most familiar principles
of Morals. As, however, in what follows I have no
intention of imitating acrobatic tricks of this sort,
but purpose proceeding with all honesty and straight-
forwardness, I cannot make the principle of Ethics
equivalent to its basis, but must keep the two quite
separate. Accordingly, this 6,ti, — i.e., the principle,
the fundamental proposition — as to which in its
essence all teachers of Morals are really, at one, how-
ever much they may clothe it in different costumes,
I shall at once express in the form which I take to
be the simplest and purest possible, viz. : Neminem
laede, immo omnes^ quantum potes, Juva. (Do harm
to no one ; but rather help all people, as far as
lies in your power.) This is in truth the proposi-
tion which all ethical writers expend their energies
in endeavouring to account for. It is the common
result of their manifold and widely differing de-
ductions ; it is the 6,Tt for which the Siotl is still
sought after ; the consequence, the cause of which
is wanting. Hence it is itself nothing but the

myth in Plato's Symposium Chap. 23 (Teubner's edition,
Leipzig, 1875), where Eros is represented as the offspring of
Hopos and Ufvia, who on the birthday of Aphrodite were united
in the garden of Zeus. — (Translator.)

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 55

Datum (the thing given), in relation to which the
Quaesitum (the thing required) is the problem of
every ethical system, as also of the present prize
essay. The solntion of this riddle will disclose
the real foundation of Ethics, which, like the
philosopher's stone, has been searched for from time
immemorial. That the Datum, the o,Tt, the principle
is most purely expressed by the enunciation I have
given, can be seen from the fact that it stands to
every other precept of Morals as a conclusion to given
premises, and therefore constitutes the real goal it
is desired to attain ; so that all other ethical com-
mandments can only be regarded as paraphrases, as
indirect or disguised statements, of the above simple
proposition. This is true, for instance, even of that
trite and apparently elementary maxim : Quod tibi fieri
non vis, alteri nefeceris} (Do not to another what you
are unwilling should be done to yourself.) The defect
here is that the wording only touches the duties im-
posed by law, not those required by virtue ; — a thing
which can be easily remedied by the omission of non
and ne. Thus changed, it really means nothing else
than : Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum pates, juva.
But as this sense is only reached by a periphrasis, the
formula gains the appearance of having also revealed
its own ultimate foundation, its StoVt ; which, however,
is not the case, because it does not in the least follow
that, if I am unwilling that something be done to
myself, I ought not to do it to others. The same
is true of every other principle or leading proposition
of Ethics that has hitherto been put forward.
' Hugo Grotius attributes it to the Emperor Severus.

56 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

If we now return to the above question : — how does
the law read, in obeying which, according to Kant, duty
consists ? and on what is it based ? — we shall find that
our philosopher, like most others, has in an extremely
artificial manner closely connected the principle of
Morals with its basis. I again call attention to what
I have already examined at the outset — I mean, the
Kantian claim that the principle of Ethics must be
purely a priori and purely formal, indeed an a -priori
synthetical proposition, which consequently may not
contain anything material, nor rest upon anything
empirical, whether objectively in the external world,
or subjectively in consciousness, such as any feeling,
inclination, impulse, and the like. Kant was perfectly
aware of the difficulty of this position ; for on p. 60
(R., p. 53) he says : " It will be seen that philosophy
has here indeed reached a precarious standpoint,
which yet is to be immovable, notwithstanding that
it is neither dependent on, nor supported by, anything
in heaven or on earth." We shall therefore with all
the greater interest and curiosity await the solution
of the problem he has set himself, namely, how
something is to arise out of nothing, that is, how
out of purely a priori conceptions, which contain
nothing empirical or material, the laws of material
human action are to grow up. This is a process
which we may find symbolised in chemistry, where
out of three invisible gases (Azote, Hydrogen, and
Chlorine^), and thus in apparently empty space,
solid sal-ammoniac is evolved before our eyes.

' Azote = Nitrogen. The formula for Ammonium Chloride
or Sal-ammoniac is NH4CI. — {Translator).

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 57

I will, however, explain, more clearly than Kant either
would or could, the method whereby he accomplishes
this difficult task. The demonstration is all the more
necessary because what he did appears to be seldom
properly understood. Almost all Kant's disciples
have fallen into the mistake of supposing that he
presents his Categorical Imperative directly as a fact
of consciousness. But in that case its origin would
be anthropological, and, as resting on experience,
although internal, it would have an empirical basis :
a position which runs directly counter to the Kantian
view, and which he repeatedly rejects. Thus on p. 48
(R., p. 44) he says : " It cannot be empirically
determined whether any such Categorical Imperative
exists everywhere " ; and again, on p. 49 (R., p. 45) :
" The possibility of the Categorical Imperative must
be investigated entirely on a priori grounds, because
here we are not helped by any testimony of ex-
perience as to its reality." Even Reinhold, his first
pupil, missed this point ; for in his Beitrdge zur
Uebersicht der Philosophie am Anfange des 19.
Jahrhunderts, No. 2, p. 21, we find him saying : " Kant
assumes the moral law to be a direct and certain
reality, an original fact of the moral consciousness."
But if Kant had wished to make the Categorical
Imperative a fact of consciousness, and thus give it
an empirical foundation, he certainly would not have
failed at least to put it forward as such. And this
is precisely what he never does. As far as I know,
the Categorical Imperative appears for the first time
in the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (p. 802 of the
first, and p. 830 of the fifth, edition), entirely ex nunc

58 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

(unexpectedly), without any preamble, and merely
connected with the preceding sentence by an altogether
unjustifiable " therefore." It is only in the Grundlage
zur MetapJujsik tier Sitten — a book to which we here
devote especial attention — that it is first introduced
expressly and formally, as a deduction from certain
concepts. Whereas in lieinhold's Formula concordiae
des Kriticismus,^ we actually read on p. 122 the
following sentence : " We distinguish moral self-
consciousness from the experience with which it, as
an original fact transcending all knowledge, is bound
up in the human consciousness ; and we understand
by such self-consciousness the direct consciousness of
duty, that is, of the necessity we are under of admitting
the legitimacy — whether pleasurable or the reverse —
of the will, as the stimulus and as the measure of
its own operations."

This would of course be " a charming thesis, with
a very pretty hypothesis to boot." ^ But seriously :
into what an outrageous petitio principii do we
find Kant's moral law here developed ! If that
were true. Ethics would indubitably have a basis
of incomparable solidity, and there would be no need
of any questions being set for prize essays, to en-
courage inquiry in this direction. But the greatest
marvel would be, that men had been so slow in
discovering such a fact of consciousness, consider-

* To be found in the fifth number of the Beitrdge zur
Uehersicht der Fhilosophie am Anfange des 19. JahrhuTiderts —
a journal of the greatest importance for critical philosophy.

" " Einen erklecUichen Satz, ja, und der avxh was setzt."
—Schiller.

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 59

ing that for the space of thousands of years a basis
for Morals has been sought after with zealous patient
toil. How Kant himself is responsible for this
deplorable mistake, I shall explain further on ; never-
theless, one cannot but wonder at the undisputed
predominance of such a radical error among his
disciples. Have they never, whilst writing all their
numberless books on the Kantian philosophy, noticed
the disfigurement which the Kritik der Reinen Ver-
nunft underwent in the second edition, and which made
it an incoherent, self-contradictory work ? It seems
that this has only now come to light ; and, in my
opinion, the fact has been quite correctly analysed in
Rosenkranz's preface to the second volume of his
complete edition of Kant's works. We must, how-
ever, remember that many scholars, being unceasingly
occupied as teachers and authors, find very little
time left for private and exact research. It is certain
that docendo disco (I learn by teaching) is not un-
conditionally true ; sometimes indeed one is tempted
to parody it by saying : semper docendo nihil disco
(by always teaching I learn nothing) ; and even what
Diderot puts into the mouth of Rameau's nephew is not
altogether without reason: " ' And as for these teachers,
do you suppose they understand the sciences they
give instruction in ? Not a bit of it, my dear sir,
not a bit of it. If they possessed sufiicient knowledge
to be able to teach them, they would not do so.'
' Why ? ' ' Because they would have devoted their lives
to the study of them.'"— (Goethe's translation, p. 104.)
Lichtenberg too says : " I have rather observed that
professional people are often exactly those who do

60 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

not know best." But to return to the Kantian Ethics :
most persons, provided only the condnsion reached
agrees with their moral feelings, immediately assume
that there is no flaw to be found in its derivation ;
and if the process of deduction looks difficult, they
do not trouble themselves much about it, but are
content to trust the faculty.

Thus the foundation which Kant gave to his moral
law by no means consists in its being proved em-
pirically to be a fact of consciousness ; neither does
he base it on an appeal to moral feeling, nor yet on
a petitio principii, under its fine modern name of
an "absolute Postulate." It is formed rather of a
very subtle process of thought, which he twice
advances, on p. 17 and p. 51 (R., p. 22, and p. 46),
and which I shall now proceed to make clear.

Kant, be it observed, ridiculed all empirical stimuli
of the will, and began by removing everything,
whether subjective or objective, on which a law
determining the will's action could be empirically
based. The consequence is, that he has nothing left
for the substance of his law but simply its Form. Now
this can only be the abstract conception of lawfulness.
But the conception of lawfulness is built up out of
what is valid for all persons equally. Therefore the
substance of the law consists of the conception of
what is universally valid, and its contents are of
course nothing else than its universal validity. Hence
the formula will read as follows : " Act only in
accordance with that precept which you can also wish
should be a general law for all rational beings."
This, then, is the real foundation — for the most part so

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 61

greatly misunderstood — which Kant constructed for his
principle of Morals, and therefore for his whole ethical
system. Compare also the Kritik der Praktischen
Vernunft, p. 61 (R., p. 147) ; the end of Note 1.

I pay Kant a tribute of sincere admiration for the
great acumen he displayed in carrying out this dex-
terous feat, but I continue in all seriousness my
examination of his position according to the standard
of truth. I will only observe — and this point I shall
take up again later on — that here reason, because,
and in so far as, it works out the above explained
special ratiocination, receives the name of practical
reason. Now the Categorical Imperative of Practical
Reason is the law which results from this process of
thought. Consequently Practical Reason is not in
the least what most people, including even Fichte,
have regarded it — a special " faculty that cannot be
traced to its source, a qualitas occulta, a sort of
moral instinct, like Hutcheson's " moral sense " ; but
it is (as Kant himself in his preface, p. xii. [R., p. 8],
and elsewhere, often enough declares) one and the
same with theoretical reason — is, in fact, theoretical
reason itself, in so far as the latter works out the
ratiocinative process I have described. It is noticeable
that Fichte calls the Categorical Imperative of Kant
an absolute Postulate {Grundlage der gesammten
Wissenschaftslehre, Tubingen, 1802, p. 240, Note).
This is the modern, more showy, expression for petitio
pri7icipii, and thus we see that he, too, regularly
accepted the Categorical Imperative, and consequently
must be included among those who have fallen into
the mistake above criticised.

62 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

The objection, to which this Kantian basis of
Morals is at once and directly exposed, lies in the
fact that such an origin of a moral law in us is im-
possible, because of its assumption that man would
quite of his own accord hit on the idea of looking
about for, and inquiring after, a law to which his will
should be subject, and which should shape its actions.
This procedure, however, cannot possibly occur to him
of itself ; at best it could only be after another moral
stimulus had supplied the first impulse and motive
thereto ; and such a stimulus would have to be
positively operative, and real ; and show itself to
be such, as well as spontaneously influence, indeed
force its presence upon, the mind. But anything of
this sort would ran counter to Kant's assumption,
which, according to the chain of reasoning above
described, is to be regarded as itself the origin of all
moral conceptions — in fact, the punctum saliens of
Morality. Consequently, as long as there is no such
antecedent incentive (because, ex hypothesis there
exists no other moral stimulus but the process of
thought already explained), so long Egoism alone
must remain as the plumb-line of human conduct,
as the guiding thread of the law of motivation ; so
long the entirely empirical and egoistic motives of
the moment, alone and unchecked, must determine,
in each separate case, the conduct of a man ; since,
on this assumption, there is no voice to arrest
him, neither does any reason whatever exist, why
he should be minded to inquire after, to say nothing
of anxiously searching for, a law which should limit
and govern his y{\\\. And yet it is only possible

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 63

on this supposition thfit he should think out the
above remarkable piece of mental legerdemain. It
matters not how far we may care to put a strict
and exact interpretation on this Kantian process,
or whether we choose to tone it down to some
dim, obscurely felt operation of thought. No
modification of it can attack the primary truths that
out of nothing, nothing comes, and that an effect
requires a cause. The moral stimulus, like every
motive that effects the will, must in all cases make
itself felt spontaneously, and therefore have a positive
working, and consequently be real. And because for
men the only thing which has reality is the empirical,
or else that which is supposed to have a possibly
empirical existence, therefore it follows that the
moral stimulus cannot but be empirical, and show
itself as such of its own accord ; and without waiting
for us to begin our search, it must come and press
itself upon us, and this with such force that it may,
at least possibly, overcome the opposing egoistic
motives in all their giant strength. For Ethics has
to do with actual human conduct, and not with the
a 'priori building of card houses — a performance
which yields results that no man would ever turn to
in the stern stress and battle of life, and which, in
face of the storm of our passions, would be about
as serviceable as a syringe in a great fire.

I have already noticed above how Kant considered
it a special merit of his moral law that it is founded
solely on abstract, pure a 'priori conceptions, con-
sequently on pure reason ; whereby its validity obtaine
(he says) not only for men, but for all rational beings

64 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

as such. All the more must we regret that pure,
abstract conceptions a priori, without real contents,
and without any kind of empirical basis can never
move, at any rate, men ; of other rational beings
I am of course incapable of speaking. The second
defect, then, in Kant's ethical basis is its lack of
real substance. So far this has escaped notice,
because the real nature of his foundation has in all
probability been thoroughly understood only by an
exceedingly small number of those who were its
enthusiastic propagandists. The second fault, I re-
peat, is entire want of reality, and hence of possible
efficacy. The structure floats in the air, like a web
of the subtlest conceptions devoid of all contents ;
it is based on nothing, and can therefore support
nothing, and move nothing. And yet Kant loaded
it with a burden of enormous weight, namely, the
hypothesis of the Freedom of the Will. In spite of
his oft declared conviction that freedom in human
action has absolutely no place ; that theoretically
not even its possibility is thinkable {Kritik der
Praktischen Vernunft, p. 168 ; R., p. 223); that, if the
character of a man, and all the motives which work
on him were exactly known, his conduct could be
calculated as certainly and as precisely as an eclipse
of the moon {ibidem^ p. 177 ; II., p. 230) : he
nevertheless makes an assumption of freedom
(although only idealiter, and as a postulate) by his
celebrated conclusion : " You can, because you
ought " ; and this on the strength of his precious
ethical basis, which, as we see, floats in the air in-
corporeal. But if it has once been clearly recognised

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 65

that a thing is not, and cannot be, what is the use of
all the postulates iu the world? It would be much
more to the purpose to cast away that on which
the postulate is based, because it is an impossible
supposition ; and this course would be justified by the
rule a non posse ad non esse valet consequentia ; ^ and
by a reductio ad absurdum, which would at the same
time be fatal to the Categorical Imperative. Instead
of which one false doctrine is built up on the other.

The inadmissibility of a basis for Morals consisting
of a few entirely abstract and empty conceptions
must have been apparent to Kant himself in secret.
For in the Kritik der Praktischeti Vernunft, where (as
I have already said) he is not so strict and methodical
in his work, and where we find him becoming bolder
on account of the fame he had gained, it is re-
markable how the ethical basis gradually changes
its nature, and almost forgets that it is a mere web
of abstract ideas ; in fact, it seems distinctly desirous
of becoming more substantial. Thus, for instance,
on p. 81 (R., p. 163) of the above work are the
words : " The Moral Law in some sort a fact of Pure
Reason." What is one to think of this extraordinary
expression ? In every other place that which is
fact is opposed to what is knowable by pure reason.
Similarly on p. 83 (R., p. 164) we read of " a Reason
which directly determines the Will " ; and so on.

Now let us remember that in laying his founda-
tion Kant expressly and repeatedly rejects every

' To argue from impossibility to non-existence is valid —
i.e., the impossibility of a thing makes its non-existence a
safe conclusion. — {Translator.)

5

66 THE BASIS OF MORALITY,

anthropological basis, everything that conld prove the
Categorical Imperative to be a fact of consciousness,
because such a proof would be empirical. Neverthe-
less, his successors were so emboldened by incidental
utterances like the above that they went to much
greater lengths. Fichte in his work, System der
Sittenlehre, p. 49, warns us expressly " not to allow
ourselves to be misled into trying to explain, and
derive from external sources, the consciousness that
we have duties, because this would be detrimental
to the dignity and absoluteness of the law." A
very nice excuse ! Again on p. 66 he says : " The
principle of Morality is a thought which is based
on the intellectual intuition of the absolute activity
of the intelligence, and which is directly conceived
by the pure intelligence of its own accord." What
a fine flourish to conceal the helplessness of this
clap-trap ! Whoever may like to convince himself
how Kant's disciples, little by little, totally forgot
and ignored the real nature of the foundation and
derivation which their master originally gave to the
moral law, should read a very interesting essay in
Reinhold's Beitrdge zur Uebersicht der 'Philosophic
im Anfange des 19. Jahrhunderts, No. 2, 1801. In
it, on pp. 105 and 106, it is maintained "that in
the Kantian philosophy Autonomy (which is the
same thing as the Categorical Imperative) is a fact
of consciousness, and cannot be traced further back,
inasmuch as it declares itself by means of a direct
consciousness."

But in this case, it would have an anthropological ,
and consequently empirical, foundation — a position

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 67

which is diametrically opposed to Kant's explicit
and repeated utterances. Again, on p. 108 we find :
" Both in the practical philosophy of criticism, and
in the whole of the purified or higher transcendental
philosophy, Autonomy is that which is founded, and
which founds, by itself alone ; and which is neither
capable of, nor requires, any other foundation ; it is that
which is absolutely original, true and certain per se ;
the primal truth ; the p7ius kut i^oxnv (par excel-
lence) ; the absolute principle. Whoever, therefore,
imagines, requires, or seeks any basis for this Auto-
nomy external to itself, can only be regarded by the
Kantian School as wanting in moral consciousness ; ^
or else as failing to interpret this consciousness
correctly, through the employment of false first
principles in his speculations. The School of Fichte
and Schelling declares him to be afflicted with a
dulness of intellect that renders him incapable of
being a philosopher, and forms the characteristic of
the unholy canaille, and the sluggish brute, or (to
use Schelling's more veiled expression) of the
profaniim vulgus and the ignavum pecus^ Every
one will understand how much truth there can be in
a doctrine which it is sought to uphold by such

' Dachi icKs dock ! Wissen sie nichts Vernunftiges mehr
zu erwidern,
Schiehen sies JEinem geschwind in das Gewissen hinein.
— Schiller, Die Philosophen.

Just as I thought ! Can they give no more any answer of
reason,
Quickly the ground is changed : Conscience, they say,
is at fault.

— {Translator.)

68 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

defiant and dogmatic rhetoric. Meanwhile, we must
doubtless explain by the respect that this language
inspired, the really childish credulity with which
Kant's followers accepted the Categorical Imperative,
and at once treated it as a matter beyond dispute.
The truth is that in this case any objections raised to
a theoretical assertion might easily be confounded
with moral obliquity ; so that every one, although
he had no very clear idea in his own mind of the
Categorical Imperative, yet preferred to be silent,
believing, as he did, in secret, that others were
probably better off, and had succeeded in evolving a
clearer and more definite mental picture of it. For
no one likes to turn his conscience inside out.

Thus in the Kantian School Practical Reason
with its Categorical Imperative appears more and
more as a hyperphysical fact, as a Delphian temple
in the human soul, out of whose dark recesses proceed
oracles that infallibly declare not, alas ! what will,
but what ought to, happen. This doctrine of Practical
Reason, as a direct and immediate fact, once it had
been adopted, or rather introduced by artifice combined
with defiance, was unhappily later on extended also
to Theoretical Reason ; and not unnaturally : for
Kant himself had often said that both are but one
and the same Reason (e.g., Preface, p. xii ; R., p. 8).
After it had been once admitted that in the domain
of the Practical there is a Reason which dictates ex
tripode,^ it was an easy step to concede the same
privilege to Theoretical Reason also, closely related

" As from the Pythian tripod : i.e., with official authority,
ex cathedrd.

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 69

as the latter is to the former — indeed, consubstantial
with it. The one was thas pronounced to be just
as immediate as the other, the advantage of this
being no less immense than obvious.

Then it was that all philosophasters and fancy-
mongers, with J. H. Jacobi — the denouncer of atheists
— at their head, came crowding to this postern which
was so unexpectedly opened to them. They wanted to
bring their small wares to market, or at least to save
what they most valued of the old heirlooms which
Kant's teaching threatened to pulverise. As in the
life of the individual a single youthful mistake often
ruins the whole career ; so when Kant made that
one false assumption of a Practical Reason furnished
with credentials exclusively transcendent, and (like
the supreme courts of appeal) with powers of decision
" without grounds," the result was that out of the
austere gravity of the Critical Philosophy was evolved
a teaching utterly heterogeneous to it. We hear of a
Reason at first only dimly " surmising," then clearly
" comprehending " the " Supersensuous," and at last
endowed with a perfect "intellectual intuition" of it.
Every dreamer could now promulgate his mental freaks
as the " absolute," i.e., officially issued, deliverances,
and revelations of this Reason. Nor need we be sur-
prised if the new privilege was fully taken advantage of.

Here, then, is the origin of that philosophical
method which appeared immediately after Kant,
and which is made up of clap-trap, of mystifica-
tion, of imposture, of deception, and of throwing
dust in the eyes. This era will be known one day
in the History of Philosophy as "The Period of

70 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

Dishonesty." For it was signalised by the disappear-
ance of the characteristic of honesty, of searching after
truth in common with the reader, which was well
marked in the writings of all previous philosophers.
The philosophaster's object was not to instruct, but
to befool his hearers, as every page attests. At
first Fichte and Schelling shine as the heroes of
this epoch ; to be followed by the man who is quite
unworthy even of them, and greatly their inferior
in point of talent — I mean the stupid and clumsy
charlatan Hegel. The Chorus is composed of a mixed
company of professors of philosophy, who in solemn
fashion discourse to their public about the Endless,
the Absolute, and many other matters of which they
can know absolutely nothing.

As a stepping-stone to raise Reason to her
prophetic throne a wretched jeu cVesprit was actually
dragged in, and made to serve. It was asserted
that, as the word Vernunft (Reason) comes from
vernehmen (to comprehend), therefore Vernunft means
a capacity to comprehend the so-called " Super-
sensuous," i.e., NeipeXoKOKKvyia,^ or Cloud-cnckoo-
town. This pretty notion met with boundless
approval, and for the space of thirty years was
constantly repeated in Germany with immense
satisfaction ; indeed, it was made the foundation of
philosophic manuals. And yet it is as clear as noon-
day that of course Vernunft (Reason) comes from
vernehmen (to comprehend), but only because Reason
makes man superior to animals, so that he not only
hears, but also comprehends (vei^nimmt) — by no means,
* V. Aristoph., Aves, 819 et alibi. — {Translato7\)

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 71

what is going on in Cloud-cuckoo-town — but what
is said, as by one reasonable person to another, the
words spoken being comprehended {vernommen) by the
listener ; and this capacity is called Reason ( Vernunft).
Such is the interpretation that all peoples, ages,
and languages have put on the word Reason. It
has always been understood to mean the posses-
sion of general, abstract, non-intuitive ideas, named
concepts, which are denoted and fixed by means of
words. This faculty alone it is which in reality gives
to men their advantage over animals. For these
abstract ideas, or concepts, that is, mental impressions
formed of the sum of many separate things, are
the condition of language and through it of actual
thought ; through which again they determine the
consciousness not only of the present (which animals
also have), but of the past and the future as such ;
whence it results that they are the modulus, so to say,
of clear recollection, of circumspection, of foresight,
and of intention ; the constant factor in the evolution
of systematic co-operation, of the state, of trades,
arts, sciences, religions, and philosophies, in short,
of everything that so sharply distinguishes human
from animal life. Beasts have only intuitive ideas,
and therefore also only intuitive motives ; consequently
the dependence of their volition on motives is manifest.
With man this dependence is no less a fact ; he,
too (with due allowance for individual character), is
affected by motives under the strictest law of necessity.
Only these are for the most part not intuitive but
abstract ideas, that is, conceptions, or thoughts, which
nevertheless are the result of previous intuitions, hence

72 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

of external influences. This, however, gives him a
relative freedom — relative, that is, as compared with
an animal. For his action is not determined (as it
is in all other creatures) by the surroundings of
the moment as intuitively perceived, but by the
thoughts he has derived from experience, or gained
by instruction. Consequently the motive, by which
he, too, is necessarily swayed, is not always at once
obvious to the looker-on simultaneously with the act ;
it lies concealed in the brain. It is this that lends
to all his movements, as well as to his conduct and
work as a whole, a character manifestly different
from that observable in the habits of beasts. He
seems as though guided by finer, invisible threads ;
whence all his acts bear the stamp of deliberation
and premeditation, thus gaining an appearance of
independence, which sufficiently distinguishes them
from those of animals. All these great differences,
however, spring solely out of the capacity for abstract
ideas, concepts. This capacity is therefore the essen-
tial part of Reason, that is, of the faculty peculiar to
man, and it is called ro \6yi/j.ov,^ to XoyicrrLKov,
ratio, la ragioue, 11 discorso, raison, reason, discourse
of reason. If I were asked what the distinction is
between it and Verstand, vov<;, intelleotus, entendement,
understanding ; I should reply thus : The latter is
that capacity for knowledge which animals also
possess in varying degrees, and which is seen in us at
its highest development ; in other words, it is the

* Xo'yi/xos means *' remarkable," being never used in the sense
of " rational." To XoyiKov is perhaps a possible expression ;
the right word is Xoyos.— (IVanslator.)

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 73

direct conscionsness of the law of Causality — a con-
scionsness which precedes all experience, being
constituted by the very form of the understanding,
whose essential nature is, in fact, therein contained.
On it depends in the first place the intuitive percep-
tion of the external world ; for the senses by them-
selves are only capable of impression, a thing which
is very far from being intuitive perception; indeed,
the former is nothing but the material of the latter :
vovt opa Kol vom CLKOveLj raXKa Kco(f}a koI rv^Xd.
(The mind sees, the mind hears ; everything else is
deaf and blind.) Intuitive perception is the result of
our directly referring the impressions of the sense-
organs to their cause, which, exactly because of this
act of the intelligence, presents itself as an external
object under the mode of intuition proper to us,
i.e., in space. This is a proof that the Law of
Causality is known to us a priori, and does not
arise from experience, since experience itself, inas-
much as it presupposes intuitive perception, is only
possible through the same law. All the higher
qualities of the intellect, all cleverness, sagacity,
penetration, acumen are directly proportional to the
exactness and fulness with which the workings of
Causality in all its relations are grasped ; for all
knowledge of the connection of things, in the widest
sense of the word, is based on the comprehension
of this law, and the clearness and accuracy with
which it is understood is the measure of one man's
superiority to another in understanding, shrewdness,
cunning. On the other hand, the epithet reasonable
has at all times been applied to the man who does

74 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

not allow himself to be guided by intuitive impressions,
but by thoughts and conceptions, and who therefore
always sets to work logically after due reflection
and forethought. Conduct of this sort is everywhere
known as reasonable. Not that this by any means
implies uprightness and love for one's fellows.
On the contrary, it is quite possible to act in the
most reasonable way, that is, according to conclusions
scientifically deduced, and weighed with the nicest
exactitude ; and yet to follow the most selfish, unjust,
and even iniquitous maxims. So that never before
Kant did it occur to any one to identify just, virtuous,
and noble conduct with reasonable ; the two lines of
behaviour have always been completely separated, and
kept apart. The one depends on the kind of motivation ;
the other on the difference in fundamental principles.
Only after Kant (because he taught that virtue
has its source in Pure Reason) did the virtuous and
the reasonable become one and the same thing, despite
the usage of these words which all languages have
adopted — a usage which is not fortuitous, but the
work of universal, and therefore uniform, human
judgment. " Keasonable " and " vicious " are terms
that go very well together ; indeed great, far-reaching
crimes are only possible from their union. Similarly,
" unreasonable " and " noble-minded " are often found
associated ; e.g.^ if I give to-day to the needy man
what I shall myself require to-morrow more urgently
than he ; or, if I am so far affected as to hand over
to one in distress the sum which my creditor is waiting
for ; and such cases could be multiplied indefinitely.
We have seen that this exaltation of Reason to

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 75

be the source of all virtue rests on two assertions.
First, as Practical Reason, it is said to issue, like
an oracle, peremptory Imperatives purely a priori.
Secondly, taken in connection with- the false ex-
planation of Theoretical Reason, as given in the
Kritik der Reinen Vernunfty it is presented as a certain
faculty essentially concerned with the Unconditioned, as
manifested in three alleged Ideas ^ (the impossibility
of which the intellect at the same time recognises
a priori). And we found that this position, as an
exemplar vitiis imitabile,^ led our muddy-headed
philosophers, Jacobi at their head, from bad to
worse. They talked of Reason ( Vernunft) as directly
comprehending (rernehmend) the " Supersensuous,"
and absurdly declared that it is a certain mental
property which has to do essentially with things
transcending all experience, i.e., with metaphysics ;
and that it perceives directly and intuitively the
ultimate causes of all things, and of all Being, the
Supersensuous, the Absolute, the Divine, etc. Now,
had it been wished to use Reason, instead of deifying
it, such assertions as these must long ago have been
met by the simple remark that, if man, by virtue
of a special organ, furnished by his Reason, for
solving the riddle of the world, possessed an innate
metaphysics that only required development ; in that

' The three Ideas are : (1) The Psychological ; (2) The
Cosmological ; (3) The Theological. V. The Paralogisms of
Pure Reasons, in the Dialectics : Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,
Part I. — {Translator.)

^ An example easy to be imitated in its faults. V. Horace,
Ep. Lib. I., xix. 17. — {Translator.)

76 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

case there would have to be just as complete agree-
ment on metaphysical matters as on the truths
of arithmetic and geometry ; and this would make
it totally impossible that there should exist on the
earth a large number of radically different religions,
and a still larger number of radically different
systems of philosophy. Indeed, we may rather
suppose that, if any one were found to differ from
the rest in his religious or philosophical views, he
would be at once regarded as a subject for mental
pathology. Nor would the following plain reflection
have failed to present itself. If we discovered a
species of apes which intentionally prepared instrn-
ments for fighting, or building, or for any other
purpose ; we should immediately admit that it was
endowed with Reason. On the other hand, if we
meet with savages destitute of all metaphysics, or
of all religion (and there are such) ; it does not
occur to us to deny them Reason on that account.
The Reason that proves its pretended supersensuous
knowledge was duly brought back to bounds by
Kant's critique ; but Jacobi's wonderful Reason, that
directly comprehends the supersensuous, he must
indeed have thought beneath all criticism. Mean-
while, a certain imperious and oracular Reason of
the same kind is still, at the Universities, fastened
on the shoulders of our innocent youth.

NOTE.

If we wish to reach the real origin of this hypothesis
of Practical Reason, we must trace its descent a
little further back. We shall find that it is derived

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 77

from a doctrine, which Kant totally confuted, but
which nevertheless, in this connection, lies secretly
(indeed he himself is not aware of it) at the root
of his assumption of a Practical Reason with its
Imperatives and its Autonomy — a reminiscence of
a former mode of thought. I mean the so-called
Rational Psychology, according to which man is
composed of two entirely heterogeneous substances —
the material body, and the immaterial soul. Plato
was the first to formulate this dogma, and he en-
deavoured to prove it as an objective truth. But it
was Descartes who, by working it out with scientific
exactness, perfectly developed and completed it.
And this is just what brought its fallacy to light, as
demonstrated by Spinoza, Locke, and Kant succes-
sively. It was demonstrated by Spinoza ; because his
philosophy consists chiefiy in the refutation of his
master's twofold dualism, and because he entirely and
expressly denied the two Substances of Descartes,
and took as his main principle the following pro-
position : " Substantia cogitans et substantia extensa
una eademque est substantia, quae jam sub hoc, jam
sub illo attributo comprehenditur .''^ ^ It was demon-
strated by Locke ; for he combated the theory of
innate ideas, derived all knowledge from the sensuous,
and taught that it is not impossible that Matter
should think. And lastly, it was demonstrated by

* The thinking substance, and substance in extension are
one and the self-same substance, which is contained now
under the latter attribute {i.e., extension), now under the
former {i.e., the attribute of thinking). — Ethica, Part II.,
Prop. 7. Corollary.

78 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

Kant, in his Kritik der Rationalen Psychologies as
given in the first edition. Leibnitz and Wolff were
the champions on the bad side ; and this brought
Leibnitz the undeserved honour of being compared
to the great Plato, who was really so unlike him.

But to enter into details here would be out of
place. According to this Rational Psychology, the
soul was originally and in its essence a perceiving
substance, and only as a consequence thereof did it
become possessed of volition. According as it carried
on these two modes of its activity. Perception and
Volition, conjoined with the body, or incorporeal, and
entirely per se, so it was endowed with a lower or
higher faculty of perception, and of volition in like
kind. In its higher faculty the immaterial soul
was active solely by itself, and without co-opera-
tion of the body. In this case it was intellectus
purus, being composed of concepts, belonging ex-
clusively to itself, and of the corresponding acts of
will, both of which were absolutely spiritual, and
had nothing sensuous about them— the sensuous
being derived from the body. ^ So that it perceived
nothing else but pure Abstracts, Universals, innate
conceptions, aeternae veritates, etc. ; wherefore also
its volition was entirely controlled by purely spiritual
ideas like these. On the other hand, the soul's lower
faculty of Perception and Volition was the result
of its working in concert and close union with the
various organs of the body, whereby a prejudicial

* Intellectio pura est intellectio, qiuie circa nullas imagines
corporeas versatur. (Pure intelhgence is intelligence that has
nothing to do with any bodily forms.) — Cart., Medit, p. 188.

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 79

eflfect was produced on its unmixed spiritual activity.
Here, i.e., to this lower faculty, was supposed to
belong every intuitive perception, which consequently
would have to be obscure and confused, while the
abstract, formed by separating from objects their
qualities, would be clear ! The will, which was
determined by preceptions thus sensuously conditioned,
formed the lower Volition, and it was for the most
part bad ; for its acts were guided by the impulse
of the senses ; while the other will (the higher) was
untrammelled, was guided by Pure Reason, and apper-
tained only to the immaterial soul. This doctrine of
the Cartesians has been best expounded by De la
Forge, in his Tractatus de Mente Humana, where in
chap. 23 we read : ^ Non nisi eadem voluntas est, quae
appellatur appetitus sensitivus, quando excitatur per
judicia, quae formantur consequenter ad perceptiones
sensuum ; et quae appetitus rationalis nominatur, cum

' It is nothing but one and the same will, which at one
time is called sensuous desire, when it is stimulated by acts
of judgment, formed in consequence of perceptions of the
senses ; and which at another time is called rational desire
{i.e. desire of the reason), when the mind forms acts of
judgment about its own proper ideas, independently of the
thoughts belonging to, and mixed up with, the senses ; which
thoughts are the causes of the mind's tendencies. . . . That
these two diverse propensities of the Avill should be regarded
as two distinct desires is occasioned by the fact that very
often the one is opposed to the other, because the intention,
which is built up by the mind on the foundation of its own
proper perceptions, does not always agree with the thoughts
which are suggested to the mind by the body's disposition ;
whereby it (the mind) is often constrained to will something,
while its reason makes it choose something different. —
{Translator,)

80 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

mens judicia format de propriis suis ideis, inde-
pendenter a cogitationibus sensuum confusis, quae
inclinationum. ejus sunt causae. . . . Id, quod
occasionem dedit, ut duae istae diversae voluntatis
propensiones pro duohus diversis appetitibus sumer-
entur, est, quod saepissime unus alteri opponatur,
quia propositum, quod mens superaedificat propriis
suis perceptionibus, non semper consentit cum cogita-
tionibus, quae menti a corporis dispositione suggeruntur,
per quam saepe obligatur ad aliquid volendum, dum
ratio ejus earn aliud optare facit.

Out of the dim reminiscence of such views there
finally arose Kant's doctrine of the Automony of the
Will, which, as the mouthpiece of Pure, Practical
Reason, lays down the law for all rational beings
as such, and recognises nothing but formal motives,
as opposed to material ; the latter determining only
the lower faculty of desires, to which the higher
is hostile. For the rest, this whole theory, which
was not really systematically set forth till the time
of Descartes, is nevertheless to be found as fiir back
as Aristotle. In his De Anima I. 1, it is sufficiently
clearly stated ; while Plato in the Phaedo (pp. 188
and 189, edit. Bipont.) had already paved the way,
with no uncertain hints. After being elaborated to
great perfection by the Cartesian doctrine, we find
it a hundred years later waxed bold and strong,
and occupying the foremost place ; but precisely for
this reason forced to reveal its true nature. An
excellent resume of the view which then prevailed
is presented in Muratori's Delia Forza della Fantasia^
chaps. 1-4 and 13. In this work the imagination is

ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 81

regarded as a pa rely material, corporeal organ of
the brain (the lower faculty of perception), its
function being to intuitively apprehend the external
world on the data of the senses ; and nought remains
for the immaterial soul but thinking, reflecting, and
determining. It must have been felt how obviously
this position involves the whole subject in doubt.
For if Matter is capable of the intuitive apprehension
of the world in all its complexity, it is inconceivable
that it should, not also be capable of abstracting
this intuition ; wherefrom everything else would
follow. Abstraction is of course nothing else than
an elimination of the qualities attaching to things
which are not necessary for general purposes, in
other words, the individual and special differences.
For instance, if 1 disregard, or abstract, that which
is peculiar to the sheep, ox, stag, camel, etc., 1
reach the conception of ruminants. By this opera-
tion the ideas lose their intuitiveness, and as merely
abstract, non-intuitive notions or concepts, they
require words to fix them in the consciousness, and
allow of their being adequately handled. All this
shows that Kant was still under the influence of
the after-efi'ect of that old-time doctrine, when he
propounded his Practical Reason with its Imperatives.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE LEADING PEINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

Aftrk having tested in the preceding chapter the
actual basis of Kant's Ethics, I now turn to that
which rests on it — his leading principle of Morals,
The latter is very closely connected with the former ;
indeed, in a certain sense, they both grew up together.
We have seen that the formula expressing the
principle reads as follows : " Act only in accordance
with that precept which you can also wish should be
a general law for all rational beings." It is a strange
proceeding for a man, who ex hypothesi is seeking
a law to determine what he should do, and what
he should leave undone, to be instructed first to search
for one fit to regulate the conduct of all possible
rational beings ; but we will pass over that. It is
suificient only to notice the fact that in the above
guiding rule, as put forth by Kant, we have obviously
not reached the moral law itself, but only a finger-
post, or indication where it is to be looked for. The
money, so to say, is not yet paid down, but we hold
a safe draft for it. And who, then, is the cashier?
To say the truth at once : a paymaster in this con-
nection surely very unexpected, being neither more
nor less than Egoism, as I shall now demonstrate.

82

THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 83

The precept, it is said, which I can wish were
the guide of all men's conduct, is itself the real
moral principle. That which I can wish is the hinge
on which the given direction turns. But what can
1 truly wish, and what not ? Clearly, in order to
determine what I can wish in the matter under
discussion, I require yet another criterion ; for with-
out such I could never find the key to the instruction
which comes to me like a sealed order. Where,
then, is this criterion to be discovered ? Certainly
nowhere else but in my Egoism, which is the nearest,
ever ready, original, and living standard of all volition,
and which has at any rate the jus primi occupantis
before every moral principle. The direction for finding
the real moral law, which is contained in the Kantian
rule, rests, as a matter of fact, on the tacit assump-
tion that I can only wish for that which is most
to my advantage. Now because, in framing a precept
to be generally followed, I cannot regard myself as
always active, but must contemplate my playing a
passive part eventualiter and at times ; therefore
from this point of view my egoism decides for justice
and lovingkindness ; not from any wish to practise
these virtues, but because it desires to experience them.
We are reminded of the miser, who, after listening
to a sermon on beneficence, exclaims :

" Wie griindlich aiisgefuhrt, wie schon ! —

Fast mochf ich hetteln gehn."
(How well thought out, how excellent ! —

Almost I'd like to beg.)

This is the indispensable key to the direction in
which Kant's leading principle of Ethics is embedded ;

84 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

nor can he help supplying it himself. Only he re-
frains frorri doing so at the moment of propounding
his precept, lest we should feel shocked. It is found
further on in the text, at a decent distance, so as
to prevent the fact at once leaping to light, that
here, after all, in spite of his grand a priori edifice.
Egoism is sitting on the judge's seat, scales in hand.
Moreover, it does not occur, till after he has decided,
from the point of view of the eventualiter passive
side, that this position holds good for the active
role as well. Thus, on p. 19 (R., p. 24) we read :
" That 1 could not wish for a general law to establish
lying, because people would no longer believe me,
or else pay me back in the same coin." Again on
p. 55 (R., p. 49) : " The universality of a law to
the effect that every one could promise what he
likes, without any intention of keeping his word,
would make the promise itself, together with the
object in view, whatever that might be, impossible ;
for no one would believe it." On p. 56 (R., p. 50),
in connection with the maxim of hard-heartedness, we
find the following : " A will, which should determine
this, would contradict itself ; for cases can occur, in
which a man needs the love and sympathy of others,
and in which he, by virtue of such a natural law,
evolved from his own will, would deprive himself
of all hope of the help, which he desires." Similarly
in the Kritik der Praktiscken Vernunft (Part I., vol. i.,
chap. 2, p. 123 ; R., p. 192) : "If every one were to
regard others' distress with total indifference, and
you were to belong to such an order of things ;
would you be there with the concurrence of your

THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 85

will ? " Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus
iniquam ! ^ one could reply. These passages suffici-
ently show in what sense the phrase, " to be able
to wish," in Kant's formula is to be understood.
But it is in the Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der
Tugejidlehre, that this real nature of his ethical
principle is most clearly stated. In § 30 we read :
" For every one wishes to be helped. If, however,
a man were to give utterance to his rule of unwilling-
ness to help others, all people would be justified
in refusing him assistance. Thus this rule of selfish-
ness contradicts itself." "Would be justified, he says,
would be justified! Here, then, it is declared, as
explicitly as anything can be, that moral obligation
rests solely and entirely on presupposed reciprocity ;
consequently it is utterly selfish, and only admits
of being interpreted by egoism, which, under the
condition of reciprocity, knows how to make a
compromise cleverly enough. Such a course would
be quite in place if it were a question of laying
down the fundamentals of state-organisation, but not,
when we come to construct those of ethics. In the
Grundlegung, p. 81 (R., P- 6^)j the following sentence
occurs : " The principle of always acting in accordance
with that precept which you can also wish were
universally established as law — this is the only
condition under which a man's will can never be in
antagonism with itself." From what has been said
above, it will be apparent that the true meaning
of the word " antagonism " may be thus explained :

' How rashly do we sanction an unjust law, which will
come home to ourselves! — (Hor., Sat, Lib. I., iii. 67.)

86 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

if a man should sanction the precept of injustice
and hard-heartedness, he would subsequently, in the
event of his playing a passive part, recall it, and
so his will would contradict itself.

From this analysis it is abundantly clear that
Kant's famous leading principle is not — as he
maintains with tireless repetition — a categorical, but
in reality a hypothetical Imperative ; because it
tacitly presupposes the condition that the law to be
established for what I do — inasmuch as I make it
universal — shall also be a law for what is done to
me ; and because I, under this condition, as the
eventualiter non-active party, cannot possibly wish
for injustice and hard-heartedness. But if I strike
out this proviso, and, trusting perhaps to my sur-
passing strength of mind and body, think of myself
as always active, and never passive ; then, in choosing
the precept which is to be universally valid, if there
exists no basis for ethics other than Kant's, I can
perfectly well wish that injustice and hard-heartedness
should be the general rule, and consequently order
the world

Upon the simple plan,
That they should take, who have the power,
And they should keep, who can,

—(Wordsworth.)

In the foregoing chapter we showed that the
Kantian leading principle of Ethics is devoid of all
real foundation. It is now clear that to this singular
defect must.be added, notwithstanding Kant's express
assertion to the contrary, its concealed hypothetical
nature, whereby its basis turns out to be nothing else

THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 87

than Egoism, the latter being the secret interpreter
of the direction which it contains. Furthermore,
regarding it solely as a formula, we find that it is
only a periphrasis, an obscure and disguised mode of
expressing the well-known rule : Quod tihi fieri non
vis, alteri ne feceris (do not to another what you are
unwilling should be done to yourself) ; if, that is, by
omitting the non and ne, we remove the limitation, and
include the duties taught by love as well as those pre-
scribed by law. For it is obvious that this is the only
precept which I can wish should regulate the conduct
of all men (speaking, of course, from the point of view
of the possibly passive part I may play, where my
Egoism is touched). This rule, Quod tibi fieri, etc., is,
however, in its turn, merely a circumlocution for, or,
if it be preferred, a premise of, the proposition which
I have laid down as the simplest and purest definition
of the conduct required by the common consent of all
ethical systems ; namely, Neminem laede, immo omnes,
quantum potes, juva (do harm to no one ; but
rather help all people, as far as lies in your power).
The true and real substance of Morals is this, and
never can be anything else. But on what is it based ?
What is it that lends force to this command ? This
is the old and difficult problem with which man is
still to-day confronted. For, on the other side, we
hear Egoism crying with a loud voice : Neminem juva,
immo om?ies, si forte conducit, laede (help nobody,
but rather injure all people, if it brings you any
advantage) ; nay more, Malice gives us the variant :
Immo omnes, quantum potes, laede (but rather injure
all people as far as you can). To bring into the

88 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

lists a combatant equal, or rather superior to Egoism
and Malice combined — this is the task of all Ethics.
Heic Rkodus, heic salta ! ^

The division of human duty into two classes has
long been recognised, and no doubt owes its origin
to the nature of morality itself. We have (1) the
duties ordained by law (otherwise called the perfect,
obligatory, narrower duties), and (2) those prescribed
by virtue (otherwise called imperfect, wider, meri-
torious, or, preferably, the duties taught by love).
On p. 67 (R, p. 60) we find Kant desiring to give
a further confirmation to the moral principle, which
he propounded, by undertaking to derive this classi-
fication from it. But the attempt turns out to be
so forced, and so obviously bad, that it only testifies
in the strongest way against the soundness of his
position. For, according to him, the duties laid
down by statutes rest on a precept, the contrary
of which, taken as a general natural law, is declared
to be quite unthinkable without contradiction ; while

' " Here is Rhodes, here make your leap ! " /.e., " Here is the
place of trial, here let us see what you can do ! " This Latin
proverb is derived from one of ^sop's fables. A braggart
boasts of having once accomplished a wonderful jump in
Rhodes, and appeals to the evidence of the eye-witnesses.
The bystanders then exclaim : " Friend, if this be true, you
have no need of witnesses ; for this is Rhodes, and your leaj)
you can make here." The words are: aAX', a- ^iXe, d rovro
akrjdei earcv, ovbev Sei aroi fxaprvpoaV avrrj yap 'PoSoj Knl irrjdrjpa. V-
Fabvlae Aesopicae Gollectae. Edit. Halm, Leipzig : Teubner.
1875. Nr. 2036, p. 102. The other version of the fable (Nr.
20.3, p. 101) gives : 2) ovto^, el dXrjdes tovt^ fariv, ovdev 8el croi
fiapTVpoiv Idoii f) 'PoSos, Idoii koi to 7rf}8r]pa. — {Ti'anslator.) ,

THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 89

the duties incnlcated by virtue are made to depend
on a maxim, the opposite of which can (he says)
be conceived as a general natural law, but cannot
possibly be wished for. I beg the reader to reflect
that the rule of injustice, the reign of might instead
of riorht, which in the Kantian view is not even
thinkable as a natural law, is in reality, and in
point of fact, the dominant order of things not only
in the animal kingdom, but among men as well.
It is true that an attempt has been made among
civilised peoples to obviate its injurious effects by
means of all the machinery of state government ;
but as soon as this, wherever, or of whatever kind,
it be, is suspended or eluded, the natural law
immediately resumes its sway. Indeed between
nation and nation it never ceases to prevail ; the
customary jargon about justice is well known to
be nothing but diplomacy's official style ; the real
arbiter is brute force. On the other hand, genuine,
i.e., voluntary, acts of justice, do occur beyond all
doubt, but always only as exceptions to the rule.
Furthermore : wishing to give instances by way
of introducing the above-mentioned classification,
Kant establishes the duties prescribed by law first
(p. 53 ; R., p. 48) through the so-called duty towards
oneself, — the duty of not ending one's life voluntarily,
if the pain outweigh the pleasure. Accordingly, the
rule of suicide is held to be not even thinkable as
a general natural law. I, on the contrary, maintain
that, since here there can be no intervention of
state control, it is exactly this rule which is proved
to be an actually existing, unchecked natural law.

90 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

For it is absolutely certain (as daily experience
attests) that men in the vast majority of cases turn
to self-destruction directly the gigantic strength of
the innate instinct of self-preservation is distinctly
overpowered by great suffering. To suppose that
there is any thought whatever that can have a
deferring effect, after the fear of death, which is
so strong and so closely bound up with the nature
of every living thing, has shown itself powerless ;
in other words, to suppose that there is a thought
still mightier than this fear — is a daring assump-
tion, all the more so, when we see, that it
is one which is so difficult to discover that the
moralists are not yet able to determine it with pre-
cision. In any case, it is certain that arguments
against suicide of the sort put forward by Kant in
this connection (p. 63 : R., p. 48, and p. 67 ; B., p.
57) have never hitherto restrained any one tired
of life even for a moment. Thus a natural law,
which iucontestably exists, and is operative every
day, is declared by Kant to be simply unthinkable
without contradiction, and all for the sake of making
liis Moral Principle the basis of the classification of
duties 1 At this point it is, I confess, not without
satisfaction that I look forward to the groundwork
which I shall give to Ethics in the sequel. From
it the division of Duty into what is prescribed by
law, and what is taught by love, or, better, into
justice and lovingkindness, results quite naturally
though a principle of separation which arises from
the nature of the subject, and which entirely of itself
draws a sharp line of demarkation ; so that the

THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 91

foundation of Morals, which I shall present, has in
fact ready to hand that confirmation, to which Kant,
with a view to support his own position, lays a
completely groundless claim.

CHAPTEU VI.

ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE
OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.

It is well known that Kant put the leading principle
of his Ethics into another quite different shape,
in which it is expressed directly ; the first being
indirect, indeed nothing more than an indication as
to how the principle is to be sought for. Beginning
at p. 63 (R., p. 5.5), he prepares the way for his
second formula by means of very strange, ambiguous,
not to say distorted,^ definitions of the conceptions
End and Means, which may be much more simply and
correctly denoted thus : an End is the direct motive
of an act of the Will, a Means the indirect : simplex
sigilluin veri (simplicity is the seal of truth). Kant,
however, slips through his wonderful enunciations to
the statement : " Man, indeed every rational being,
exists as an end in himself." On this I must remark
that " to exist as an end in oneself" is an unthinkable
expression, a contradictio in adjecto. ^ To be an

' To keep the play of words in " geschrohene" " verschro-
bene," we may perhaps render them : "twisted" . . . ''mis-
twisted." — (Translator.)

* A contradiction in that which is added. A terra applied
to two ideas which cannot be brought into a thinkable
relationship. — ( Translator.)

92

DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE. 93

end means to be an object of volition. Every end
can only exist in relation to a will, whose end, i.e.,
(as above stated), whose direct motive it is. Only
thus can the idea, " end " have any sense, which is
lost as soon as such connection is broken. But this
relation, which is essential to the thing, necessarily
excludes every "in itself." "End in oneself" is
exactly like saying : " Friend in oneself ; — enemy
in oneself ; — uncle in oneself ; — north or east in
itself ; — above or below in itself ; " and so on. At
bottom the "end in itself" is in the same case as
the " absolute ought " ; the same thought — the theo-
logical — secretly, indeed, unconsciously lies at the
root of each as its condition. Nor is the " absolute
worth," which is supposed to be attached to this
alleged, though unthinkable, " end in itself," at all
better circumstanced. It also must be characterised,
without pity, as a contradictio in adjecto. Every
"worth" is a valuation by comparison, and its
bearing is necessarily twofold. First, it is relative,
since it exists for some one ; and secondly, it is
comparative, as being compared with something else,
and estimated accordingly. Severed from these two
conditions, the conception, " worth," loses all sense
and meaning, and so obviously, that further demon-
stration is needless. But more : just as the phrases
" end in itself " and " absolute worth " outrage
logic, so true morality is outraged by the statement
on p. 65 (R., p. 56), that irrational beings (that is,
animals) are things, and should therefore be treated
simply as means, which are not at the same time
ends. In harmony with this, it is expressly declared

94 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

in the Metaphysische Anfangsgrilnde der Tugend-
lehre, § 16 : "A man can have no duties towards
any being, except towards his fellowmen ; " and
then, § 17, we read: "To treat animals cruelly
runs counter to the duty of man towards himself;
because it deadens the feeling of sympathy for
them in their sufferings, and thus weakens a natural
tendency which is very serviceable to morality in
relation to other men." So one is only to have
compassion on animals for the sake of practice,
and they are as it were the pathological phantom
on which to train one's sympathy with men ! In
common with the whole of Asia that is not tainted
by IslS,m (which is tantamount to Judaism), I
regard such tenets as odious and revolting. Here,
once again, we see withal how entirely this philo-
sophical morality, which is, as explained above, only
a theological one in disguise, depends in reality on
the biblical Ethics. Thus, because Christian morals
leave ^ animals out of consideration (of which more
later on) ; therefore in philosophical morals they are
of course at once outlawed ; they are merely " things,"
simply means to ends of any sort ; and so they are
good for vivisection, for deer-stalking, bull-fights,
horse-races, etc., and they may be whipped to death
as they struggle along with heavy quarry carts.
Shame on such a morality which is worthy of Pariahs,
Chandalas and Mlechchas ^ ; which fails to recognise

' A Chandala (or Candala) means one who is born of a

Brahman woman by a Sudra husband, such a union being
an abomination. Hence it is a term appUed to a low common

DEEIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE. 95

the Eternal Reality immanent in everything that has
life, and shining forth with inscrutable significance
from all eyes that see the sun I This is a morality
which knows and values only the precious species
that gave it birth ; whose characteristic — reason— it
makes the condition under which a being may be
an object of moral regard.

By this rough path, then, — indeed, -per fas et
nefas (by fair means and by foul), Kant reaches the
second form in which he expresses the fundamental
principle of his Ethics : " Act in such a way that
you at all times treat mankind, as much in your
own person, as in the person of every one else, not
only as a Means, but also as an End." Such a
statement is a very artificial and roundabout way
of saying : " Do not consider yourself alone, but
others also ; " this in turn is a paraphrase for : Quod
tiU fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris (do not to another
what yon are unwilling should be done to yourself) ;
and the latter, as I have said, contains nothing but
the premises to the conclusion, which is the true
and final goal of all morals and of all moralising ;
Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes juva (do
harm to no one ; but rather help all people as far
as lies in your power). Like all beautiful things,
this proposition looks best unveiled. Be it only
observed that the alleged duties towards oneself are
dragged into this second Kantian edict intentionally

person. Mlechcha (or Mleccha) means a foreigner; one who
does not speak Sanskrit, and is not subject to Hindu in-
stitutions. The transition from a " a barbarian " to a bad
or wicked man, is easy. — {Translator.)

96 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

and not without dilBficulty. Some place of course had
to be found for them.^

Another objection that could be raised against the
formula is that the malefactor condemned to be
executed is treated merely as an instrument, and not
as an end, and this with perfectly good reason ; for
he is the indispensable means of upholding the terror
of the law by its fulfilment, and of thus accomplishing
the law's end — the repression of crime.

But if this second definition helps nothing towards
laying a foundation for Ethics, if it cannot even pass
muster as its leading principle, that is, as an adequate
and direct summary of ethical precepts ; it has never-
theless the merit of containing a fine apergu of moral
psychology, for it marks egoism by an exceedingly
characteristic token, which is quite worth while being
here more closely considered. This egoism, then, of
which each of us is full, and to conceal which, as our
partie honteuse, we have invented politeness, is per-
petually peering through every veil cast over it, and
may especially be detected in the fact that our
dealings with all those, who come across our path,
are directed by the one object of trying to find,
before everything else, and as if by instinct, a pos-
sible means to any of the numerous ends with which
we are always engrossed. When we make a new
acquaintance, our first thought, as a rule, is whether
the man can be useful to us in some way. If he
can do nothing for our benefit, then as soon as we
are convinced of this, he himself generally becomes

' These so-called duties have been discussed in Chapter III.
of this Part.

DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE. 97

nothing to us. To seek ia all other people a possible
means to onr ends, in other words, to make them
our instruments, is almost part of the very nature
of human eyes ; and whether the instrument will
have to suffer more or less in the using, is a thought
which comes much later, sometimes not at all. That
we assume others to be similarly disposed is shown
in many ways ; e.g., by the fact that, when we ask
any one for information or advice, we lose all con-
fidence in his words directly we discover that he
may have some interest in the matter, however small
or remote. For then we immediately take for granted
that he will make us a means to his ends, and hence
give his advice not in accordance with his discernment,
but with his desire, and this, no matter how exact
the former may be, or how little the latter seem
involved ; since we know only too well that a cubic
inch of desire weighs much more than a cubic yard
of discernment. Conversely, when we ask in such
cases : " What ought I to do ? " as a rule, nothing
else will occur to our counsellor, but how we should
shape our action to suit his own ends ; and to this
effect he will give his reply immediately, and as it
were mechanically, without so much as bestowing
a thought on our ends ; because it is his Will that
directly dictates the answer, or ever the question
can come before the bar of his real judgment. Hence
he tries to mould our conduct to his own benefit,
without even being conscious of it, and while he
supposes that he is speaking out of the abundance
of his discernment, in reality he is nothing but the
mouth-piece of his own desire ; indeed, such self-

7

98 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

deception may lead him so far as to utter lies,
without being aware of it. So greatly does the
influence of the Will preponderate that of the
Intelligence. Consequently, it is not the testimony
of our own consciousness, but rather, for the most
part, that of our interest, which avails to determine
whether our language be in accordance with what
we discern, or what we desire. To take another
case. Let us suppose that a man pursued by enemies
and in danger of life, meets a pedlar and inquires
for some by-way of escape ; it may happen that the
latter will answer him by the question : " Do you
need any of my wares ? " It is not of course meant
that matters are always like this. On the contrary,
many a man is found to show a direct and real
participation in another's weal and woe, or (in Kant's
language) to regard him as an end and not as a
means. How far it seems natural, or the reverse,
to each one to treat his neighbour for once in the
way as an end, instead of (as usual) a means, —
this is the criterion of the great ethical difference
existing between character and character ; and that
on which the mental attitude of sympathy rests in
the last resort will be the true basis of Ethics, and
will form the subject of the third part of this Essay.

Thus, in his second formula, Kant distinguishes
Egoism and its opposite by a very characteristic
trait ; and this point of merit I have all the more
gladly brought out into strong light and illustrated,
because in other respects there is little in the ground-
work of his Ethics that I can admit.

The third and last form in which Kant put forward

DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE. 99

his Moral Principle is the Autonomy of the Will :
" The Will of every rational being is universally
legislative for all rational beings." This of course
follows from the first form. As a consequence of the
third, however, we are asked to believe (see p. 71 ;
R., p. 60) that the specific characteristic of the
Categorical Imperative lies in the renunciation of all
interest by the Will when acting from a sense of duty.
All previous moral principles had thus (he says)
broken down, " because the latter invariably attributed
to human actions at bottom a certain interest, whether
originating in compulsion, or in pleasurable attraction
— an interest which might be one's own, or another's "
(p. 73 ; R., p. 62). (Another's : let this be particularly
•noticed.) " Whereas a universally legislative Will
must prescribe actions which are not based on any
interest at all, but solely on a feeling of duty."
I beg the reader to think what this really means.
As a matter of fact, nothing less than volition with-
out motive, in other words, eifect without cause.
Interest and Motive are interchangeable ideas ;
what is interest but quod mea interest, that which
is of importance to me ? And is not this, in one
word, whatever stirs and sets in motion my Will ?
Consequently, what is an interest other than the
working of a motive upon the Will ? Therefore
where a motive moves the Will, there the latter has
an interest ; but where the Will is affected by no
motive, there in truth it can be as little active, as
a stone is able to leave its place without being
pushed or pulled. No educated person will require
any demonstration of this. It follows that every

100 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

action, inasmuch as it necessarily .must have a
motive, necessarily also presupposes an interest.
Kant, however, propounds a second entirely new class
of actions which are performed without any interest,
i.e.y without motive. And these actions are — all
deeds of justice and lovingkindness ! It will be
seen that this monstrous assumption, to be refuted,
needed only to be reduced to its real meaning, which
was concealed through the word " interest " being
trifled with. Meanwhile Kant celebrates (p. 74 sqq. ;
K., p. 62) the triumph of his Autonomy of the
Will by setting up a moral Utopia called the
Kingdom of Ends, which is peopled with nothing but
rational beings in abstracto. These, one and all, are
always willing, without willing any actual thing {i.e.,
without interest) : the only thing that they will is
that they may all perpetually will in accordance with
one maxim {i.e., Autonomy). Difficile est satiram
non scribere^ (it is difficult to refrain from writing
a satire).

But there is something else to which Kant is led
by his autonomy of the will ; and it involves more
serious consequences than the little innocent King-
dom of Ends, which is perfectly harmless and may
be left in peace. I mean the conception of human
dignity. Now this " dignity " is made to rest solely
on man's autonomy, and to lie in the fact that the law
which he ought to obey is his own work, his relation
to it thus being the same as that of the subjects of a
constitutional government to their statutes. As an
ornamental iinish to the Kantian system of morals
' Juvenal, Sat. I. 30.

DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE. 101'

such a theory might after all be passed over. Only
this expression " Human Dignity," once it was uttered
by Kant, became the shibboleth of all perplexed aud
empty-headed moralists. For behind that imposing
formula they concealed their lack, not to say, of a
real ethical basis, but of any basis at all which
was possessed of an intelligible meaning ; supposing
cleverly enough that their readers would be so
pleased to see themselves invested with such a
"dignity" that they would be quite satisfied.^ Let
us, however, look at this conception a little more
carefully, and submit it to the test of reality. Kant
(p. 79 ; R., p. 60) defines dignity as " an uncon-
ditioned, incomparable value." This is an explanation
which makes such an eifect by its magnificent sound
that one does not readily summon up courage to
examine it at close quarters ; else we should find
that it too is nothing but a hollow hyperbole, within
which there lurks like a gnawing worm, the con-
tradictio in adjecto. Every value is the estimation
of one thing compared with another ; it is thus a
conception of comparison, and consequently relative ;
and this relativity is precisely that which forms the
essence of the idea. According to Diogenes Laertius
(Book VII., chap. 106),^ this was already correctly
taught by the Stoics. He says : Tr)v he a^iav dvau

' It appears that G. W. Block in his Nev£. Grundlegung der
Philosophie der Sitten, 1802, was the first to make " Human
Dignity" expressly and exclusively the foundation-stone of
Ethics, which he then built up entirely on it.

* V. Diogenes Laertius, de Clarorum Philosophorum Vitis,
etc., edit. C. Gabr. Cobet. Paris ; Didot, 1862. In this edition
the passage quoted is in chap. 105 ad fin., -p. 182. — {Translator.)

102 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

afjLOi^rjv BoKi/jbdarov, rjv av 6 €fi7recpo<i roiv irpwyfidTwv
rd^r)' ofxoLOV eiirelv, dfxei^eadat 7rvpov<i 7rpo<i Taii aijv
rjfjbtovq) Kptddf} An incomparable, unconditioned, absolute
value, such as "dignity" is declared by Kant to
be, is thus, like so much else in Philosopliy, the-
statement in words of a thought which is really
unthinkable ; just as much as " the highest number,"
or " the greatest space."

" Dock eben wo Begriffe fehlen,
Da stellt ein Wort zu rechter Zeit sick ein."

(But where conceptions fail,
Just there a Word comes in to fill the blank.)

So it was with this expression, " Human Dignity."
A most acceptable phrase was brought into currency.
Thereon every system of Morals, that was spun out
through all classes of duty, and all forms of casuistry,
found a broad basis ; from which serene elevation
it could comfortably go on preaching.

At the end of his exposition (p. 124 ; R., p. 97),
Kant says : " But how it is that Pure Reason without
other motives, that may have their derivation else-
where, can by itself be practical ; that is, how, without
there being any object for the Will to take an
antecedent interest in, the simple principle of the
universal validity of all the precepts of Pare Reason,
as laws, can of itself provide a motive and bring
about an interest which may be called purely moral ;
or, in other words, how it is that Pure Reason can

' They teach that " worth " is the equivalent value of a
thing which has been tested, whatever an expert may fix that
value to be ; as, for instance, to take wheat in exchange for
barley and a mule. — {Translator.)

DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE. 103

be practical ; — to explain this problem, all human
reason is inadequate, and all trouble and work spent
on it are vain." Now it should be remembered that,
if any one asserts the existence of a thing which
cannot even be conceived as possible, it is incumbent on
him to prove that it is an actual reality ; whereas the
Categorical Imperative of Practical Reason is expressly
not put forward as a fact of consciousness, nor otherwise
founded on experience. Rather are we frequently
cautioned not to attempt to explain it by having
recourse to empirical anthropology. (Cf. e.g.., p. vi.
of the preface ; R., p. 5 ; and pp. 59, 60 ; R,, p. 52).
Moreover, we are repeatedly {e.g., p. 48 ; R., p. 44)
assured " that no instance can show, and consequently
there can be no empirical proof, that an Imperative
of this sort exists everywhere." And further, on
p. 49 (R., p. 45), we read, '' that the reality of the
Categorical Imperative is not a fact of experience."
Now if we put all this together, we can hardly avoid
the suspicion that Kant is jesting at his readers'
expense. But although this practice may be allowed
by the present philosophical public of Germany, and
seem good in their eyes, yet in Kant's time it was
not so much in vogue ; and besides, Ethics, then,
as always, was precisely the subject that least of
all could lend itself to jokes. Hence we must
continue to hold the conviction that what can neither
be conceived as possible, nor proved as actual, is
destitute of all credentials to attest its existence.
And if, by a strong effort of the imagination, we
try to picture to ourselves a man, possessed, as it
were, by a daemon, in the form of an absolute Ought,

104 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

that speaks only in Categorical Imperatives, and,
confronting his wishes and inclinations, claims to be
the perpetual controller of his actions ; iil this figure
we see no true portrait of human nature, or of
our inner life ; what we do discern is an artificial
substitute for theological Morals, to which it stands
in the same relation as a wooden leg to a living one.

Our conclusion, therefore, is, that the Kantian
Ethics, like all anterior systems, is devoid of any
sure foundation. As I showed at the outset, in my
examination of its imperative Form, the structure is
at bottom nothing but an inversion of theological
Morals, cloaked in very abstract formulae of an
apparently a priori origin. That this disguise was
most artificial and unrecognisable is the more certain,
from the fact that Kant, in all good faith, wag
actually himself deceived by it, and really believed
that he could establish, independently of all theology,
and on the basis of pure intelligence a 'priori, those
conceptions of the Law and of the bests of Duty,
which obviously have no meaning except in theo-
logical Ethics ; whereas I have sufficiently proved
that with him they are destitute of all real foundation,
and float loosely in mid air. However, the mask at
length falls away in his own workshop, and theo-
logical Ethics stands forth unveiled, as witness his
doctrine of the Highest Good, the Postulates of
Practical Reason ; and lastly, his Moral Theology.
But this revelation freed neither Kant nor the public
from their illusion as to the real state of things ; on
the contrary, both he and they rejoiced to see all
those precepts, which hitherto had been sanctioned

DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE. 105

by Faith, now ratified and established by Ethics
(although only idealiter, and for practical purposes).
The truth is that they, in all sincerity, put the effect
for the cause, and the cause for the effect, inasmuch
as they failed to perceive that at the root of this
system of Morals there lay, as absolutely necessary
assumptions, however tacit and concealed, all the
alleged consequences that had been drawn from it.

At the end of this severe investigation, which must
also have been tiring to my readers, perhaps I may
be allowed, by way of diversion, to make a jesting,
indeed frivolous comparison. I would liken Kant,
in his self-mystification, to a man who at a ball has
been flirting the whole evening with a masked beauty,
in hopes of making a conquest ; till at last, throwing
off her disguise, she reveals herself — as his wife.

CHAPTER VII.

rant's doctkine of conscience.

The alleged Practical Reason with its Categorical
Imperative, is manifestly very closely connected with
Conscience, although essentially difiereut from it in
two respects. In the first place, the Categorical
Imperative, as commanding, necessarily speaks
before the act, whereas CVmscience docs not till after-
wards. Before the act Conscience can at best only
speak indirectly, that is, by means of reflection, which
holds up to it the recollection of previous cases, in
which similar acts after they were committed received
its disapproval. It is on this that the etymology of
the word Gewissen (Conscience) appears to me to
rest, because only what has already taken place is
gewiss ^ (certain). Undoubtedly, through external
inducement and kindled emotion, or by reason of
the internal discord of bad humour, impure, base
thoughts, and evil desires rise up in all people,
even in the best. But for these a man is not morally
responsible, and need not load his conscience with
them ; since they only show what the genus homo^
not what the individual, who thinks them, would be

' Both words are, of course, derived from zoissen = scire =
fldfpai. — {Trandator.)

106

Kant's doctrine of conscience. 107

capable of doing. Other motives, if not simul-
taneously, yet almost immediately, come into his
consciousness, and confronting the unworthy inclina-
tions prevent them from ever being crystallised into
deeds ; thus causing them to resemble the out- voted
minority of an acting committee. By deeds alone
each person gains an empirical knowledge no less
of himself than of others, just as it is deeds alone
that burden the conscience. For, unlike thoughts,
these are not problematic ; on the contrary, they
are certain (jewiss), they are unchangeable, and
are not only thought, but known {gewusst). The
Latin conscientia^ and the Greek avveiSrjai^; ^ have
the same sense. Conscience is thus the knowledge
that a man has about what he has done.

The second point of difference between the alleged
Categorical Imperative and Conscience is, that the
latter always draws its material from experience ;
which the former cannot do, since it is purely a
prioj'i. Nevertheless, we may reasonably suppose
that Kant's Doctrine of Conscience will throw some
light on this new conception of an absolute Ought
which he introduced. His theory is most completely
set forth in the Metaphysische Anfangsgrilnde zur
Tugendlehre, § 13, and in the following criticism I
shall assume that the few pages which contain it
are lying before the reader.

' Cf . Horace's conscire sibi, pallescere culpa : Epist. I. 1 ,
61. To be conscious of having done wrong, to turn pale at
the thought of the crime.

* 2vviibri(Tis = consciousness {oi right or wrong done). —
{Translator.)

108 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

The Kantian interpretation of Conscience makes
an exceedingly imposing effect, before which one
nsed to stand with reverential awe, and all the less
confidence was felt in demurring to it, because there
lay heavy on the mind the ever-present fear of having
theoretical objections construed as practical, and, if
the correctness of Kant's view were denied, of being
regarded as devoid of conscience. I, however, cannot
be led astray in this manner, since the question here
is of theory, not of practice ; and I am not concerned
with the preaching of Morals, but with the exact
investigation of the ultimate ethical basis.

We notice at once that Kant employs exclusively
Latin legal terminology, which, however, would seem
little adapted to reflect the most secret stirrings of
the human heart. Yet this language, this judicial
way of treating the subject, he retains from first
to last, as though it were essential and proper
to the matter. And so we find brought upon the
stage of our inner self a complete Court of justice,
with indictment, judge, plaintiff, defendant, and
sentence ; — nothing is wanting. Now if this tribunal,
as portrayed by Kant, really existed in our breasts,
it would be astonishing if a single person could be
found to be, I do not say, so had, but so stupid, as to
act against his conscience. For such a superuatural
assize, of an entirely special kind, set up in our
consciousness, such a secret court — like another
Fehmgericht ^ — held in the dark recesses of our

' The celebrated Secret Tribunal of Westphalia, which came
into prominence about a.d. 1220. In A.D. 1335 the Arch-
bishop of Cologne was appointed head of all the Fehme

ka.nt's doctrine of conscience. 109

inmost being, would inspire everybody with- a terror
and fear of the gods strong enough to really keep
him from grasping at short transient advantages, in
face of the dreadful threats of superhuman powers,
speaking in tones so near and so clear. In real
life, on the contrary, we find that the efficiency of
conscience is generally considered such a vanishing
quantity that all peoples have bethought themselves
of helping it out by means of positive religion, or
even of entirely replacing it by the latter. Moreover,
if Conscience were indeed of this peculiar nature,
the Royal Society could never have thought of the
question put for the present Prize Essay.

But if we look more closely at Kant's exposition,
we shall find that its imposing effect is mainly pro-
duced by the fact that he attributes to the moral
verdict passed on ourselves, as its peculiar and
essential characteristic, a form which in fact is not so
at all. This metaphorical bar of judgment is no more
applicable to moral self-examination than it is to
every other reflection as regards what we have done,
and might have done otherwise, where no ethical
question is involved. For it is not only true that
the same procedure of indictment, defence, and
sentence is occasionally assumed by that obviously
spurious and artificial conscience which is based on
mere superstition ; as, for instance, when a Hindu
reproaches himself with having been the murderer of

benches in Westphalia by the Emperor Charles IV. The
reader will remember the description of the trial scene in
Scott's Anne of Geierstein. Perhaps the Court of Star Chamber
comes nearest to it in English History. — {Translator.)

110 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

a COW, or when a Jew remembers that he has smoked
his pipe at home on the Sabbath ; but even the self-
questioning which springs from no ethical source,
being indeed rather unmoral than moral, often
appears in a shape of this sort, as the following case
may exemplify. Suppose I, good-naturedly, but
thoughtlessly, have made myself surety for a friend,
and suppose there comes with evening the clear
perception of the heavy responsibility I have taken on
myself — a responsibility that may easily involve me
in serious trouble, as the wise old saying, iyyva' irdpa
8' dra ! ^ predicts ; then at once there rise up within
me the Accuser and the Counsel for the defence, ready
to confront each other. The latter endeavours to
palliate my rashness in giving bail so hastily, by
pointing out the stress of circumstance or of obliga-
tion, or, it may be, the simple straightforwardness
of the transaction ; perhaps he even seeks excuse by
commending my kind heart. Last of all comes the
Judge who inexorably passes the sentence : " A fool's
piece of work ! " and 1 am overwhelmed withconfusion
So much for this judicial form of which Kant is so
fond ; his other modes of expression are, for the most
part, open to the same criticism. For instance, that
which he attributes to conscience, at the beginning of
the paragraph, as its peculiar property, applies equally
to all other scruples of an entirely different sort. He
says : " It (conscience) follows him like his shadow,
try though he may to escape. By pleasures and

' If you give a pledge, be sure that Ate (the goddess of
mischief) is beside you ; i.e., beware of giving pledges. — Thales
ap. Plat. Charm. 165 A.

kant's doctrine of conscience. Ill

distractions lie may be stupefied and In lied to sleep,
but he cannot avoid occasionally waking up and
coming to himself ; and then he is immediately
aware of the terrible voice," etc. Obviously, this may
be just as well understood, word for word, of the
secret consciousness of some person of private means,
who feels that his expenses far exceed his income,
and that thus his capital is being affected, and will
gradually melt away.

We have seen that Kant represents the use of
legal terms as essential to the subject, and that he
keeps to them from beginning to end ; let it now
be noted how he employs the same style for the
following finely devised sophism. He says : " That
a person accused by his conscience should be identi-
fied with the judge is an absurd way of portraying
a court of justice ; for in that case the accuser
would invariably lose." And he adds, by way of
elucidating this statement, a very ambiguous and
obscure note. His conclusion is that, if we would
avoid falling into a contradiction, we must think
of the judge (in the judicial conscience-drama that
is enacted in our breasts) as different from us, in
fact, as another person ; nay more, as one that is
an omniscient knower of hearts, whose bests are
obligatory on all, and who is almighty for every
purpose of executive authority.^ He thus passes by a

• Kant leads up to this position with great ingenuity, by-
having recourse to the theory of the two characters coexistent
in man — the noumenal (or intelligible) and the empirical ;
the one being in time, the other, timeless ; the one, fast bound
by the law of causality, the other free. — (Translator.)

112 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

perfectly smooth path from conscience to superstition,
making the latter a necessary consequence of the
former ; while he is secretly sure that he will be
all the more willingly followed because the reader's
earliest training will have certainly rendered him
familiar with such ideas, if not have made them his
second nature. Here, then, Kant finds an easy task,
— a thing he ought rather to have despised; for
he should have concerned himself not only with
preaching, but also with practising truthfulness. I
entirely reject the above quoted sentence, and all the
conclusions consequent thereon, and I declare it to
be nothing but a shuffling trick. It is not true that
the accuser must always lose, when the accused is
the same person as the judge ; at least not in the
court of judgment in our hearts. In the instance I
gave of one man going surety for another, did the
accuser lose ? Or must we in this case also, if we
wish to avoid a contradiction, really assume a per-
sonification after Kant's fashion, and be driven to
view objectively as another person that voice whose
deliverance would have been those terrible words :
" A fool's piece of work I " ? A sort of Mercury,
forsooth, in living flesh ? Or perhaps a prosopopoeia
of the Mr]Ti^ (cunning) recommended by Homer (11.
xxiii. 313 sqq.)?^ But thus we should only be
landed, as before, on the broad path of superstition,
aye, and pagan superstition too.

It is in this passage that Kant indicates his Moral
Theology, briefly indeed, yet not without all its vital
points. The fact that he takes care not to attribute

' 'A\X' aye 8fj <rv, <^iXor, imtjtiv e/x/SaXXco dvfia, k.t.X.

kant's doctrine of conscience. 113

to it any objective validity, but rather to present it
merely as a form subjectively unavoidable, does not
free him from the arbitrariness with which he con-
structs it, even though he only claims its necessity
for human consciousness. His fabric rests, as we
have seen, on a tissue of baseless assumptions.

So much, then, is certain. The entire imagery —
that of a judicial drama — whereby Kant depicts con-
science is wholly unessential and in no way peculiar
to it ; although he keeps this figure, as if it were
proper to the subject, right through to the end, in
order finally to deduce certain conclusions from it.
As a matter of fact it is a sufficiently common form,
which our thoughts easily take when we consider any
circumstance of real life. It is due for the most part
to the conflict of opposing motives which usually
spring up, and which are successively weighed and
tested by our reflecting reason. And no difference is
made whether these motives are moral or egoistic in
their nature, nor whether our deliberations are con-
cerned with some action in the past, or in the future.
Now if we strip from Kant's exposition its dress of
legal metaphor, which is only an optional dramatic
appendage, the surrounding nimbus with all its
imposing eff'ect immediately disappears as well, and
there remains nothing but the fact that sometimes,
when we think over our actions, we are seized
with a certain self-dissatisfaction, which is marked
by a special characteristic. It is with our conduct
per se that we are discontented, not with its result,
and this feeling does not, as in every other case in
which we regret the stupidity of our behaviour, rest

8

114 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

on egoistic grounds. For on these occasions the cause
of our dissatisfaction is precisely because we have
been too egoistic, because we liave taken too much
thought for ourselves, and not enough for our
neighbour ; or perhaps even because, without any
resulting advantage, we have made the misery of
others an object in itself. That we may be dissatisfied
with ourselves, and saddened by reason of sufferings
which we have inflicted, not undergone, is a plain
fact and impossible to be denied. The connection of
this with the only ethical basis that can stand an
adequate test we shall examine further oq. But
Kant, like a clever special pleader, tried by magnifying
and embellishing the original datum to make all that
he possibly could of it, in order to prepare a very
broad foundation for his Ethics and Moral Theology.

CHAPTER VIII.

kant's doctrine of the intelligible 1
and empirical character. theory of freedom.

The attack I have made, in the cause of truth, on
Kant's system of Morals, does not, like those of my
predecessors, touch the surface only, but penetrates to
its deepest roots. It seems, therefore, only just that,
before I leave this part of my subject, I should bring
to remembrance the brilliant and conspicuous service
which he nevertheless rendered to ethical science.
I allude to his doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom
and Necessity. We find it first in the Kritik der
lieinen Vernunft (pp. 533-554 of the first, and pp. 561-
582 of the fifth, edition) ; but it is still more clearly
expounded in the Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft
(fourth edition, pp. 169-179 ; K, pp. 224-231).

The strict and absolute necessity of the acts of
Will, determined by motives as they arise, was first
shown by Hobbes, then by Spinoza, and Hume, and
also by Dietrich von Holbach in his Systeme de la
Nature ; and lastly by Priestley it was most com-
pletely and precisely demonstrated. This point,
indeed, has been so clearly proved, and placed beyond

' V. Note onj " intelligible " in Chapter I. of this Part. —
{Translator.)

115

116 THE BASIS OF MORALirY,

all doubt, that it must be reckoned among the
number of perfectly established truths, and only-
crass ignorance could continue to speak of a freedom,
of a liberum arbitrium inclifferentiae (a free and
indifferent choice) in the individual acts of men. Nor
did Kant, owing to the irrefutable reasoning of his
predecessors, hesitate to consider the Will as fast
bound in the chains of Necessity, the matter admitting,
as he thought, of no further dispute or doubt. This
is proved by all the passages in which he speaks of
freedom only from the theoretical standpoint. Never-
theless, it is true that onr actions are attended with
a consciousness of independence and original initi-
ative, which makes us recognise them as our own
work, and every one with ineradicable certainty
feels that he is the real author of his conduct, and
morally responsible for it. But since responsibility
implies the possibility of having acted otherwise,
which possibility means freedom in some sort or
manner ; therefore in the consciousness of responsi-
bility is indirectly involved also the consciousness
of freedom. The key to resolve the contradiction,
that thus arises out of the nature of the case, was
at last found by Kant through the distinction he
drew with profound acumen, between phaenomena
and the Thing in itself (das Ding an sick). This
distinction is the very core of his wliole philosophy,
and its greatest merit.

The individual, with his immutable, innate character,
strictly determined in all his modes of expression
by the law of Causality, which, as acting through
the medium of the intellect, is here called by the

THE INTELLIGIBLE AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER. 117

name of Motivation, — the individual so constituted
is only the phaenomenon {Erscheinung). The Thing
in itself which underlies this phaenomenon is outside
of Time and Space, consequently free from all
succession and plurality, one, and changeless. Its
constitution in itself is the intelligible character,
which is equally present in all the acts of the
individual, and stamped on every one of them,
like the impress of a signet on a thousand seals.
The empirical character of the phaenomenon — the
character which manifests itself in time, and in
succession of acts — is thus determined by the in-
telligible character ; and consequently, the individual,
as phaenomenon, in all his modes of expression,
which are called forth by motives, must show the
invariableness of a natural law. Whence it results
that all his actions are governed by strict necessity.
Now it used to be commonly maintained that the
character of a man may be transformed by moral
admonitions and remonstrances appealing to reason ;
but when the distinction between the intelligible
and empirical character had once been drawn, it
followed that the unchangeableness, the inflexible
rigidity of the empirical character, which thinking
people had always observed, was explained and
traced to a rational basis, and consequently accepted
as an established fact by Philosophy, Thus the
latter was so far harmonised with experience, and
ceased to stand abashed before popular wisdom,
which long before had spoken the words of truth
in the Spanish proverb : Lo que entra con el
capillOy sale con la mortaja (that which comes in

118 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

with the child's cap, goes ont with the winding-
sheet) ; or : Lo que en la leche se mama, en la
mortaja se derrama (what is imbibed with the nailk,
is poured out again in the winding-sheet).

This doctrine of the coexistence of Freedom and
Necessity I regard as the greatest of all the achieve-
ments of human sagacity. With the Transcendental
Aesthetics it forms the two great diamonds in the
crown of Kant's fame, which will never pass away.
In his Treatise on Freedom, Schelling obviously
served up the Kantain teaching in a paraphrase,
which by reason of its lively colouring and graphic
delineation, is for many people more comprehensible.
The work would deserve praise if its author had
had the honesty to say that he is drawing on Kant's
wisdom, not on his own. As it is, a certain part
of the philosophic public still credits him with the
entire performance.

The theory itself, and the whole question re-
garding the nature of Freedom, can be better
understood if we view them in connection with a
general truth, which I think, is most concisely
expressed by a formnla frequently occurring in the
scholastic writings : Operari sequitur esse} In other
words, everything in the world ()i)erates in accordance
with what it is, in accordance with its inherent
nature, in which, consequently, all its modes of
expression are already contained potentially, while
actually they are manifested when elicited by external
causes ; so that external causes are the means
whereby the essential constitution of the thing is
* I.e., Avhat is done is a consequence of that which is.

THE INTELLIGIBLE AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER. 119

revealed. And the modes of expression so resulting
form the empirical character ; whereas its hidden,
ultimate basis, which is inaccessible to experience,
is the intelligible character, that is, the real nature
'per se of the particular thing in question. Man
forms no exception to the rest of nature ; he too
has a changeless character, which, however, is strictly
individual and different in each case. This character
is of course empirical as far as we can grasp it, and
therefore only phaenomenal ; while the intelligible
character is whatever may be the real nature m
itself of the person. His actions one and all, being,
as regards their external constitution, determined
by motives, can never be shaped otherwise than in
accordance with the unchangeable individual char-
acter. As a man is, so he his bound to act. Hence
for a given person in every single case, there is
absolutely only one way of acting possible : Operari
sequitar esse} Freedom belongs only to the in-
telligible character, not to the empirical. The operari
(conduct) of a given individual is necessarily
determined externally by motives, internally by his
character ; therefore everything that he does neces-
sarily takes place. But in his esse (i.e., in what
he is), there, we find Freedom. He might have
been something different ; and guilt or merit attaches
to that which he is. All that he does follows
from what he is, as a mere corollary. Through
Kant's doctrine we are freed from the primary error
of connecting Necessity with esse (what one is),
and Freedom with operari (what one does) ; we
' I.e., his acts are a consequence of what he is.

120 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

become aware that this is a misplacement of terms,
and that exactly the inverse arrangement is the
true one. Hence it is char that the moral responsi-
bility of a man, while it first of all, and obviously,
of course, touches what he does, yet at bottom
touches what he is ; because, what he is being the
original datum, his conduct, as motives arise, could
never take any other course than that which it
actually does take. But, however strict be the
necessity, whereby, in the individual, acts are elicited
by motives, it yet never occurs to anybody — not
even to him who is convinced of this necessity —
to exonerate himself on that account, and cast
the blame on the motives ; for he knows well
enough that, objectively considered, any given cir-
cumstance, and its causes, perfectly admitted quite
a difierent, indeed, a directly opposite course of
action ; nay, that such a course would actually have
taken place, if only he had been a different person.
That he is precisely such a one as his conduct
proclaims him to be, and no other — this it is for
which he feels himself responsible ; in his esse (what
he is) lies the vulnerable place, where the sting of
conscience penetrates. For Conscience is nothing but
acquaintance with one's own self— an acquaintance
that arises out of one's actual mode of conduct, and
which becomes ever more intimate. So that it is the
esse (what one is) which in reality is accused by
conscience, while the operari (what one does) sup-
plies the incriminating evidence. Since we are only
conscious of Freedom through the sense of responsi-
bility ; therefore where the latter lies the former must

THEORY OF FREEDOM. 121

also be ; in the esse (in one's being). It is the
operari (what one does) that is subject to necessity.
Bat we can only get to know ourselves, as well as
others empirically ; we have no a jjriori knowledge
of OUT character. Certainly oiti* natural tendency
is to cherish a very high opinion of it, because the
maxim : Quisque praesumitur bonus, donee probetur
eontrarium (every one is presumed to be good, until
the contrary is proved), is perhaps even more true of
the inner court of justice than of the world's tribunals.

NOTE.

He who is capable of recognising the essential
part of a thought, though clothed in a dress very
dijfferent from what he is familiar with, will see,
as I do, that this Kantian doctrine of the intelligible
and emj)irical character is a piece of insight already
possessed by Plato. The ditiference is, that with Kant
it is sublimated to an abstract clearness ; with Plato
it is treated mythically, and connected with metem-
psychosis, because, as he did not perceive the ideality
of Time, he could only represent it under a temporal
form. The identity of the one doctrine with the other
becomes exceedingly plain, if we read the explana-
tion and illustration of the Platonic myth, which
Porphyrins has given with such clear exactitude,
that its agreement with the abstract language of Kant
comes out unmistakably. In the second book of his
Eclogues, chap, 8, §§ 37-40,^ Stobaeus has preserved

^ V. Joannes Stobaeus. Eclogae Phydcae et Ethicae, edit.
Curtius Waclismuth et Otto Hense ; Weidmann, Berlin, 1884.
Vol. IL, pp. Wi-IQ^.— {Translator,)

122 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

for ns in extenso that part of one of Porphyrins' lost
writings which specially comments on the myth in
question, as Plato gives it in the second half of
the tenth book of the Republic.^ The whole section
is eminently worth reading. As a specimen I shall
qnote the short § 39, in the hope of inducing any
one who cares for these things to study Stobaeus
for himself. It will then immediately become ap-
parent that this Platonic myth is nothing less than
an allegory of the profound truth which Kant stated
in its abstract purity, as the doctrine of the intelligible
and empirical character, and consequently that the
latter had been reached, in its essentials, by Plato
thousands of years ago. Indeed, this view seems to
go back much further still, for Porphyrins is of opinion
that Plato took it from tlie Egyptians. Certainly
we already find the same theory in the Brahraanical
doctrine of metempsychosis, and it is from this Indian
source that the Egyptian priests, in all i)robability,
derived their wisdom. § 39 is as follows : —

To 'yap oKov ^ovkqjxa toiovt eoiK€v elvai to tov
TI\dT(ovo<i' €)(eiv fvev to avTe^ovaiov ra? ■^v')(^a<;, irplv
elf (T(o/j(,aTa koL ^iov<i Siacfiepovi €fj,7recrelv, et? to r) tovtou
TOV ^iov eXeadai, r) dWov, 6v, /jbeTa ttoio.^ ^wtj^ kuI
a(ofzaTO<; oIkclov ttj ^(orj^ CKTeXeaecv fxeWei' (kuI yap
\eopTO<{ ^iov eV avrfj elvav eXeaOai, /cal avSpo-i).
KaK€Lvo fjbivTOi TO avTe^ovcTiop, dixa TJj Trpo? Tiva tmu
TOiovTOiv /Si&jy TTTCoaei, e/u,7r€7r6Bt,aTat. Karekdovcrai
yap et? to, acofjuaTa, Kal dvTi "^v^wv diroXvToyv yeyovvlav
■y^v')(aX ^(ocov, to avTe^ovaiov (pepovaiv oiKelov Ty tov

^ V. Plat., Rep., edit. Stallbaum, 614 sqq. It is the arroXoyo?
'Hpoy TOV 'Apfieviov. — (Translator.)

THEORY OF FREEDOM. 123

^(oov KaraaKeinj, koX e0' wv fiev eTvac iroXvvovv koX
7ro\uKLV7)TOV, o)? cV avdpcoTTOv, i<j} SiV he okiyoKivrjTov
KoX fiovorpoTTov, ft)? iirl rcav aXKwv a^^Sov irdvTbw ^cocov.
'Hprrjcrdai Be to avre^ovatov tovto airo t^? KaraaKeri)^^
Kivovfievov fiev e^ avrov, (f)ep6/.tevov Be Kara ra? eV tt}?
Kara(TKeDrj<i yiyi'ofi€va<i 7rpo6vfxia<;^

^ To sum up. What Plato meant seems to be this. Souls
(he said) have free power, before passing into bodies and different
modes of being, to choose this or that form of life, which they
will pass through in a certain kind of existence, and in a body
adapted thereto. (For a soul may choose a lion's, equally
with a man's, mode of being.) But this free power of choice
is removed simultaneously with entrance into one or other of
such forms of life. For when once they have descended into
bodies, and instead of unfettered souls have become the souls
of living things, then they take that measure of free power
which belongs in each case to the organism of the living thing.
In some forms this power is very intelligent and full of
movement, as in man ; in some it has but little energy, and is
of a simple nature, as in almost all other creatures. More-
over, this free power depends on the organism in such a
way that while its capability of action is caused by itself
alone, its impulses are determined by the desires which have
their origin in the organism. — {Translator.)

CHAPTER IX.

fichte's ethics as a magnifying glass for the
errors of the kantian.

Just as in Anatomy and Zoology, many things are
not so obvious to the pupil in preparations and
natural products as in engravings where there is
some exaggeration ; so if there is any one who, after
the above criticism, is still not entirely satisfied as
to the worthlessness of the Kantian foundation of
Ethics, I would recommend him Fichte's System der
Sittenlekre^ as a sure means of freeing him from
all doubt.

In the old German Marionnettes a fool always
accompanied the emperor, or hero, so that he might
afterwards give in his own way a highly coloured
version of what had been said or done In like
manner behind the great Kant there stands the
author of the Wissenschaftslehre, ^ a true Wissen-
schaftsleere? In order to secure his own, and his
family's welfare, Fichte formed the idea of creating
a sensation by means of subtle mystification. It
was a very suitable and reasonable plan, considering

^ I.e. Scientific Doctrine.

^ I.e. Scientific Blank. Perhaps we might translate :—
"Scientific Instruction" and "Scientific Misinstr action." —
{Translator^

124

fichte's ethics as a magnifying glass 125

the nature of the German philosophic public, and
he executed it admirably by outdoing Kant in every
particular. He appeared as the latter's living
superlative, and produced a perfect caricature of
his philosophy by magnifying all its salient points.
Nor did the Ethics escape similar treatment. In
his System der Sittenlehre^ we find the Categorical
Imperative grown into a Despotic Imperative ; while
the absolute " Ought," the law-giving Reason, and
the Hest of Duty have developed into a moral Fate,
an unfathomable Necessity, requiring mankind to
act strictly in accordance with certain maxims.
To judge (pp. 308, 309) from the pompous show
made, a great deal must depend on these formulae,
although one never quite discovers what. So much
only seems clear. As in bees there is implanted
an instinct to build cells and a hive for life in
common, so men (it is alleged) are endowed with
an impulse leading them to play in common a
great, strictly moral, world-embracing Comedy, their
part being merely to figure as puppets — nothing
else. But there is this important difi'erence between
the bees and men. The hive is really brought to
completion ; while instead of a moral World-Comedy,
as a matter of fact, an exceedingly immoral one is
enacted. Here, then, we see the imperative form
of the Kantian Ethics, the moral Law, and the
absolute " Ought " pushed farther and further till
a system of ethical Fatalism is evolved, which, as
it is worked out, lapses at times into the comic.^

' As evidence of the truth of my words, space prevents me
from quoting more than a few passages. P. 196 : " The moral

126 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

If in Kant's doctrine we trace a certain moral
pedantry ; with Fichte this pedantry reaches the
absurd, and furnishes abundant material for satire.
Let the reader notice, for example (pp. 407-409),
how he decides the well-known instance of casuistry,
where of two human lives one must be lost. We find
indeed all the errors of Kant raised to the superlative.
Thus, on p. 199, we read : " To act in accordance with

instinct is absolute, and its requirements are peremptory,
without any object outside itseK." P. 232 : " In consequence
of the Moral Law, the empirical Being in Time must be an
exact copy of the original Ego." P. 308 : " The whole man
is a vehicle of the Moral Law." P. 342 : " I am only an
instrument, a mere tool of the Moral Law, not in any sense
an end." P. 343: "The end laid before every one is to be
the means of realising Reason : this is the ultimate purpose
of his existence ; for this alone he has his being, and if this
end should not be attained, there is not the least occasion
for him to live." P. 347 : "I am an instrument of the Moral
Law in the phaenomenal world." P. 360 : " It is an ordinance
of the Moral Law to nourish one's body, and study one's
health ; this of course should be done in no way, and for no
other purpose, except to provide an efficient instrument for
furthering the end decreed by Reason, i.e., its realisation," —
(cf. p. 371.) P. 376 : " Every human body is an instrument
for furthering the end decreed by Reason, i.e., its realisation ;
therefore the greatest possible fitness of each instrument must
constitute for me an end : consequently I must take thought
for every one." — This is Fichte's derivation of loving-kindness !
P. 377 : " I can and dare take thought for myself, solely
because, and is so far as I am, an instrunie7it of the Moral
Law." P. 388 : " To defend a hunted man attthe risk of one's
own life, is an absolute duty ; whenever the life of another
human being is in danger, you have no right to think of the
safety ot your own." P. 420 : " In the province of the Moral
Law there is no way whatever of regarding my feUow-man
except as an instrument of Reason."

ftchte's ethics as a magnifying glass 127

the dictates of sympathy, of compassion, and of
loving-kindness is distinctly unmoral ; indeed this
line of conduct, as such, is contrary to morality."
Again, on p. 402 : " The impulse that makes us ready
to serve others must never be an inconsiderate good-
nature, but a clearly thought-out purpose ; that, namely,
of furthering as much as possible the causality of
Reason." However, between these sallies of ridiculous
I)edantry, Fichte's real philosophic crudeness peeps
out clearly enough, as we might only expect in the
case of a man whose teaching left no time for learn-
ing. He seriously puts forward the liberum arbitrium
indifferentiae (a free and indiflferent choice), giving
as its foundation the most trivial and frivolous
reasons. (Pp. 160, 173, 205, 208, 237, 259, 261.)
There can be no doubt that a motive, althougli
working through the medium of the intelligence,
is, nevertheless, a cause, and consequently involves
the same necessity of effect as all other causes;
the corollary being that all human action is a strictly
necessary result. Whoever remains unconvinced of
this, is still, philosophically speaking, barbarous, and
ignorant of the rudiments of exact knowledge. The
perception of the strict necessity governing man's
conduct forms the line of demarcation which separates
philosophic heads from all others ; arrived at this
limit Fichte clearly showed that he belonged to the
others. Moreover, following the footsteps of Kant
(p. 303), he proceeds to make various statements
vsrhich are in direct contradiction to the above
mentioned passages ; but this inconsistency, like
many more in his writings, only proves that he,

128 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

being one who was never serious in the search for
truth, possessed no strong convictions to build on ;
as indeed for his purpose they were not in the least
necessary. Nothing is more laughable than the fact
that this man has received so much posthumous
praise for strictly consequential reasoning ; his
pedantic style full of loud declamation about trifling
matters being actually mistaken for such.

The most complete development of Fichte's system
of moral Fatalism is found in his last work : Die
Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem Allgemeinen Uminsse
Dargestellt, Berlin, 1810. It has the advantage of
being only forty-six pages (duodecimo) long, while it
contains his whole philosophy in a nutshell. It is
therefore to be recommended to all those who consider
their time too precious to be wasted on his larger
productions, which are framed with a length and
tediousness worthy of Christian Wolff, and with the
intention, in reality, of deluding, not of instructing
the reader. In this little treatise we read on p. 32 :
" The intuitive perception of a phaenomenal world
only came about, to the end that in such a world the
Ego as the absolute Ought might be visible to itself."
On p. 33 we actually find : " The ought," {i.e., the
moral necessity,) "of the Ought's visibility ;" and on
p. 36 : " An ought," {i.e., a moral necessity,) " of the
perception that I ought." This, then, is what we have
come to so soon after Kant ! His imperative Form,
with its unproved Ought, which it secured as a most
convenient irov arrSi (standpoint), is indeed an exemplar
vitiis imitabile !

For the rest, all that I have said does not

fichte's ethics as a magnifying glass. 129

overthrow the service Fichte rendered. Kant's
philosophy, this late masterpiece of human sagacity,
in the very land where it arose, he obscured, nay,
supplanted by empty, bombastic superlatives, by
extravagances, and by the nonsense which is found,
in his Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre,
appearing under the disguise of profound penetration.
His merit was thus to show the world unmistakably
what the capacity of the German philosophical
public is ; for he made it play the part of a child
who is coaxed into giving up a precious gem in
exchange for a Niirnberg toy. The fame he obtained
in this fashion still lives on credit ; and still Fichte
is always mentioned in the same breath with Kant
as being another such {'HpaK\i]<} koI Tr/^iy/co? I ^).
Indeed his name is often placed above the latter's. '
It was, of course, Fichte's example that encouraged
his successors in the art of enveloping the German
people in philosophic fog. These were animated by
the same spirit, and crowned with the same prosperity. .
Every one knows their names ; nor is this the place
to consider them at length. Needless to say, their
different opinions, down to the minutest details, are

' I.e-, Hercules and an ape. A Greek proverb denoting
the juxtaposition of the sublime and the ridiculous. V. Greg.
Cypr. M. 3, 66 ; Macar. 4, 53 ; Luc. pise. 37 ; and Schol.
Bachni. An. 2, 2Z2.—{Translatm:)

^ My proof for this is a passage from the latest philosophical
literature. Herr Feuerbach, an Hegehan {c'est tout dire ! )
in his book, Pierre Bayle : Ein Beitrag zur Geschiclite der
Philosophie, 1838, p. 80, writes as follows : " But still more
sublime than Kant's are Fichte's ideas as expressed in his
Doctrine of Morals and elsewhere. Christianity has nothing
in sublimity that could bear comparison with them."

9

130 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

still set forth, and seriously discussed, by the Pro-
fessors of Philosophy ; as if one had really to do
with philosophers ! We must, then, thank Fichte
for lucid documents now existing, which will have
to be revised one day before the Tribunal of posterity,
that Court of Appeal from the verdicts of the present,
which — like the Last Judgment looked forward to
by the Saints — at almost all periods, has been left
to give to true merit its just award.

part IIL
THE FOUNDING OP ETHICS.

CHAPTER I.

CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM.

Thus the fonndation which Kant gave to Ethics,
which for the last sixty years has been regarded as
a sure basis, proves to be an inadmissible assumption,
and merely theological Morals in disguise ; it sinks
therefore before our eyes into the deep gulf of
philosophic error, which perhaps will never be filled
up. That the previous attempts to lay a foundation
are still less satisfactory, I take for granted, as I
have already said. They consist, for the most part,
of nnproved assertions, drawn from the impalpable
world of dreams, and at the same time — like Kant's
system itself — full of an artificial subtlety dealing
with the finest distinctions, and resting on the
most abstract conceptions. We find difficult combi-
nations ; rules invented for the purpose ; formulae
balanced on a needle's point ; and stilted maxims,
from which it is no longer possible to look down
and see life as it really is with all its turmoil.
Such niceties are doubtless admirably adapted for
the lecture-room, if only with a view to sharpen-
ing the wits ; but they can never be the cause of
the impulse to act justly and to do good, which
is found in every man ; as also they are powerless

133

134 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

to counterbalance the deep-seated tendency to in-
justice and hardness of heart. Neither is it possible
to fasten the reproaches of conscience upon them ; to
attribute the former to the breaking of such hair-
splitting precepts only serves to make the same
ridiculous. In a word, artificial associations of ideas
like these cannot possibly — if we take the matter
seriously — contain the true incentive to justice and
loving-kindness. Rather must this be something
that requires but little reflection, and still less
abstraction and complicated synthesis ; something
that, independent of the training of the understanding,
speaks to every one, even to the rudest,— a something
resting simply on intuitive perception, and forcing its
way home as a direct emanation from the reality of
things. So long as Ethics cannot point to a foundation
of this sort, she may go on with her discussions, and
make a great display in the lecture-rooms ; but real
life will only pour contempt upon her. I must there-
fore give our moralists the paradoxical advice, first
to look about them a little among: their fellow-men.

CHAPTER II.

SCEPTICAL VIEW.

But when we cast a retrospect over the attempts
made, and made in vain, for more than two thousand
years, to find a sure basis for Ethics, ought we not
perhaps to think that after all there is no natural
morality, independent of human institution ? Shall
we not conclude that all moral systems are nothing
but artificial products, means invented for the better
restraint of the selfish and wicked race of men ; and
further, that, as they have no internal credentials
and no natural basis, they would fail in their purpose,
if without the support of positive religion ? The
legal code and the police are not sufficient in all
cases ; there are offences, the discovery of which is
too difficult ; some, indeed, where punishment is a
precarious matter ; where, in short, we are left
without public protection. Moreover, the civil law
can at most enforce justice, not loving-kindness and
beneficence ; because, of course, these are qualities
as regards which every one would like to play the
passive, and no one the active, part. All this has
given rise to the hypothesis that morality rests
solely on religion, and that both have the same
aim — that of being complementary to the necessary

135

136 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

inadequacy of state machinery and legislation.
Consequently, there cannot be (it is said) a natural
morality, i.e., one based simply on the nature of
things, or of man, and the fruitless search of
philosophers for its foundation is explained. This
view is not without plausibility ; and we find it as
far back as the Pyrrhonians :

oijTf ayaOov ri e'ori <f)V(Tfi, ovrt kukou,

dXX.a irpbs avOpanav ravra v6a KeKpirai,
Kara top Ti/iwva.^

— Sext. Emp. adv. Math., XI., 140.

Also in modern times distinguished thinkers have
given their adherence to it. A careful examination
therefore it deserves; although the easier course would
be to shelve it by giving an inquisitorial glance at the
consciences of those in whom such a theory could arise.
We should fall into a great, a very childish
blunder, if we believed all the just and legal actions
of mankind to have a moral origin. This is far from
being the case. As a rule, between the justice, which
men practise, and genuine singleness of heart, there
exists a relation analogous to that between polite
expressions, and the true love of one's neighbour,
which, unlike the former, does not ostensibly over-
come Egoism, but really does so. That honesty of
sentiment, everywhere so carefully exhibited, which

* I.e., there is nothing either good or bad by nature, but
these things are decided by human judgment, as Timon says.
V. Sexti Empirici Oj^era Quae Exstant : Adversus Mathe-
maticos ; p. 462 A ad Jin. Aurelianae : Petrus et Jacobus
Chouet, 1621. V. also : Sexti Empirici Oi^era, edit. Jo. Albertus
Fabricius : Lipsiae, 1718, Lib. XI., 140, p. 716.

SCEPTICAL VIEW. 137

requires to be regarded as above all suspicion ; that
deep indignation, which is stirred by the smallest
sign of a doubt in this direction, and is ready to break
out into furious anger ; — to what are we to attri-
bute these symptoms ? None but the inexperienced
and simple will take them for pure coin, for the work-
ing of a fine moral feeling, or conscience. In point
of fact, the general correctness of conduct which is
adopted in human intercourse, and insisted on as
a rule no less immovable than the hills, depends
principally on two external necessities ; first, on legal
ordinance, by virtue of which the rights of every
man are protected by public authority ; and secondly,
on the recognised need of possessing civil honour,
-in other words, a good name, in order to advance
in the world. This is why the steps taken by the
individual are closely watched by public opinion,
which is so inexorably severe that it never forgives
even a single false move or slip, but remembers
it against the guilty person as an indelible blot, all
his life long. As far as this goes, public opinion
is wise enough ; for, starting from the fundamental
principle : Operari sequitur esse (what one does is
determined by what one is), it shows its conviction
that the character is unchangeable, and that there-
fore what a man has once done, he will assuredly do
again, if only the circumstances be precisely similar.
Such are the two custodians that keep guard on
the correct conduct of people, without which, to
speak frankly, we should be in a sad case, especially
with reference to property, this central point in human
life, around which the chief part of its energy and

138 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

activity revolves. For the purely ethical motives to
integrity, assumiag that they exist, cannot as a rule
be applied, except very indirectly, to the question of
ownership as guaranteed by the state. These motives,
in fact, have a direct and essential bearing only on
natural right ; with positive right their connection is
merely indirect, in so far as the latter is based on the
former. Natural right, however, attaches to no other
property than that which has been gained by one's own
exertion ; because, when this is seized, the owner is
at the same time robbed of all the efforts he expended
in acquiring it. The theory of preoccupancy I reject
absolutely, but cannot here set forth its refutation.^
Now of course all estate based on positive right ought
ultimately and in the last instance (it matters not
how many intermediate links are involved) to rest
on the natural right of possession. But what a
distance there is, in most cases, between the title-
deeds, that belong to our civil life, and this natural
right — their original source ! Indeed their connection
with the latter is generally either very difficult, or
else impossible, to prove. What we hold is ours by
inheritance, by marriage, by success in the lottery ;
or if in no way of this kind, still it is not gained by
our own work, with the sweat of the brow, bnt rather
by shrewdness and bright ideas {e.g.^ in the field
of speculation), yes, and sometimes even by our very
stupidity, which, through a conjunction of circum-
stances, is crowned and glorified by the Deus eventus.
It is only in a very small minority of cases that

^ See Die Welt cUs Wille und Vorstellung, VoUI., § 62, p.
396 sqq., and Vol. II., chap. 47, p. 682.

SCEPTICAL VIEW. 139

property is the fruit of real labour and toil ; and even
then the work is usually mental, like that of lawyers,
doctors, civilians, teachers, etc. ; and this in the eyes
of the rude appears to cost but little effort.

Now, when wealth is acquired in any such fashion,
there is need of considerable education before the ethical
right can be recognised and respected out of a purely
moral impulse. Hence it comes about that not a
few secretly regard the possessions of others as held
merely by virtue of positive right. So, if they find
means to wrest from another man his goods, by using,
or perhaps by evading, the laws, they feel no scruples ;
for in their opinion he would lose what he holds, in
the same way in which he had previously obtained it,
and they consequently regard their own claims as
equal to his. From their point of view, the right of
the stronger in civil society is superseded by the right
of the cleverer.

Incidentally we may notice that the rich man
often shows an inflexible correctness of conduct.
Why ? Because with his whole heart he is attached
to, and rigidly maintains, a rule, on the observance
of which his entire wealth, and all its attendant
advantages, depend. For this reason his profession
of the principle : Suum cuique (to each his own), is
thoroughly in earnest, and shows an unswerving
consistency. No doubt there is an objective loyalty
to sincerity and good faith, which avails to keep them
sacred ; but such loyalty is based simply on the
fact that sincerity and good faith are the foundation
of all free intercourse among men ; of good order ;
and of secure ownership. Consequently they very

140 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

often benefit ourselves, and with this end in view they
mnst be preserved even at some cost : just as a good
piece of land is worth a certain outlay. But integrity
thus derived is, as a rule, only to be met with among
wealthy people, or at least those who are engaged
in a lucrative business. It is an especial characteristic
of tradesmen ; because they have the strongest con-
viction that for all the operations of commerce the
one thing indispensable is mutual trust and credit ;
and this is why mercantile honour stands quite by
itself. On the other hand, the poor man, who cannot
make both ends meet, and who, by reason of the
unequal division of property, sees himself condemned
to want and hard work, while others before his eyes
are lapped in luxury and idleness, will not easily
perceive that the raison d'etre of this inequality is a
corresponding inequality of service and honest industry.
And if he does not recognise this, how is he to be
governed by the purely ethical motive to uprightness,
which should keep him from stretching out his hand
to grasp the superfluity of another ? Generally, it
is the order of government as established by law
that restrains him. But should ever the rare occasion
present itself when he discovers that he is beyond
the reach of the police, an'd that he could by a single
act throw off the galling burden of penury, which is
aggravated by the sight of others' opulence ; if he
feels this, and realises that he could thus enter
into the possession and enjoyment of all that he has
BO often coveted : what is there then to stay his
hand ? Religious dogmas ? It is seldom that faith
is so firm. A purely moral incentive to be just and

SCEPTICAL VIEW. 141

upright ? Perhaps in a few Isolated cases. But in by
far the greater number there is in reality nothing
but the anxiety a man feels to keep his good
name, his civil honour — a thing that touches closely
even those in humble circumstances. He knows
the imminent danger incurred of having to pay
for dishonest conduct by being expelled from the
great Masonic Lodge of honourable people who live
correct lives. He knows that property all over the
world is in their hands, and duly apportioned among
themselves, and that they wield the power of making
him an outcast for life from good society, in case he
commit a single disgraceful action. He knows that
whoever takes one false step in this direction is
marked as a person that no one trusts, whose company
every one shuns, and from whom all advancement is
cut off; to whom, as being " a fellow that has stolen,"
the proverb is applied : " He who steals once is a
thief all his life."

These, then, are the guards that watch over correct
behaviour between man and man, and he who has
lived, and kept his eyes open, will admit that the
vast majority of honourable actions in human inter-
course must be attributed to them ; nay, he will go
further, and say that there are not wanting people
who hope to elude even their vigilance, and who
regard justice and honesty merely as an external
badge, as a flag, under the protection of which they
can carry out their own freebooting propensities with
better success. We need not therefore break out into
holy wrath, and buckle on our armour, if a moralist
is found to suggest that perhaps all integrity and

-142 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

uprightness may be at bottom only conventional.
This is what Holbach, Helvetius, d'Alembert, and
others of their time did ; and, following out the
theory, they endeavoured with great acumen to trace
back all moral conduct to egoistic motives, however
remote and indirect. That their position is literally
true of most just actions, as having an ultimate
foundation centred in the Self, I have shown above.
That it is also true to a large extent of what is done
in kindness and humanity, there can be no doubt ;
acts of this sort often arise from love of ostentation,
still oftener from belief in a retribution to come,
which may be dealt out in the second or even the
third power ; ^ or they can be explained by other
egoistic motives. Nevertheless, it is equally certain
that there occur actions of disinterested good-will
and entirely voluntary justice. To prove the latter
statement, I appeal only to the facts of experience,
not to those of consciousness. There are isolated,
yet indisputable cases on record, where not only
the danger of legal prosecution, but also all chance
of discovery, and even of suspicion has been ex-
cluded, and where, notwithstanding, the poor man has
rendered to the rich his own. For example, things
lost, and found, have been given back without any
thought or hope of reward ; a deposit made by a
third person has been restored after his death to the
rightful owner ; a poor man, secretly intrusted with

^ In other words : If a be a given offence, or virtuous act,
and X the punishment, or reward, proportional to it ; then
the punishment, or reward, actually inflicted, instead of being
X, may be x' or oc^. — {Translator.)

SCEPTICAL VIEW. 143

a treasure by a fugitive, has faithfully kept, and then
returned, it. Instances of this sort can be found, beyond
all doubt ; only the surprise, the emotion, and the
high respect awakened, when we hear of them, testify
to the fact that they are unexpected and very ex-
ceptional. There are in truth really honest people :
like four-leaved clover, their existence is not a fiction.
But Hamlet uses no hyperbole when he says : " To
be honest, as this world goes, is to be one man pick'd
out of ten thousand." If it be objected that, after
all, religious dogmas, involving rewards and penalties
in another world, are at the root of conduct as
above described ; cases could probably be adduced
where the actors possessed no religious faith what-
ever. And this is a thing by no means so infrequent
as is generally maintained.

Those who combat the sceptical view appeal specially
to the testimony of conscience. But conscience itself
is impugned, and doubts are raised about its natural
origin. Now, as a matter of fact, there is a conscientia
spuria (false conscience), which is often confounded
with the true. The regret and anxiety which many
a man feels for what he has done is frequently,
at bottom, nothing but fear of the possible conse-
quences. Not a few people, if they break external,
voluntary, and even absurd rules, suffer from painful
searchings of heart, exactly similar to those inflicted
by the real conscience. Thus, for instance, a bigoted
Jew, if on Saturday he should smoke a pipe at
home, becomes really oppressed with the sense of
having disobeyed the command in Exodus xxxv. 3 :
" Ye shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations

144 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

upon the Sabbath day." How often it happens that
a nobleman or officer is the victim of self-reproach,
because on some occasion or other he has not properly
complied with that fools' codex, which is called
knightly honour ! Nay more : there are many of this
class, who, if they see the impossibility of merely
doing enough in some quarrel to satisfy the above-
named code — to say nothing of keeping their pledged
word of honour — are ready to shoot themselves. (In-
stances of both have come under my knowledge.)
And this, while the selfsame man would with
an easy mind break his promise every day, if only
the shibboleth " Honour " be not involved. In short,
every inconsequent, and thoughtless action, all
conduct contrary to our prejudices, principles, or
convictions, whatever these may be ; indeed, every
indiscretion, every mistake, every piece of stupidity
rankles in us secretly, and leaves its sting behind.
The average individual, who thinks his conscience
such an imposing structure, would be surprised, could
he see of what it actually consists : probably of about
one-fifth, fear of men ; one-fifth, superstition ; one-
fifth, prejudice ; one-fifth, vanity ; and one-fifth, habit.
So that in reality he is no better than the English-
man, who said quite frankly : " 1 cannot afford to
keep a conscience." Religious people of every creed,
as a rule, understand by conscience nothing else
than the dogmas and injunctions of their religion,
and the self-examination based thereon ; and it is
in this sense that the expressions coercion of conscience
and liberty of conscience are used. The same inter-
pretation was always given by the theologians,

SCEPTICAL VIEW. 145

schoolmen, and casuists of the middle ages and of
later times. Whatever a man knew of the formulae
and prescriptions of the Church, coupled with a re-
solution to believe and obey it, constituted his
conscience. Thus we find the terms " a doubting
conscience," " an opinionated conscience," " an erring
conscience," and the like ; and councils were held,
and confessors employed, for the special purpose of
setting such irregularities straight. How little the
conception of conscience, just as other conceptions, is
determined by its own object ; how difi'erently it is
viewed by difi'erent people ; how wavering and un-
certain it appears in books ; all this is briefly but
clearly set forth in Staudlin's Geschichte der Lehre vom
Gewissen. These facts taken in conjunction are not
calculated to establish the reality of the thing ; they
have rather given rise to the question whether there is
in truth a genuine, inborn conscience. I have already
had occasion in Part II., Chapter VIII., where the
theory of Freedom is discussed, to touch on my view
of conscience, and I shall return to it below.

All these sceptical objections added together do
not in the least avail to prove that no true morality
exists, however much they may moderate our ex-
pectations as to the moral tendency in man, and the
natural basis of Ethics. Undoubtedly a great deal
that is ascribed to the ethical sense can be proved
to spring from other incentives ; and when we
contemplate the moral depravity of the world, it is
sufficiently clear that the stimulus for good cannot
be very powerful, especially as it often does not
work even in cases where the opposing motives are

10

146 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

weak, although then the individual difference of
character makes itself fully felt.

It should be observed that this moral depravity
is all the more difficult to discern, because its
manifestations are checked and cloaked by public
order, as enforced by law ; by the necessity of having
a good name ; and even by ordinary polite manners.
And this is not all. People commonly suppose that
in the education of the young their moral interests
are furthered by representing uprightness and virtue
as principles generally followed by the world. Later
on, it is often to their great harm that experience
teaches them something else ; for the discovery, that
the instructors of their early years were the first to
deceive them, is likely to have a more mischievous
effect on their morality than if these persons had given
them the first example of ingenuous truthfulness, by
saying frankly : " The world is sunk in evil, and
men are not what they ought to be ; but be not
misled thereby, and see that you do better." All
this, as I have said, increases the difficulty of re-
cognising the real immorality of mankind. The state
— this masterpiece, which sums up the self-conscious,
intelligent egoism of all — consigns the rights of each
person to a power, which, being enormously superior
to that of the individual, compels him to respect the
rights of all others. This is the leash that restrains
the limitless egoism of nearly every one, the malice
of many, the cruelty of not a few. The illusion
thus arising is so great that, when in special cases,
where the executive power is ineffective, or is eluded,
the insatiable covetousness, the base greed, the deep

SCEPTICAL VIEW. 147

hypocrisy, or the spiteful tricks of men are apparent
in all their ugliness, we recoil with horror, supposing
that we have stumbled on some unheard-of monster :
whereas, without the compulsion of law, and the
necessity of keeping an honourable name, these sights
would be of every day occurrence. In order to dis-
cover what, from a moral point of view, human
beings are made of, we must study anarchist records,
and the proceedings connected with criminals. The
thousands that throng before our eyes, in peaceful
intercourse each with the other, can only be regarded
as so many tigers and wolves, whose teeth are secured
by a strong muzzle. Let us now suppose this muzzle
cast off, or, in other words, the power of the state
abolished ; the contemplation of the spectacle then
to be awaited would make all thinking people
shudder ; and they would thus betray the small
amount of trust they really have in the efl&ciency
either of religion, or of conscience, or of the natural
basis of Morals, whatever it be. But if these im-
moral, antinomian forces should be unshackled and
let loose, it is precisely then that the true moral
incentive, hidden before, would reveal its activity,
and consequently be most easily recognised. And
nothing would bring out so clearly as this the
prodigious moral difference of character between man
and man ; it would be found to be as great as the
intellectual, which is saying much.

The objection will perhaps be raised that Ethics
is not concerned with what men actually do, but
that it is the science which treats of what their
conduct ought to be. Now this is exactly the position

148 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

which I deny. In the critical part of the present
treatise I have sufficiently demonstrated that the con-
ception of ought, in other words, the imperative form of
Ethics, is valid only in theological morals, outside of
which it loses all sense and meaning. The end which
I place before Ethical Science is to point out all the
varied moral lines of human conduct ; to explain
them ; and to trace them to their ultimate source.
Consequently there remains no way of discovering
the basis of Ethics except the empirical. We must
search and see whether we can find any actions to
which we are obliged to ascribe genuine moral worth :
actions, that is, of voluntary justice, of pure loving-
kindness, and of true nobleness. Such conduct,
when found, is to be regarded as a given phaenome-
non, which has to be properly accounted for ; in other
words, its real origin must be explored, and this will
involve the investigation and explanation of the
peculiar motives which lead men to actions so radically
distinct from all others, that they form a class by
themselves. These motives, together with a respon-
sive susceptibility for them, will constitute the
ultimate basis of morality, and the knowledge of
them will be the foundation of Ethics. This is the
humble path to which I direct the Science of Morals.
It contains no construction a priori, no absolute
legislation for all rational beings in abstracto-, it
lacks all official, academic sanction. Therefore, who-
ever thinks it not sufficiently fashionable, may return
to the Categorical Imperative; to the Shibboleth
of " Human Dignity " ; to the empty phrases, the
cobwebs, and the soap-bubbles of the Schools ; to

SCEPTICAL VIEW. 149

principles on which experience ponrs contempt at
every step, and of which no one, outside the lectnre-
rooms knows anything, or has ever had the least
notion. On the other hand, the foundation which
is reached by following my path is upheld by ex-
perience ; and it is experience which daily and hourly
delivers its silent testimony in favour of my theory.

CHAPTER III.

ANTIMORAL ^ INCENTIVES.

The chief and fundamental incentive in man, as in
animals, is Egoism, that is, the urgent impulse to
exist, and exist under the best circumstances. The
German word Selbstsucht (self-seeking) involves a
false secondary idea of disease (Sucht)} The term
Eigennutz (self-interest) denotes Egoism, so far as
the latter is guided by rt^ason, which enables it, by
means of reflection, to prosecute its purposes system-

' I venture to use this word although irregularly formed,
because " antiethical " would not here give an adequate
meaning. Sittlich (in accordance with good manners) and
unsittlich (contrary to good manners), which have lately
come into vogue, are bad substitutes for moralisch (moral)
and unmoralisch (immoral) : first, because moralisch is a
scientific conception, which, as such, requires to be denoted
by a Greek or Latin term, for reasons which may be found
in Die Welt ah Wille und Vorstellung, vol. ii., chap. 12, p. 134
sqq. ; and secondly, because sittlich is a weaker and tamer
expression, difficult to distinguish from sittsam (modest)
which in popular acceptation means zimjierlich (simpering).
No concessions must be made to this extravagant love of
germanising !

^ In Sucht (siech = sick) and Selbst-sucht (stichen = s,eek) there
is an apparent confusion between the two bases SUK (seuka)
to be ill, and sokyan, to seek. V. Skeat's Etymological
Dictianary. — ( Tra'ndator. )

150

ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 151

atically ; so that animals may be called egoistic,
but not self-interested (eigennutzig). I shall there-
fore retain the word Egoism for the general idea. Now
this Egoism is, both in animals and men, connected
in the closest way with their very essence and being ;
indeed, it is one and the same thing. For this reason
all human actions, as a rule, have their origin in
Egoism, and to it, accordingly, we mast always first
turn, when we try to find the explanation of any
given line of conduct ; just as, when the endeavour
is made to guide a man in any direction, the means
to this end are universally calculated with reference
to the same all-powerful motive. Egoism is, from
its nature, limitless. The individual is filled with
the unqualified desire of preserving his life, and of
keeping it free from all pain, under which is included
all want and privation. He wishes to have the
greatest possible amount of pleasurable existence,
and every gratification that he is capable of appreciat-
ing ; indeed, he attempts, if possible, to evolve fresh
capacities for enjoyment. Everything that opposes
the strivings of his Egoism awakens his dislike, his
anger, his hate : this is the mortal enemy, which
he tries to annihilate. If it were possible, he would
like to possess everything for his own pleasure ; as
this is impossible, he wishes at least to control every-
thing. " All things for me, and nothing for others "
is his maxim. Egoism is a huge giant overtopping
the world. If each person were allowed to choose
between his own destruction and that of the rest
of mankind, I need not say what the decision would
be in most cases. Thus it is that every human unit

152 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

makes himself the centre of the world, which he views
exclusively from that standpoint. Whatever occurs,
even, for instance, the most sweeping changes in the
destinies of nations, he brings into relation first and
foremost with his own interests, which, however
slightly and indirectly they may be affected, he is
sure to think of before anything else. No sharper
contrast can be imagined than that between the
profound and exclusive attention which each person
devotes to his own self, and the indifference with
which, as a rule, all other people regard that self, —
an indifference precisely like that with which he in
turn looks upon them. To a certain extent it is
actually comic to see how each individual out of
innumerable multitudes considers himself, at least
from the practical })oint of view, as tlie only real
thing, and all others in some sort as mere phantoms.
The ultimate reason of this lies in the fact that
every one is directly conscious of himself, but of
others only indirectly, through his mind's eye ; and
the direct impression asserts its right. In other
words, it is in consequence of the subjectivity which
is essential to our consciousness that each person
is himself the whole world ; for all that is objec-
tive exists only indirectly, as simply the mental
picture of the subject ; whence it comes about that
everything is invariably expressed in terms of self-
consciousness. The only world which the individual
really grasps, and of which he has certain knowledge,
he carries in himself, as a mirrored image fashioned
by his brain ; and he is, therefore, its centre. Conse-
quently he is all in all to himself ; and since he

ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 153

feels that he contains within his ego all that is real,
nothing can be of greater importance to him than his
own self.^ Moreover this supremely important self, this
microcosm, to which the macrocosm stands in relation
as its mere modification or accident, — this, which is
the individual's whole world, he knows perfectly well
must be destroyed by death ; which is therefore for
Inm equivalent to the destruction of all things.

Such, then, are the elements out of which, on the
basis of the Will to live, Egoism grows up, and like a
broad trench it forms a perennial separation between
man and man. If on any occasion some one actually
jumps across, to help another, such an act is regarded
as a sort of miracle, which calls forth amazement and
wins approval. In Part II., Chapter VI., where Kant's
principle of Morals is discussed, I had the opportunity
of describing how Egoism behaves in everyday life,
where it is always peering out of some corner or other,
despite ordinary politeness, which, like the traditional
fig-leaf, is used as a covering. In point of fact,
politeness is the conventional and systematic dis-
avowal of Egoism in the trifles of daily intercourse,
and is, of course, a piece of recognised hypocrisy.
Gentle manners are expected and commended, because
that which they conceal — Egoism — is so odious, that
no one wishes to see it, however much it is known
to be there ; just as people like to have repulsive
objects hidden at least by a curtain. Now, unless

' It should be noticed that while from the subjective side
a man's self assumes these gigantic proportions, objectively
it shrinks to almost nothing — namely, to about the one-
thousand-millionth part of the human race.

154 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

external force (under which must be inchided every
source of fear whether of human or superhuman
powers), or else the real moral incentive is in
effective operation, it is certain that Egoism always
pursues its purposes with unqualified directness ;
hence without these checks, considering the countless
number of egoistic individuals, the helium omnium
contra omnes ^ would be the order of the day, and
prove the ruin of all. Thus is explained the early
construction by reflecting reason of state government,
which, arising, as it does, from a mutual fear of
reciprocal violence, obviates the disastrous con-
sequences of the general Egoism, as far as it is
possible to do by negative procedure. Where, how-
ever, the two forces that oppose Egoism fail to be
operative, the latter is not slow to reveal all its
horrible dimensions, nor is the spectacle exactly
attractive. In order to express the strength of this
antimoral power in a few words, to portray it, so to
say, at one stroke, some very emphatic hyperbole is
wanted. It may be put thus : many a man would be
quite capable of killing another, simply to rub his
boots over with the victim's fat. I am only doubtful
whether this, after all, is any exaggeration. Egoism,
then, is the first and principal, though not the only,
power that the moral Motive has to contend against ;
and it is surely sufficiently clear that the latter, in
order to enter the lists against such an opponent,
must be something more real than a hair-splitting
sophism or an a priori soap-bubble. In war the first

' The war of all against all. Hobbes uses this expression.
— {Translator.)

ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 155

thing to be done is to know the enemy well ; and
in the shock of battle, now impending, Egoism, as the
chief combatant on its own side, is best set against
the virtue of Justice, which, in my opinion, is the
first and original cardinal virtue.

The virtue of loving-kindness, on the other hand,
is rather to be matched with ill-wiU, or spitefulness,
the origin and successive stages of which we will
now consider. Ill-will, in its lower degrees, is very
frequent, indeed, almost a common thing ; and it
easily rises in the scale. Goethe is assuredly right
when he says that in this world indifference and
aversion are quite at home. — ( Wahlverwandtschaften,
Part I., chap. 3.) It is very fortunate for us that
the cloak, which prudence and politeness throw over
this vice, prevents us from seeing how general it
is, and how the helium omnium contra omnes is
constantly waged, at least in thought. Yet ever
and anon there is some appearance of it : for instance,
in the relentless backbiting so frequently observed ;
while its clearest manifestation is found in all out-
breaks of anger, which, for the most part, are quite
disproportioual to their cause, and which could
hardly be so violent, had they not been compressed —
like gunpowder — into the explosive compound formed
of long cherished brooding hatred. Ill-will usually
arises from the unavoidable collisions of Egoism
which occur at every step. It is, moreover, objectively
excited by the view of the weakness, the folly, the
vices, failings, shortcomings, and imperfections of
all kinds, which every one more or less, at least
occasionally, affords to others. Indeed, the spectacle

156 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

is such, that many a man, especially in moments of
melancholy and depression, may be tempted to regard
the world, from the aesthetic standpoint, as a cabinet
of caricatures ; from the intellectual, as a madhouse ;
and from the moral, as a nest of sharpers. If such
a mental attitude be indulged, misanthropy is the
result. Lastly, one of the chief sources of ill-will
is envy ; or rather, the latter is itself ill-will, kindled
by the happiness, possessions, or advantages of others.
No one is absolutely free from envy ; and Herodotus
(III. 80) said long ago : <j)d6vo<i dpxv^ep e^i^verat
dv6pco7ra) (envy is a natural growth in man from
the beginning). But its degrees vary considerably.
It is most poisonous and implacable when directed
against personal qualities, because then the envious
have nothing to hope for. And precisely in such
cases its vilest form also appears, because men
are made to hate what they ought to love and
honour. Yet so " the world wags," even as Petrarca
complained :

Di lor j)ar piu, che d'altri, invidia s'abbia,

Che per se stessi son levati a volo,

Uscendo fuor della commune gahbia.

(For envy fastens most of all on those,

Who, rising on their own strong wings, escape

The bars wherein the vulgar crowd is cag'd.)

The reader is referred to the Parerga, vol. ii., § 114,
for a more complete examination of envy.

In a certain sense the opposite of envy is the
habit of gloating over the misfortunes of others.
At any rate, while the former is human, the latter
is diabolical. There is no sign more infallible of an

ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 157

entirely bad heart, and of profound moral worthless-
ness than open and candid enjoyment in seeing other
people snfiPer. The man in whom this trait is observed
ought to be for ever avoided : Hie niger est, hunc
tu, Romane, camto} These two vices are in them-
selves merely theoretical ; in practice they become
malice and cruelty. It is true that Egoism may
lead to wickedness and crime of every sort ; but
the resulting injury and pain to others are simply
the means, not the end, and are therefore involved
only as an accident. Whereas malice and cruelty
make others' misery the end in itself, the realisation
of which affords distinct pleasure. They therefore
constitute a higher degree of moral turpitude. The
maxim of Egoism, at its worst is : Neminem juva,
immo omnes, si forte eonducit (thus there is always
a condition), laede (help no body, but rather injure
all people, if it brings you any advantage). The
guiding rule of malice is : Omnes, quantum potes,
laede (injure all people as far as you can). As
malicious joy is in fact theoretical cruelty, so, con-
versely, cruelty is nothing but malicious joy put
into practice ; and the latter is sure to show itself
in the form of cruelty, directly an opportunity offers.

An examination of the special vices that spring
from these two primary antimoral forces forms no part
of the present treatise : its proper place would be
found in a detailed system of Ethics. From Egoism
we should probably derive greed, gluttony, lust,
selfishness, avarice, covetousness, injustice, hardness

* This man is black ; of him shalt thou, O Roman, beware.
V, Horace, Sat.^ Lib. I. 4. 85. — {Translator.)

158 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

of heart, pride, arrogance, etc. ; while to spitefulness
• might be ascribed disaffection, envy, ill-will, malice,
pleasure in seeing others suffer, prying curiosity,
slander, insolence, petulance, hatred, anger, treachery,
fraud, thirst for revenge, cruelty, etc. The first root
is more bestial, the second more devilish ; and accord-
ing as either is the stronger ; or according as the
moral incentive, to be described below, predominates,
so the salient points for the ethical classification
of character are determined. No man is entirely
free from some traces of all three.

Here I bring to an end my review of these terrible
powers of evil ; it is an array reminding one of the
Princes of Darkness in Milton's Pandemonium. But
my plan, which in this respect of course differs from
that of all other moralists, required me to consider
at the outset this gloomy side of human nature, and,
like Dante, to descend first to Tartarus.

It will now be fully apparent how difficult our
problem is. We have to find a motive capable of
making a man take up a line of conduct directly
opposed to all those propensities which lie deeply
ingrained in his nature ; or, given such conduct as
a fact of experience, we must search for a motive
capable of supplying an adequate and non-artificial
explanation of it. The difficulty, in fact, is so great
that, in order to solve it, for the vast majority of
mankind, it has been everywhere necessary to have
recourse to machinery from another world. Gods
have been pointed to, whose will and command
the required mode of behaviour was said to be, and
who were represented as emphasising this command

ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 159

by penalties and rewards either in this, or in another
world, to which death would be the gate. Now
let ns assume that belief in a doctrine of this sort
took general root (a thing which is certainly possible
through strenuous inculcation at a very early age) ;
and let us also assume that it brought about the
intended effect, — though this is a much harder matter
to admit, and not nearly so well confirmed by ex-
perience ; we should then no doubt succeed in obtain-
ing strict legality of action, even beyond the limits
that justice and the police can reach ; but every one
feels that this would not in the least imply what
we mean by morality of the heart. For obviously,
every act arising from motives like those just
mentioned is after all derived simply from pure
Egoism. How can I talk of unselfishness when I
am enticed by a promised guerdon, or deterred by a
threatened punishment ? A recompense in another
world, thoroughly believed in, must be regarded as
a bill of exchange, which is perfectly safe, though
only payable at a very distant date. It is thus quite
possible that the profuse assurances, which beggars
so constantly make, that those, who relieve them,
will receive a thousandfold more for their gifts in the
next world, may lead many a miser to generous alms-
giving ; for such a one complacently views the matter
as a good investment of money, being perfectly con-
vinced that he will rise again as a Croesus. For the
mass of mankind, it will perhaps be always necessary
to continue the appeal to incentives of this nature,
and we know that such is the teaching promulgated
by the different religions, which are in fact the

160 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

metaphysics of the people. Be it, however, observed
in this connection that a man is sometimes just as
much in error as to the true motives that govern his
own acts, as he is with regard to those of others.
Hence it is certain that many persons, while they
can only account to themselves for their noblest
actions by attributing them to motives of the kind
above described, are, nevertheless, really guided in
their conduct by far higher and purer incentives,
though the latter may be much more difficult to
discover. They are doing, no doubt, out of direct
love of their neighbour, that which they can but
explain as the command of their God. On the other
hand, Philosophy, in dealing with this, as with all
other problems, endeavours to extract the true and
ultimate cause of the given phaenomena from the
disclosures which the nature itself of man yields,
and which, freed as they must be from all mythical
interpretation, from all religious dogmas, and trans-
cendent hypostases, she requires to see confirmed
by external or internal experience. Now, as our
present task is a philosophical one, we must entirely
disregard all solutions conditioned by any religion ;
and I have here touched on them merely in order
to throw a stronger light on the magnitude of the
difficulty.

CHAPTER IV.

CBITERION OF ACTIONS OF MOBAL WORTH.

Thebb is first the empirical question to be settled,
whether actions of volnntary justice and unselfish
loving-kindness, which are capable of rising to noble-
ness and magnanimity, actually occur in experience.
Unfortunately, this inquiry cannot be decided alto-
gether empirically, because it is invariably only the
act that experience gives, the incentives not being
apparent. Hence the possibility always remains that
an egoistic motive may have had weight in determining
a just or good deed. In a theoretical investigation
like the present, I shall not avail myself of the
inexcusable trick of shifting the matter on to the
reader's conscience. But I believe there are few
people who have any doubt about the matter, and
who are not convinced from their own experience
that just acts are often performed simply and solely
to prevent a man suffering from injustice. Most of
us, I do not hesitate to say, are jDersuaded that there
are persons in whom the principle of giving others
their due seems to be innate, who neither intentionally
injure any one, nor unconditionally seek their own
advantage, but in considering themselves show regard
also for the rights of their neighbours ; persons who,

161 11

162 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

when they undertake matters involving reciprocal
obligations, not only see that the other party does
his duty, but also that he gets his own, because it is
really against their will that any one, with whom they
have to do, should be shabbily treated. These are the
men of true probity, the few aequi (just) among the
countless number of the iniqui (unjust). Sach people
exist. Similarly, it will be admitted, I think, that
many help and give, perform services, and deny them-
selves, without having any further intention in their
hearts than that of assisting another, whose distress
they see. When Arnold von Winkelried exclaimed :
" Truwen, liehen Eidgenossen, wullt's minem Wip und
Kinde gedenken,^^ '^ and then clasped in his arms as
many hostile spears as he could grasp ; can any one
believe that he had some selfish purpose ? I cannot.
To cases of voluntary justice, which cannot be denied
without deliberate and wilful trifling with facts, I have
already drawn attention in Chapter II. of this Part.
Should any one, however, persist in refusing to believe
that such actions ever happen, then, according to
his view, Ethics would be a science without any real
object, like Astrology and Alchemy, and it would
be waste of time to discuss its basis any further.
With him, therefore, I have nothing to do, and
address myself to those who allow that we are deal-
ing with something more than an imaginary creation.
It is, then, only to conduct of the above kind that
genuine moral worth can be ascribed. Its special
mark is that it rejects and excludes the whole class

' Comrades, true and loyal to our oath, care for my wife
and child in remembrance of this.

CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH 163

of motives by which otherwise all human action is
prompted : I mean the self-interested motives, using
the word in its widest sense. Consequently the moral
value of an act is lowered by the disclosure of an
accessory selfish incentive ; while it is entirely de-
stroyed, if that incentive stood alone. The absence
of all egoistic motives is thus the Criterion of an
action of moral value. It may, no doubt, be objected
that also acts of pure malice and cruelty are not
selfish/ Bat it is manifest that the latter cannot be
meant, since they are, in kind, the exact opposite
of those now being considered. If, however, the de-
finition be insisted on in its strict sense, then we
may expressly except such actions, because of their
essential token— the compassing of others' suffering.

There is also another characteristic of conduct having
real moral worth, which is entirely internal and there-
fore less obvious. I allude to the fact that it leaves
behind a certain self-satisfaction which is called the
approval of conscience : just as, on the other hand,
injustice and unkindness, and still more malice and
cruelty, involve a secret self-condemnation. Lastly,
there is an external, secondary, and accidental sign
that draws a clear line between the two classes. Acts
of the former kind win the approval and respect
of disinterested witnesses : those of the latter incur
their disapproval and contempt.

Those actions that bear the stamp of moral value,
so determined, and admitted to be realities, constitute

* Acts of malice and cruelty are so many gratifications of
the ego, and are therefore, in a certain sense, selfish. V. Intro-
duction, pp. xvi. and xvii. — (Translator.)

164 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

the phaenomenon that lies before us, and which we
have to explain. We must accordingly search out
what it is that moves men to such conduct. If we
succeed in oor investigation, we shall necessarily bring
to light the true moral incentive ; and, as it is upon
this that all ethical science must depend, our problem
will then be solved.

CHAPTER V.

STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL
INCENTIVE.

The preceding considerations, which were unavoidably
necessary in order to clear the ground, now enable
me to indicate the true incentive which underlies
all acts of real moral worth. The seriousness, and
indisputable genuineness, with which we shall find
it is distinguished, removes it far indeed from the
hair-splittings, subtleties, sophisms, assertions formu-
lated out of airy nothings, and a priori soap-bubbles,
which all systems up to the present have tried to
make at once the source of moral conduct and the
basis of Ethics. This incentive I shall not put
forward as an hypothesis to be accepted or rejected,
as one pleases ; I shall actually prove that it is the
only possible one. But as this demonstration requires
several fundamental truths to be borne in mind, the
reader's attention is first called to certain propositions
which we must presuppose, and which may properly
be considered as axioms ; except the last two, which
result from the analysis contained in the preceding
chapter, and in Part II., Chapter III.

(1) No action can take place without a sufficient

166

166 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

motive ; as little as a stone can move without a
sufficient push or pull.

(2) Similarly, no action can be left undone, when,
given the character of the doer, a sufficient motive
is present ; unless a stronger counter-motive neces-
sarily prevents it.

(3) Whatever moves the Will, — this, and this
alone, implies the sense of weal and woe, in the
widest sense of the term ; and conversely, weal and
woe signify " that which is in conformity with, or
which is contrary to, a Will." Hence every motive
must have a connection with weal and woe.

(4) Consequently every action stands in relation to,
and has as its ultimate object, a being susceptible of
weal and woe.

(5) This being is either the doer himself ; or
another, whose position as regards the action is there-
fore passive ; since it is done either to his harm, or
to his benefit and advantage.

(6) Every action, which has to do, as its ultimate
object, with the weal and woe of the agent himself,
is egoistic.

(7) The foregoing propositions with regard to what
is done apply equally to what is left undone, in all
cases where motive and counter-motive play their parts.

(8) From the analysis in the foregoing chapter,
it results that Egoism and the moral worth of an
action absolutely exclude each other. If an act have
an egoistic object as its motive, then no moral value
can be attached to it ; if an act is to have moral
value, then no egoistic object, direct or indirect, near
or remote, may be its motive.

THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE. 167

(9) In consequence of my elimination in Part II.,
Chapter III., of alleged duties towards ourselves, the
moral significance of our conduct can only lie in
the eiFect produced upon others ; its relation to the
latter is alone that which lends it moral worth, or
worthlessness, and constitutes it an act of justice,
loving-kindness, etc., or the reverse.

From these propositions the following conclusion
is obvious : The weal and woe, which (according
to our third axiom) must, as its ultimate object, lie
at the root of everything done, or left undone, is
either that of the doer himself, or that of some other
person, whose role with reference to the action is
passive. Conduct in the first case is necessarily
egoistic, as it is impelled by an interested motive.
And this is not only true when men — as they nearly
always do — plainly shape their acts for their own
profit and advantage ; it is equally true when from
anything done we expect some benefit to ourselves,
no matter how remote, whether in this or in another
world. Nor is it less the fact when our honour, our
good name, or the wish to win the respect of some
one, the sympathy of the lookers on, etc., is the
object we have in view ; or when our intention is
to uphold a rule of conduct, which, if generally
followed, would occasionally be useful to ourselves, for
instance, the principle of justice, of mutual succour
and aid, and so forth. Similarly, the proceeding is
at bottom egoistic, when a man considers it a prudent
step to obey some absolute command issued by
an unknown, but evidently supreme power ; for in
such a case nothino' can be the motive but fear of

168 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

the disastrous consequences of disobedience, however
generally and indistinctly these may be conceived.
Nor is it a whit the less Egoism that prompts us when
we endeavour to emphasise, by something done or left
undone, the high opinion (whether distinctly realised
or not) which we have of ourselves, and of our value
or dignity ; for the diminution of self-satisfaction,
which might otherwise occur, would involve the
wounding of our pride. Lastly, it is still Egoism
that is operative, when a man, following Wolff's
principles, seeks by his conduct to work out his own
perfection. In short, one may make the ultimate
incentive to an action what one pleases ; it will
always turn out, no matter by how circuitous a path,
that in the last resort what affects the actual weal
and woe of the agent himself is the real motive ;
consequently what he does is egoistic, and there-
fore without moral worth. There is only a single
case in which this fails to happen : namely, when the
ultimate incentive for doing something, or leaving
it undone, is precisely and exclusively centred in the
weal and woe of some one else, who plays a passive
part ; that is to say, when the person on the active
side, by what he does, or omits to do, simply and
solely regards the weal and woe of another, and has
absolutely no other object than to benefit him, by
keeping harm from his door, or, it may be, even by
affording help, assistance, and relief. It is this aim
alone that gives to what is done, or left undone, the
stamp of moral worth ; which is thus seen to depend
exclusively on the circumstance that the act is carried
out, or omitted, purely for the benefit and advantage

THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE. 169

of another. If and when this is not so, then the
question of weal and woe which incites to, or deters
from, every action contemplated, can only relate to
the agent himself ; whence its performance, or non-
performance is entirely egoistic, and without moral
value.

But if what I do is to take place solely on account
of some one else ; then it follows that his weal
and woe must directly constitute my motive ; just
as, ordinarily, my own weal and woe form it. This
narrows the limits of our problem, which may now
be stated as follows : How is it possible that
another's weal and woe should influence my will
directly, that is, exactly in the same way as otherwise
my own move it ? How can that which affects
another for good or bad become my immediate motive,
and actually sometimes assume such importance that
it more or less supplants my own interests, which are,
as a rule, the single source of the incentives that
appeal to me ? Obviously, only because that other
person becomes the ultimate object of my will, pre-
cisely as usually I myself am that object ; in other
words, because I directly desire weal, and not woe,
for him, just as habitually I do for myself. This,
however, necessarily implies that I suffer with him,
and feel his woe, exactly as in most cases I feel only
mine, and therefore desire his weal as immediately
as at other times I desire only my own. But, for this
to be possible, I must in some way or other be
identified with him ; that is, the difference between
myself and him, which is the precise raison d'etre
of my Egoism, must be removed, at least to a certain

170 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

extent. Now, since I do not live in his skin, there
renaains only the knowledge, that is, the mental
picture, I have of him, as the possible means where-
by I can so far identify myself with him, that
my action declares the difference to be practically
effaced. The process here analysed is not a dream,
a fancy floating in the air ; it is perfectly real, and
by no means infrequent. It is, what we see every
day, — the phaenomenon of Compassion ; in other words,
the direct participation, independent of all ulterior
considerations, in the sufferings of another, leading to
sympathetic assistance in the effort to prevent or remove
them ; whereon in the last resort all satisfaction and all
well-being and happiness depend. It is this Compassion
alone which is the real basis of all voluntary justice
and all genuine loving-kindness. Only so far as an
action springs therefrom, has it moral value ; and all
conduct that proceeds from any other motive whatever
has none. When once compassion is stirred within
me, by another's pain, then his weal and woe go
straight to my heart, exactly in the same way, if
not always to the same degree, as otherwise I feel
only my own. Consequently the difference between
myself and him is no longer an absolute one.

No doubt this operation is astonishing, indeed hardly
comprehensible. It is, in fact, the great mystery of
Ethics, its original phaenomenon, and the boundary
stone, past which only transcendental speculation may
dare to take a step. Herein we see the wall of
partition, which, according to the light of nature (as
reason is called by old theologians), entirely separates
being from being, broken down, and the non-ego to

THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE. 171

a certain extent identified with the ego. I wish for
the moment to leave the metaphysical explanation
of this enigma untouched, and first to inquire
whether all acts of voluntary justice and true loving-
kindness really arise from it. If so, our problem
will be solved, for we shall have found the ultimate
basis of morality, and shown that it lies in human
nature itself. This foundation, however, in its turn
cannot form a problem of Ethics, but rather, like
every other ultimate fact as such, of Metaphysics.
Only the solution, that the latter offers of the
primary ethical phaenomenon, lies outside the limits
of the question put by the Danish Royal Society,
which is concerned solely with the basis ; so that
the transcendental explanation can be given merely
as a voluntary and unessential appendix.

But before I turn to the derivation of the cardinal
virtues from the original incentive, as here disclosed,
I have still to bring to the notice of the reader two
observations which the subject renders necessary.

(1) For the purpose of easier comprehension I have
simplified the above presentation of compassion as
the sole source of truly moral actions, by intentionally
leaving out of consideration the incentive of Malice,
which while it is equally useless to the self as com-
passion, makes the pain of others its ultimate purpose.
We are now, however, in a position, by including
it, to state the above proof more completely, and
rigorously, as follows : —

There are only three fundamental springs of human
conduct, and all possible motives arise from one or
other of these. They are :

172 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

(a) Egoism ; which desires the weal of the self,
and is limitless.

{b) Malice ; which desires the woe of others, and
may develop to the utmost cruelty.

(c) Compassion ; which desires the weal of others,
and may rise to nobleness and magnanimity.

Every human act is referable to one of these
springs ; although two of them may work together.
Now, as we have assumed that actions of moral worth
are in point of fact realities ; it follows that they
also must proceed from one of these primal sources.
But, by the eighth axiom, they cannot arise from the
first, and still less from the second ; since all conduct
springing from the latter is morally worthless, while
the offshoots of the former are in part neither good
nor bad in themselves. Hence they must have
their origin in the third incentive ; and this will be
established a posteriori in the sequel.

(2) Direct sympathy with another is limited to
his sufferings, and is not immediately awakened by
his well-being : the latter per se leaves us indifferent.
J. J. Rousseau in his Emile (Bk. IV.) expresses the
same view : " Premiere maxime : il rHest pas dans
le coeur hwnain^ de se mettre a la place des gens,
qui sont plus heureux que nous, mais seulement de
ceuxy qui sont plus d plaindre,""^ ^ etc.

The reason of this is that pain or suffering, which
includes all want, privation, need, indeed every wish,
is positive, and works directly on the consciousness.

* First maxim : it is not in our hearts to identify ourselves
with those who are happier than we are, but only with those
who are less happy.

THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE. 173

Whereas the nature of satisfaction, of enjoyment, of
happiness, and the like, consists solely in the fact
that a hardship is done away with, a pain lulled :
whence their effect is negative. We thus see why
need or desire is the condition of every pleasure.
Plato understood this well enough, and only excepted
sweet odours, and intellectual enjoyment. {De Rep.,
IX., p. 264 sq., edit. Bipont.) ^ And Voltaire says :
" Jl 7^ est pas de vrais plaisirs, qiCavec de vrais
besoins^^ Pain, then, is positive, and makes itself
known by itself : satisfaction or pleasure is negative —
simply the removal of the former. This principle
explains the fact that only the suffering, the want,
the danger, the helplessness of another awakens our
sympathy directly and as such. The lucky or con-
tented man, as such, leaves us indifferent — in reality
because his state is negative ; he is without pain,
indigence, or distress. We may of course take pleasure
in tjie success, the well-being, the enjoyment of
'others : but if we do, it is a secondary pleasure, and
caused by our having previously sorrowed over their
sufferings and privations. Or else we share the joy
and happiness of a man, not as such, but because,
and in so far as, he is our child, father, friend, relation,
servant, subject, etc. In a word, the good fortune,
or pleasure of another, purely as such, does not
arouse in us the same direct sympathy as is certainly
elicited by his misfortune, privation, or misery, purely
as such. If even on our own behalf it is only suffering
(under which must be reckoned all wants, needs,

^ Stallbaum : p. 584, %(\.— {Translator.)

* There are no real pleasures, without real needs.

174 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

wishes, and even ennui) that stirs our activity ; and
if contentment and prosperity fill us with indolence
and lazy repose ; why should it not be the same
when others are concerned ? For (as we have seen)
our sympathy rests on an identification of ourselves
with them. Indeed, the sight of success and enjoy-
ment, purely as such, is very apt to raise the envy,
to which every man is prone, and which has its
place among the antimoral forces enumerated above.

In connection with the exposition of Compassion
here given, as the coming into play of motives
directly occasioned by another's calamity, I take the
opportunity of condemning the mistake of Cassina,^
which has been so often repeated. His view is that
compassion arises from a sudden hallucination, which
makes us put ourselves in the place of the sufferer,
and then imagine that we are undergoing Ms pain
in own own person. This is not in the least the
case. The conviction never leaves us for a moment
that he is the sufferer, not we ; and it is precisely
in his person, not in ours, that we feel the distress
which afflicts us. We sufier with him, and there-
fore in him ; we feel his trouble as Ms, and are
not under the delusion that it is ours ; indeed, the
happier we are, the greater the contrast between
our own state and his, the more we are open to the
promptings of Compassion. The explanation of the
possibility of this extraordinary phaenomenon is,
however, not so easy ; nor is it to be reached by the
path of pure psychology, as Cassina supposed. The

* V. bis Saggio AtkhHUco sidla Compassione, 1V88 ; German
translation by Pockels, 1790.

THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE. 175

key can be fnrnislied by Metaphysics alone ; and this I
shall attempt to give in the last Part of the present
treatise.

I now tarn to consider the derivation of actions
of real moral worth from the source which has been
indicated. The general rule by which to test such
conduct, and which, consequently, is the leading
principle of Ethics, I have already enlarged upon
in the foregoing Part, and enunciated as follows :
Neminem laede ; immo omnes, quantum potes, juva.
(Do harm to no one ; but rather help all people,
as far as lies in your power.) As this formula
contains two clauses, so the actions corresponding
to it fall naturally into two classes.

CHAPTER VL

THE VIETUR OF JUSTICE.

If we look more closely at this process called Com-
passion, which we have shown to be the primary-
ethical phaenomenon, we remark at once that there
are two distinct degrees in which another's suffering
may become directly my motive, that is, may urge
me to do something, or to leave it undone. The
first degree of Compassion is seen when, by counter-
acting egoistic and malicious motives, it keeps me
from bringing pain on another, and from becoming
myself the cause of trouble, which so far does not
exist. The other higher degree is manifested, when
it works positively, and incites me to active help.
The distinction between the so-called duties of law
and duties of virtue, better described as justice and
loving-kindness, which was effected by Kant in such
a forced and artificial manner, here results entirely
of itself ; whence the correctness of the principle
is attested. It is the natural, unmistakable, and
sharp separation between negative and positive, be-
tween doing no harm, and helping. The terms in
common use — namely, '' the duties of law," and " the
duties of virtue," (the latter being also called
" duties of love," or " imperfect duties/') are in the

176

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 177

first place faulty because they co-ordinate the genus
with the species ; for justice is one of the virtues.
And next, they owe their origin to the mistake of
giving a nauch too wide extension to the idea " Duty " ;
which I shall reduce to its proper limits below. In
place, therefore, of these duties I put two virtues ;
the one, justice, and the other, loving-kindness ; and
I name them cardinal virtues, since from them all
others not only in fact proceed, but also may be
theoretically derived. Both have their root in natural
Compassion. And this Compassion is an undeniable
fact of human consciousness, is an essential part of
it, and does not depend on assumptions, conceptions,
religions, dogmas, myths, training, and education.
On the contrary, it is original and immediate, and
lies in human nature itself. It consequently remains
unchanged under all circumstances, and reveals itself
in every land, and at all times. This is why appeal
is everywhere confidently made to it, as to something
necessarily present in every man ; and it is never
an attribute of the " strange gods." ^ As he, who
appears to be without compassion, is called inhuman ;
so " humanity " is often used as its synonyme.

The first degree, then, in which this natural and
genuine moral incentive shows itself is only negative,
Originally we are all disposed to injustice and violence,
because our need, our desire, our anger and hate

' Thus, when the first gleam of Mitleid stole into her heart,
Briinnhilde could no longer remain a Walkiire ; and Wotan's
end comes, when by the same solvent he is at length set
free from the delusion of the priitcipium individtcationis. —
{Trcmslator.)

12

178 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

pass into the consciousness directly, and hence have
the Jus primi occupantis. (The right of the first
occupant.) Whereas the sufferings of others, caused
by our injustice and violence, enter the consciousness
indirectly, that is, by the secondary channel of a mental
picture, and not till they are understood by experience.
Thus Seneca (Ep. 50) says : Ad neminem ante bona
mens venit, quam mala. (Good feelings never come
before bad ones.) In its first degree, therefore,
Compassion opposes and bafiles the design to which
I am urged by the antimoral forces dwelling within
me, and which will bring trouble on a fellow-being.
It calls out to me : " Stop ! " and encircles the
other as with a fence, so as to protect him from
the injury which otherwise my egoism or malice
would lead me to inflict on him. So arises out of
this first degree of compassion the rule : Neminem
laede. (Do harm to no one.) This is the fundamental
principle of the virtue of justice, and here alone is
to be found its origin, pure and simple, — an origin
which is truly moral, and free from all extraneous
admixture. Otherwise derived, justice would have
to rest on Egoism, — a reductio ad absurdum. If my
nature is susceptible of Compassion up to this
point, then it will avail to keep me back, whenever
I should like to use others' pain as a means
to obtain my ends ; equally, whether this pain be
immediate, or an after-consequence, whether it be
effected directly, or indirectly, through intermediate
links. I shall therefore lay hands on the property as
little as on the person of another, and avoid causing
him distress, no less mental than bodily. I shall thus

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 179

not only abstain from doing him physical injury, but
also, with equal care I shall guard against inflicting on
him the suffering of mind, which . mortification and
calumny, anxiety and vexation so surely work. The
same sense of Compassion will check me from gratify-
ing my desires at the cost of women's happiness for life,
or from seducing another man's wife, or from ruining
youths morally and physically by tempting them
to paederastia. Not that it is at all necessary in
each single case that Compassion should be definitely
excited ; indeed it would often come too late ; but
rather the rule : Neminem laede, is formed by noble
minds out of the knowledge, gained once for all,
of the injury which every unjust act necessarily
entails upon others, and which is aggravated by
the feeling of having to endure wrong through a
force majeure. Such natures are led by reflecting
reason to carry out this principle with unswerving
resolution. They respect the rights of every man,
and abstain from all encroachment on them ; they
keep themselves free from self-reproach, by refus-
ing to be the cause of others' trouble ; they do
not shift on to shoulders not their own, by force
or by trickery, the burdens and sorrows of life,
which circumstances bring to every one ; they prefer
to bear themselves the portions allotted to them,
so as not to double those of their neighbours.
For although generalising formulae, and abstract
knowledge of whatever kind, are not in the least
the cause, or the real basis of morality ; these are
nevertheless indispensable for a moral course of life.
They are the cistern or reservoir, in which the habit

180 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

of mind, that springs from the fount of all morality
(a fount not at all moments flowing), may be stored
up, thence to be drawn off, as occasion requires.
There is thus an analogy between things moral and
things physiological ; among many instances of which
we need only mention that of the gall-bladder, which
is used for keeping the secretion of the liver. Without
firmly held principles we should inevitably be at
the mercy of the antiraoral incentives, directly they
are roused to activity by external influences ; and
self-control lies precisely in steadfast adherence and
obedience to such principles, despite the motives
which oppose them.

In general, the feminine half of humanity is
inferior to the masculine in the virtue of justice,
and its derivatives, uprightness, conscientiousness,
etc. ; the explanation is found in the fact that,
owing to the weakness of its reasoning powers the
former is much less capable than the latter of
understanding and holding to general laws, and of
taking them as a guiding thread. Hence injustice
and falseness are women's besetting sins, and lies
their proper element. On the other hand, they
surpass men in the virtue of loving-kindness ; because
usually the stimulus to this is intuitive, and con-
sequently appeals directly to the sense of Compassion,
of which females are much more susceptible than
males. For the former nothing but what is intuitive,
present, and immediately real has a true existence ;
that which is knowable only by means of concepts,
as for instance, the absent, the distant, the past,
the future, they do not readily grasp. We thus find

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 181

compensation here, as in so much else ; justice
is more the masculine, loving-kindness more the
feminine virtue. The mere idea of seeing women
sitting on the judges' bench raises a smile ; but the
sisters of mercy far excel the brothers of charity.
Now animals, as they have no power of gaining
knowledge by reason, that is, of forming abstract
ideas, are entirely incapable of fixed resolutions, to
say nothing of principles ; they consequently totally
lack self-control, and are helplessly given over to
external impressions and internal impulses. This
is why they have no conscious morality ; although
the different species show great contrasts of good
and evil in their characters, and as regards the
highest races these are traceable even in individuals.

From the foregoing considerations we see that in
the single acts of the just man Compassion works
only indirectly through his formulated principles, and
not so much actu as potentid ; much in the same way
as in statics the greater length of one of the scale-
beams, owing to its greater power of motion, balances
the smaller weight attached to it with the larger on
the other side, and works, while at rest, only potentid,
not actu ; yet with the same efficiency.

Nevertheless, Compassion is always ready to pass
into active operation. Therefore, whenever, in special
cases, the established rule shows signs of breaking
down, the one incentive (for we exclude of course those
based on Egoism), which is capable of infusing fresh
life into it, is that drawn from the fountain-head
itself — Compassion. This is true not only where it
is a question of personal violence, but also where

182 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

property is concerned, for instance, when any one
feels the desire to keep some valuable object which
he has found. In such cases, — if we set aside all
motives prompted by worldly wisdom, and by religion
— nothing brings a man back so easily to the path
of justice, as the realisation of the trouble, the grief,
the lamentation of the loser. It is because this is
felt to be true, that, when publicity is given to the
loss of money, the assurance is so often added that
the loser is a poor man, a servant, etc.

It is hoped that these considerations have made
it clear that, however contrary appearances may be
at first sight, yet undoubtedly justice, as a genuine
and voluntary virtue has its origin in Compassion.
But if any one should suppose such a soil too barren
and meagre to bear this great cardinal virtue, let him
reflect on what is said above, and remember how
small is the amount of true, spontaneous, unselfish,
unfeigned justice among men ; how the real thing
only occurs as a surprising excej^tion, and how, to
its counterfeit, — the justice that rests on mere worldly
wisdom and is everywhere published abroad — it is
related, both in quality and quantity, as gold is to
copper. I should like to call the one StKatoa-vvr]
'7rdvBr]fxo<i (common, ordinary justice), the other ovpavia
(heavenly justice).^ For the latter is she, who, accord-
ing to Hesiod,^ leaves the earth in the iron age, to
dwell with the celestial gods. To produce such a

' There is here an allusion to the wdvbrjfxos "Epas and Ovpavia
in Plato's SymiMsium. V. Chap. 8, sq. Edit.- Schmelzer :
Weidmann, Berlin, 1882. — (Translator.)

' V. Hesiod, Opera et Dies, 174-201. — (Tra/nslator.)

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 183

rare exotic as this the root we have indicated is
surely vigorous enough.

It will now be seen that injustice or wrong always
consists in working harm on another. Therefore
the conception of wrong is positive, and antecedent
to the conception of right, which is negative, and
simply denotes the actions performable without injury
to others ; in other words, without wrong being done.
That to this class belongs also whatever is effected
with no other object than that of warding off from
oneself meditated mischief is an easy inference. For
no participation in another's interests, and no sym-
pathy for him, can require me to let myself be
harmed by him, that is, to undergo wrong. The
theory that right is negative, in contradistinction
to wrong as positive, we find supported by Hugo
Grotius, the father of philosophical jurisprndence.
The definition of justice which he gives at the be-
ginning of his work, De Jure Belli et Pads (Bk. I.,
chap. 1., § 3), runs as follows : — Jus hie nihil aliud^
quam quod justum est, signijicat, idque negante magis
sensu, quam aiente, utjus sit, quod injustum non est}
The negative character of justice is also established,
little as it may appear, even by the familiar formula :
" Give to each one his own." Now, there is no need
to give a man his own, if he has it. The real
meaning is therefore : " Take from none his own."
Since the requirements of justice are only negative,
they may be effected by coercion ; for the Neminem

' Justice here denotes nothing else than that which is just,
and this, rather in a negative than in a positive sense ; so that
what is not unjust is to be regarded as justice.

184 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

laede can be practised by all alike. The coercive
apparatus is the state, whose sole raison d'etre is to
protect its subjects, individually from each other, and
collectively from external foes. It is true that a few-
German would-be philosophers of this venal age
wish to distort the state into an institution for the
spread of morality, education, and edifying instruction.
But such a view contains, lurking in the background,
the Jesuitical aim of doing away with jjersonal freedom
and individual development, and of making men
mere wheels in a huge Chinese governmental and
religious machine. And this is the road that once
led to Inquisitions, to Autos-da-f6, and religious wars.
Frederick the Great showed that he at least never
wished to tread it, when he said : " In my land every
one shall care for his own salvation, as he himself
thinks best." Nevertheless, we still see everywhere
(with the more apparent than real exception of North
America) that the state undertakes to provide for
the metaphysical needs of its members. The govern-
ments appear to have adopted as their guiding
principle the tenet of Qiiintus Curtius : Nulla res
efficacius multitudinem regit, quam superstitio : alio-
quin impotenSf saeva, mutabilis ; ubi vana religione
capta est, melius vatibus, quam ducibus suis paret.
We have seen that " wrong " and " right " are
convertible synonymes of " to do harm " and " to

' There is no more efficient instrument in ruling the masses
than superstition. Without this they have no self-control ;
they are brutish ; they are changeable ; but once they are
caught by some vain form of religion, they lend a more willing
ear to its soothsayers than to their own leaders.

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 185

refrain from doing it," and that under " right " is
included the warding off of injury from oneself.
It will be obvious that these conceptions are inde-
pendent of, and antecedent to, all positive legislation.
There is, therefore, a pure ethical right, or natural
right, and a pure doctrine of right, detached from
all positive statutes. The first principles of this
doctrine have no doubt an empirical origin, so far
as they arise from the idea of harm done, but per se
they rest on the pure understanding, which a priori
furnishes ready to hand the axiom : causa causae
est causa effectus. (The cause of a cause is the cause
of the effect.) Taken in this connection the words
mean : if any one desires to injure me, it is not I,
but he, that is the cause of whatever I am obliged
to do in self-defence ; and I can consequently oppose
all encroachments on his part, without wronging him.
Here we have, so to say, a law of moral repercussion.
Thus it comes about that the union of the empirical
idea of injury done with the axiom supplied by the
pure understanding, gives rise to the fundamental con-
ceptions of wrong and right, which every one grasps
a primi, and learns by actual trial to immediately
adopt. The empiric, who denies this, and refuses
to accept anything bat the verdict of experience, may
be referred to the testimony of the savage races,
who all distinguish between wrong and right quite
correctly, often indeed with nice precision ; as is
strikingly manifested when they are engaged in
bartering and other transactions with Europeans, or
visit their ships. They are bold and self-assured,
when they are in the right ; but uneasy, when they

186 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

know they are wrong. In disputes a just settlement
satisfies them, whereas unjust procedure drives them
to war. The Doctrine of Right is a branch of Ethics,
whose function is to determine those actions which
may not be performed, unless one wishes to injure
others, that is, to be guilty of wrong-doing ; and
here the active part played is kept in view. But
legislation applies this chapter of moral science
conversely, that is, with reference to the passive side
of the question, and declares that the same actions
need not be endured, since no one ought to have
wrong inflicted on him. To frustrate such con-
duct the state constructs the complete edifice of
the law, as positive Right. Its intention is that
no one shall suffer wrong ; the intention of the
Doctrine of Moral Right is that no one shall do
wrong.^

If by unjust action I molest some one, whether in
his person, his freedom, his property, or his honour,
the wrong as regards quality remains the same. But
with respect to quantity it may vary very much. This
difi'erence in the amount of wrong efiected appears not
to have been as yet investigated by moralists, although
it is everywhere recognised in real life, because the
censure passed is always proportional to the harm
inflicted. So also with just actions, the right done
is constant in quality, but not in quantity To explain
this better : he, who when dying of starvation steals a
loaf, commits a wrong ; but how small is this wrong
in comparison with the act of an opulent proprietor,

' The Doctrine of Eight in detail may be found in Die
Welt ah Wille imd Vorstellung, vol. i,, § 62.

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 187

who, in whatever way, despoils a poor man of his last
penny 1 Again : the rich person who pays his hired
labourer, acts justly ; but how insignificant is this piece
of justice when contrasted with that of a penniless
toiler, who voluntarily returns to its wealthy owner
a purse of gold which he has found ! The measure,
however, of this striking difference in the quantity
of justice, and injustice (the quality being always
constant), is not direct and absolute, as on a graduated
scale ; it is indirect and relative, like the ratio of
sines and tangents. I give therefore the following
definition : the amount of injustice in my conduct
varies as the amount of evil, which I thereby bring
on another, divided by the amount of advantage,
which I myself gain ; and the amount of justice in
my conduct varies as the amount of advantage, which
injury done to another brings me, divided by the
amount of harm which he thereby suffers.

We have further to notice a double form of injustice
which is specifically different from the simple kind, be
it never so great. This variety may be detected by
the fact that the amount of indignation shown by
disinterested witnesses, which is always proportional
to the amount of wrong inflicted, never reaches the
maximum except when it is present. We then see
how the deed is loathed, as something revolting and
heinous, as an a<yo<i {i.e., abomination), before which,
as it were, the gods veil their faces. Double injustice
occurs when some one, after definitely undertaking
the obligation of protecting his friend, master, client,
etc., in a special way, not only is guilty of non-fulfilment
of that duty (which of itself would be injurious to the

188 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

other, and therefore a wrong) ; but when, in addition,
he turns round, and attacks the man, and strikes at
the very spot which he promised to guard. Instances
are : the appointed watch, or guide, who becomes an
assassin ; the trusted caretaker, who becomes a thief ;
the guardian, who robs his ward of her property ;
the lawyer, who prevaricates ; the judge, who is
corruptible ; the adviser, who deliberately gives some
fatal counsel. All such conduct is known by the
name of treachery, and is viewed with abhorrence by
the whole world. Hence Dante puts traitors in the
lowest circle of Hell, where Satan himself is found
{Inferno : xi, 61-66).

As we have here had occasion to mention the
word " obligation," this is the place to determine
the conception of Duty, which is so often spoken of
both in Ethics and in real life, but with too wide
an extension of meaning. We have seen that wrong
always signifies injury done to another, whether it
be in his person, his freedom, his property, or
his lionour. The consequence appears to be that
every wrong must imply a positive aggression, and
so a definite act. Only there are actions, the
simple omission of which constitutes a wrong ; and
these are Duties. This is the true philosophic
definition of the conception " Duty," — a term which
loses its characteristic note, and hence becomes
valueless, if it is used (as hitherto it has been in
Moral Science) to designate all praiseworthy conduct.
It is forgotten that " Duty " ^ necessarily means a

' Duty = TO 8iov = le devoir =Pfiicht [cf. plight, O. H. G.
plegcmj. — ( Translator. )

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 189

debt which is owing, being thus an action, by the
simple omission of which another suffers harm, that
is, a wrong comes about. Clearly in this case the
injury only takes place through the person, who
neglects the duty, having distinctly pledged or bound
himself to it. Consequently all duties depend on
an obligation which has been entered into. This,
as a rule, takes the form of a definite, if some-
times tacit, agreement between two parties : as for
instance, between prince and people, government and
its servants, master and man, lawyer and client,
physician and patient ; in a word, between any and
every one who undertakes to perform some task,
and his employer in the widest sense of the word.
Hence every duty involves a right ; since no one
undertakes an obligation without a motive, which
means, in this case, without seeing some advantage
for himself. There is only one obligation that I
know of which is not subject to an agreement, but arises
directly and solely through an act ; this is because
one of the persons with whom it has to do was not
in existence when it was contracted. I refer to the
duty of parents towards their children. Whoever
brings a child into the world, has incumbent on him
the duty of supporting his offspring, until the latter is
able to maintain himself ; and should this time never
come, owing to incapacity from blindness, deformity,
cretinism, and the like, neither does the duty ever
come to an end. It is clear that merely by failing to
provide for the needs of his son, that is, by a simple
omission, the father would injure him, indeed jeopardise
his life. Children's duty towards their parents is

190 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

not SO direct and imperative. It rests on the fact
that, as ever}^ duty involves a right, parents also
mnst have some just claim on their issue. This
is the foundation of the duty of filial obedience,
which, however, in course of time ceases simultaneously
with the right out of which it sprang. It is replaced
by gratitude for that which was done by father and
mother over and above their strict duty. Neverthe-
less, " although ingratitude is a hateful, often indeed
a revolting vice, gratitude cannot be called a duty;
because its omission inflicts no injury on the other
side, and is therefore no wrong. Otherwise we should
have to suppose that in his heart of hearts the
benefactor aims at maldng a good bargain. It
should he noticed that reparation made for harm
done may also be regarded as a duty arising directly
through an action. This, however, is something purely
negative, as it is nothing but an attempt to remove
and blot out the consequences of an unjust deed, as
a thing that ought never to have taken place. Be
it also observed tliat equity ^ is the foe of justice,
and often comes into harsh collision with it ; so
that the former ought only to be admitted within
certain limits. The German is a friend of equity,
while the Englishman holds to justice.

The law of motivation is just as strict as that
of physical causality, and hence involves the same

* The word here translated " equity " {Billigheit : Lat.
aequitas) means the sense of fairness, or of natural justice
which determines what is fitting and due in all human
relations, as opposed to justice {Gerechtigkeit) taken as
positive written law. — {Translator.)

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 191

irresistible necessity. Consequently wrong may be
compassed not only by violence, but also by cunning.
If by violence I am able to kill or rob another, or compel
him to obey me, I can equally use cunning to
accomplish the same ends ; that is, I can place false
motives before his intellect, by reason of which he
must do what otherwise he would not. These false
motives are effected by lies. In reality lies are
unjustifiable solely in so far as they are instruments
of cunning, in other words, of compulsion, by means
of motivation.^ And this is precisely their function,
as a rule. For, in the first place, I cannot tell a false-
liood without a motive, and this motive will certainly
be, with the rarest exceptions, an unjust one ; namely,
the intention of holding others, over whom I have
no power, under my will, that is, of coercing them
through the agency of motivation. Also in mere ex-
aggerations and untruthful bombast there is the same
purpose at work ; for, by employing such language,
a man tries to place himself higher in the sight
of others than is his due. The binding force of a
promise or a compact is contained in the fact that, if
it be not observed, it is a deliberate lie, pronounced
in the most solemn manner, — a lie, whose intention
(that of putting others under moral compulsion) is,
in this case, all the clearer, because its motive, the
desired performance of something on the other side,
is expressly declared. The contemptible part of the

' Motivation is defined in Part II,, Chapter VIIL, as " the
law of Causality acting through the medium of the intellect."
It is thus the law of the determination of conduct by
motives. — {Translator.)

192 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

fraud is that hypocrisy is used to disarm the victim
before he is attacked. The highest point of villainy
is reached in treachery, which, as we have seen, is a
double injustice, and is always regarded with loathing.
It is, then, obvious that, jnst as I am not wrong,
that is, right in resisting violence by violence, so
where violence is not feasible, or it appears more
convenient, I am at liberty to resort to cunning ;
accordingly, whenever I am entitled to use force, I
may, if I please, employ falsehood ; for instance, against
robbers and miscreants of every sort, whom in this
way I entice into a trap. Hence a promise which is
extorted by violence is not binding. But, as a matter
of fact, the right to avail myself of lies extends
further. It occurs whenever an unjustifiable question
is asked, which has to do with my private, or business
affairs, and is hence prompted by curiosity ; for to
answer it, or even to put it off by the suspicion-
awakening words, " I can't tell you," would expose
me to danger. Here an untruth is the indispensable
weapon against unwarranted inquisitiveness, whose
motive is hardly ever a well-meaning one. For, just as
I have the right to oppose the apparent bad will of
another, and to anticipate with physical resistance,
to the danger of my would-be aggressor, the physical
violence presumably thence resulting ; so that, for
instance, as a precaution, I can protect my garden
wall with sharp spikes, let loose savage dogs in my
court at night, and even, if circumstances require it,
set man-traps and spring-guns, for the evil conse-
quences of which the burglar has only himself to
thank : — if I have the right to do this, then I am

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 193

equally authorised in keeping secret, at any price, that
which, if known, would lay me bare to the attack
of others. And 1 have good reason for acting thus,
because, in moral, no less than in physical, relations,
1 am driven to assume that the bad will of others
is very possible, and must therefore take all necessary
preventive measures beforehand. Whence Ariosto
says : —

Quantunque il simvlar sia le piit volte
Jiipreso, e dia di mala niente indict,
Si trova pure in molte cose e molte
Avere fatti evidenti henefici,
E danni e biusmi e morti avei'e tolte :
Che nan conversiani' semjyre con gli amid.
In questa assai piii oscura che serena
Vita mortal, tutta d'invidia plena}

—Orl. Fur., IV., 1.

I may, then, without any injustice match cunning
with cunning, and anticipate all crafty encroachments
on me, even if they be only probable ; and I need
neither render an account to him who unwarrantably
pries into my personal circumstances, nor by replying :
" I cannot answer this," show him the spot where I

* However much we're won't to blame a lie,
As index of a mind estranged from right,
Yet times unnumber'd it hath shap'd results
Of good most evident ; disgrace and loss,
It chang'd ; e'en death it cheated. For with friends,
Alas ! not always in this mortal life,
Where envy fills all hearts, and gloom prevails
Much more than light, are we in converse join'd.

— {Translator.)
13

194 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

have a secret, which perilous to me, and perhaps
advantageous to him, in any case puts me in his
power, if divulged : Scire volunt secreta domus, atque
inde timeri. (They wish to know family secrets, and
thus become feared.) On the contrary, I am justified
in putting him off with a lie, involving danger to
himself, in case he is thereby led into a mistake that
works him harm. Indeed, a falsehood is the only
means of opposing inquisitive and suspicious curiosity ;
to meet which it is the one weapon of necessary self-
defence. " Ask me no questions, and I'll tell yon no
lies " is here the right maxim. For among the
English, who regard the reproach of being a liar as
the deepest insult, and who on that account are really
more truthful than other nations, all unjustifiable
questions, having to do with another's affairs, are
looked upon as a piece of ill-breeding, which is denoted
by the expression, " to ask questions." Certainly
every sensible person, even when he is of the strictest
rectitude, follows the principle above set forth.
Suppose, for instance, such a one is returning from
a remote spot, where he has raised a sum of money ;
and suppose an unknown traveller joins him, and
after the customary " whither " and " whence "
gradually proceeds to inquire what may have taken
him to that place ; the former will undoubtedly give
a false answer in order to avoid the danger of robbery.
Again : if a man be found in the house of another,
whose daughter he is wooing ; and he is asked the
cause of his unexpected presence ; unless he has
entirely lost his head, he will not give the true reason,
but unhesitatingly invent a pretext. And the cases are

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 195

numberless in which every reasonable being tells an
untruth, without the least scruple of conscience. It is
this view of the matter alone that removes the crying
contradiction between the morality which is taught,
and that which is daily practised, even by the best
and most upright of men. At the same time, the
restriction of a falsehood to the single purpose of self-
defence must be rigidly observed ; for otherwise this
doctrine would admit of terrible abuse, a lie being in
itself a very dangerous instrument. But just as, even
in time of public peace, the law allows every one to
carry weapons and to use them, when required for
self-defence, so Ethics permits lies to be employed
for the same purpose, and — be it observed — for this
one purpose only. Every mendacious word is a wrong,
excepting only when the occasion arises of defending
oneself against violence or cunning. Hence justice
requires truthfulness towards all men. But the entirely
unconditional and unreserved condemnation of lies, as
properly involved in their nature, is sufficiently refuted
by well known facts. Thus, there are cases where a
falsehood is a duty, especially for doctors ; and there
are magnanimous lies, as, for instance, that of the
Marquis Posa in Don Carlos,^ or that in the Gerusa-
lemme Liberata^ II., 22 ; ^ they occur, indeed, whenever
a man wills to take on himself the guilt of another ;
and lastly, Jesus Christ himself is reported {John

^ Vide, Schiller's Don Carlos : Act V., So. 3. — {Translator.)
' " Magnanima menzogna, or quando e tl vero

SI hello che si possa a te 2»'eporre ? "
Cf. also the Horatian splendid mendax. Carm. III., 11,
35. — {Translator.)

196 THE BASIS OF MORALITY,

vii. 8 ; cf. ver. 10) on one occasion to have inten-
tionally told an untrutli. The reader will remember
that Campanella, in his Poesie Filosqfiche (Delia
Bellezza: Madr. 9), does not hesitate to say : " Bello
e il mentir^ se a fare gran bev! si trovar ^ On the
other hand, the current teaching as regards necessary
falsehoods is a wretched patch on the dress of a
poverty-stricken morality. Kant is responsible for
the theory found in many text-books, which derives
the unjustifiableness of lies from man's faculty of
speech ; but the arguments are so tame, childish and
absurd that one might well be tempted, if only to
pour contempt on them, to join sides with the devil,
and say with Talleyrand ; Vhomme a regu la parole
pour pouvoir cacher sa pensee? The unqualified and
boundless horror shown by Kant for falsehoods,
whenever he has the opportunity, is due either to
affectation, or to prejudice. In the chapter of his
" Tugendlehre^'' dealing with lies, he loads them
with every kind of defamatory epithet, bat does
not adduce a single adequate reason for their con-
demnation ; which would have been more to the
point. Declamation is easier than demonstration,
and to moralise less difficult than to be sincere.
Kant would have done better to open the vials of
his wrath on that vice which takes pleasure in seeing
others suifer ; it is the latter, and not a falsehood,
which is truly fiendish. For malignant joy is the exact

* 'Tis well to lie, an there result much good therefrom.
Vide., Opere di Tommaso Campanella, da Alessandro d'Ancona,
Torino, 1854. — {Translator.)

" Man has received the gift of language, so as to be able to
conceal his thoughts.

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 197

opposite of Compassion, and nothing else but powerless
cruelty, which, unable itself to bring about the misery-
it so gladly beholds others enduring, is thankful to
Tvxv for having done so instead. According to the
code of knightly honour, the reproach of being a liar
is of extreme gravity, and only to be washed out with
the accuser's blood. Now this obtains, not because
the lie is wrong in itself, since, were such the reason,
to accuse a man of an injury done by violence would
certainly be regarded as equally outrageous, — which
is not the case, as every one knows ; but it is due to
that principle of chivalry, which in reality bases right
on might ; so that whoever, when trying to work
mischief, has recourse to falsehood, proves that he
lacks either power, or the requisite courage. Every
untruth bears witness of his fear ; and this is why a
fatal verdict is passed on him.

CHAPTER VII.

THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS.

Thus justice is the primary and essentially cardinal
virtue. Ancient philosophers recognised it as such,
but made it co-ordinate with three others unsuitably
chosen.^ Loving-kindness (caritas, dydirr]) was not
as yet ranked as a virtue. Plato himself, who rises
highest in moral science, reaches only so far as
voluntary, disinterested justice. It is true that
loving-kindness has existed at all times in practice
and in fact ; but it was reserved for Christianity, —
whose greatest service is seen in this — to theoretically
formulate, and expressly advance it not only as a
virtue, but as the queen of all ; and to extend it even to
enemies. We are thinking of course only of Europe.
For in Asia, a thousand years before, the bound-
less love of one's neighbour had been prescribed
and taught, as well as practised: the Vedas^ are

' Plato taught that Justice (diKaioo-vvr]) includes in itself
the three other virtues of Wisdom (<Tocf)ia), Fortitude {dvdpeia\
and Temperance (aacppoa-vvT]). With Aristotle, too, Justice is
the chief of virtues ; while the Stoic doctrine is that Virtue
is manifested in four leading co-ordinate forms : Wisdom,
Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance. — (Translator.)

' There are four Vedas : the Big- Veda, Yajur- Veda, Sdvia-
Veda, and Atharva-Veda.— {Translator.)

198

THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS. 199

full of it; while in the Dharma-Sastra,^ Itihasa,^
and Parana^ it constantly recurs, to say nothing of
the preaching of ^akya-muni, the Buddha. And to
be quite accurate we must admit that there are
traces to be found among the Greeks and Romans
of a recommendation to follow loving-kindness ; for
instance, in Cicero, De Finibus, V., 23 ; * and also
in Pythagoras, according to lamblichus, De vita
Pyihagoraey chap. 33.* My task is now to give a
philosophical derivation of this virtue from the
principle I have laid down.

It has been demonstrated in Chapter Y. of this
Part, that the sense of Compassion, however much its
origin is shrouded in mystery, is the one and sole cause
whereby the suflfering I sae in another, of itself, and
as such, becomes directly my motive ; and we have
seen that the first stage of this process is negative.

^ Dharmm-^astra (" a law book ") : the body or code of
Hindu law. — {Translator.)

* Itihdsa (iti-ha-asa, " so indeed it is ") : talk, legend, tradi-
tional accounts of former events, heroic history ; e.g., the
Maha-bharata. — {Translator.)

^ Purdna (ancient, legendary) : the name given to certain
well-known sacred works, eighteen in number, comprising
the whole body of modern Hindu mythology. V. Monier
Williams' Sanskrit Dictionary. — (Translator.)

* Ipsa CARITAS generis humani, qitae nata a primo satu,
quod a procreatoribus nati diliguntur, et tota dormis conjiigio
et stirpe conjungitur, serjnt sensim foras, cognationihus
primum, turn affinitatihus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatihus
turn civibus et iis, qui publice socii atque amid sunt, deinde

TOTIUS COMPLEXU GENTIS HUMAN AE.

* This chapter describes the Pythagorean ^wXt'a navrav rrpos
iiravTas, which comes very near to loving-kindness. It
contains also certain koKo. t^s (fnXias TeKfirjpia. — (Translator.)

200 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

The second degree is sharply distinguished from the
first, through the positive character of the actions
resulting therefrom ; for at this point Compassion
does more than keep me back from injuring my
neighbour ; it impels me to help him. And according
as, on the one hand, my sense of direct participation
is keen and deep, and, on the other hand, the distress
is great and urgent, so shall I be constrained by
this motive, which (be it noted) is purely and wholly
moral, to make a greater or less sacrifice in order to
meet the need or the calamity which I observe ; and
this sacrifice may involve the expenditure of my
bodily or mental powers, the loss of my property,
freedom, or even life. So that in this direct
suflfering with another, which rests on no arguments
and requires none, is found the one simple origin of
loving-kindness, caritas, dydirr)' in other words, that
virtue whose rule is : Omnes, quantum potes, juva
(help all people, as far as lies in your power) ;
and from which all those actions proceed which are
prescribed by Ethics under the name of duties of
virtue, otherwise called duties of love, or imperfect
duties. It is solely by direct and, as it were,
instinctive participation in the sufiferings which we
see, in other words, by Compassion, that conduct
so defined is occasioned ; at least when it can be
said to have moral worth, that is, be declared free
from all egoistic motives, and when on that account
it awakens in us that inward contentment which is
called a good, satisfied, approving conscience, and
elicits from the spectator (not without making him
cast a humiliating glance at himself), that remark-

THE VIRTUE OF LOVJNG-KINDNESS. 201

able commendation, respect, and admiration which are
too well-known to be denied.

But if a beneficent action have any other motive
whatever, then it must be egoistic, if not actually
malicious. For as the fundamental springs of all
human conduct (v. Chapter V. of this Part), are three,
namely, Egoism, Malice, Compassion ; so the various
motives which are capable of affecting men may be
grouped under three general heads : (1) one's own weal ;
(2) others' woe ; (3) others' weal. Now if the motive
of a kind act does not belong to the third class, it must
of course be found in the first or second. To the
second it is occasionally to be ascribed ; for instance,
if I do good to some one, in order to vex another,
to whom I am hostile ; or to make the latter's
sufferings more acute ; or, it may be, to put to
shame a third person, who refrained from helping ;
or lastly, to inflict a mortification on the man whom
I benefit. But it much more usually springs from
the first class. And this is the case whenever, in
doing some good, I have in view my own weal, no
matter how remote or indirect it may be ; that is,
whenever I am influenced by the thought of reward
whether in this, or in another, world, or by the hope
of winning high esteem, and of gaining a reputation
for nobleness of character ; or again, when I reflect
that the person, whom I now aid, may one day be
able to assist me in return, or otherwise be of some
service and benefit ; or when, lastly, I am guided
by the consideration that I must keep the rules of
magnanimity and beneficence, because I too may on
some occasion profit thereby. In a word, my motive

202 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

is egoistic as sooii as it is anything other than the
purely objective desire of simply knowing, without
any ulterior purpose, that my neighbour is helped,
delivered from his distress and need, or freed from
his suffering. If such an aim — shorn, as it is, of
all subjectivity — be really mine, then, and then only,
have I given proof of that loving-kindness, caritas,
aydin], which it is the great and distinguishing merit
of Christianity to have preached. It should be ob-
served, in this connection, that the injunctions which
the Gospel adds to its commandment of love, e.g.,
fjurj rypcoTco 7] apL(n€pd aov, TV TTOcel Tj Be^id aov (let
not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth),
and the like, are, in point of fact, based on a
consciousness of the conclusion I have here reached, —
namely, that another's distress, of itself alone, without
any further consideration, must be my motive, if
what I do is to be of moral value. And in the same
place {Matth. vi. 2) we find it stated with perfect
truth that ostentations almsgivers direxovatv rov
fiLcrdov avTwv. (Get in full — exhaust their reward.)
Although, in this respect too, the Vedas shed on
us the light of a higher teaching. They repeatedly
declare that he, who desires any sort of recompense
for his work, is still wandering in the path of dark-
ness, and not yet ripe for deliverance. If any one
should ask me what he gets from a charitable act,
my answer in all sincerity would be : " This, that
the lot of the poor man you relieve is just so much
the lighter ; otherwise absolutely nothing. If you
are not satisfied, and feel that such is not a suflfi-
cient end, then your wish was not to give alms,

THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS. 203

but to make a purchase ; and you have effected a
bad bargain. But if the one thing you are concerned
with is that he should feel the pressure of poverty
less ; then you have gained your object ; you have
diminished his suffering, and you see exactly how
far your gift is requited."

Now, how is it possible that trouble which is not
mine, and by which I am untouched, should become
as direct a motive to me as if it were my own, and
incite me to action ? As already explained, only
through the fact that, although it comes before
me merely as something outside myself, by means
of the external medium of sight or hearing ; I am,
nevertheless, sensible of it with the sufferer ; I feel
it as my own, not indeed in myself, but in Mm
And so what Calderon said comes to pass :

que entre el ver
Padecer y el 2:>adecer
Ningwrui distancia habia.
{No Siempre lo Peor es Gierto. Jorn. II., Esc. 9.) *

This, however, presupposes that to a certain extent
I have become identified with the other, and con-
sequently that the barrier between the ego and the
non-ego is, for the moment, broken down. It is then,
and then only, that I make his interests, his need,
his distress, his suffering directly my own ; it is then
that • the empirical picture I have of him vanishes,

* For between the view
Of pain, and pain itself, I never knew
A distance he.
It is not Always the Worst that is Certain : Act II.,
So. 9.— {Translator.)

204 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

and I no longer see the stranger, who is entirely
unlike myself, and to whom I am indifferent ; but
I share his pain in him, despite the certainty that
his skin does not enclose my nerves. Only in this
way is it possible for his woe, Ms distress to become a
motive for me ; otherwise I should be influenced solely
by my own. This process . is, I repeat, mysterious.
For it is one which Eeason can give no direct account
of, and its causes lie outside the field of experience.
And yet it is of daily occurrence. Every one has
often felt its working within himself; even to the
most hard-hearted and selfish it is not unknown.
Each day that passes brings it before our eyes, in
single acts, on a small scale ; whenever a man, by
direct impulse, without much reflection, helps a
fellow-creature and comes to his aid, sometimes even
exposing himself to the most imminent peril for the
sake of one he has never seen before, and this, with-
out once thinking of anything but the fact that
he witnesses another's great distress and danger. It
was manifested on a large scale, when after long
consideration, and many a stormy debate, the noble-
hearted British nation gave twenty millions of pounds
to ransom the negroes in its colonies, with the
approbation and joy of a whole world. If any one
refuses to recognise in Compassion the cause of this
deed, magnificent as it is in its grand proportions,
and prefers to ascribe it to Christianity ; let him
remember that in the whole of the New Testament
not one word is said against slavery, though at that
time it was practically universal ; and further, that
as late as a.d. I860, in North America, when the

THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS. 205

qnestion was being discnssed, a man was found who
thought to strengthen his case by appealing to the
fact that Abraham and Jacob kept slaves I

What will be in each separate case the practical
effect of this mysterious inner process may be left
to Ethics to analyse, in chapters and paragraphs
entitled " Duties of Virtue," " Duties of Love,"
" Imperfect Duties," or whatever other name be used.
The root, the -basis of all these is the one here
indicated ; for out of it arises the primary precept :
Omnes, quantum potes^ juva ; from which in turn
everything else required can very easily be deduced ;
just as out of the Neminem laede — the first half of
my principle — all duties of justice are derivable.
Ethics is in truth the easiest of all sciences. And
this is only to be expected, since it is incumbent on
each person to construct it for himself, and himself
form the rule for every case, as it occurs, out of
the fundamental law which lies deep in his heart ;
for few have leisure and patience enough to learn
a ready-made system of Morals. From justice and
loving-kindness spring all the other virtues ; for which
reason these two may properly be called cardinal, and
the disclosure of their origin lays the corner-stone
of Moral Science. The entire ethical content of
the Old Testament is justice ; loving-kindness being
that of the New. The latter is the Katvr] ivroXr) (the
new commandment \_John xiii. 34] ), which accord-
ing to Paul (Romans xiii. 8-10) includes all Christian
virtues.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PKOOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED
BY EXPERIENCE.

The truth I have here laid down, that Compassion
is the sole non-egoistic stimulus, and therefore the
only really moral one, is a strange, indeed almost
incomprehensible paradox. I shall hope, therefore,
to render it less extraordinary to the reader, if I
show that it is confirmed by experience, and by the
universal testimony of human sentiment.

(1) For this purpose I shall, in the first place,
state an imaginary case, which in the present investi-
gation may serve as an experimentum crucis ^ (a crucial
test). But not to make the matter too easy, I shall
take no instance of loving-kindness, but rather a
breach of lawful right, and that of the worse kind.

' This term appears to have been first used by Newton
and Boyle. The sense is undoubtedly derived from Bacon's
phrase "'instantia crwa's," which is one of his "Prerogative
Instances." Vide, Novum Organum : Lib. II., xxxvi., where it
is explained as follows : Inter Praerogativas Instantiarum
ponemus loco decimo qtiarto Instantias Crucis ; translato
vocabulo a Grucihus, quae erectae in Biviis, indicant et signant
viarum separationes. Has etiam Instantias Decisorias et
Judiciales, et in Casibus nonnullis Instantias Oraculi et
Mandati, appellare consuevimus, etc. — (Translator.)

206

THE PEOOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 207

Let US suppose two young people, Cains and Titus,
to be passionately in love, each with a different girl,
and that both are completely thwarted- by two other
men who are preferred because of certain external
circumstances. They have both resolved to put their
rivals out of the way, and are perfectly secure from
every chance of detection, even from all suspicion.
But when they come to actually prepare for the
murder, each of them, after an inward struggle,
draws back. They are now to give us a truthful and
clear account of the reasons why they abandoned
their project. As for Caius, I leave it entirely to
the reader to choose what motive he likes. It may
be that religious grounds checked him ; for in-
stance, the thought of the Divine Will, of future
retribution, of the judgment to come, etc. Or perhaps
he may say : "I reflected that the principle I was
going to apply in this case would not be adapted to
provide a rule universally valid for all possible
rational beings ; because I should have treated my
rival only as a means, and not at the same time as
an end." Or, following Fichte, he may deliver
himself as follows : " Every human life is a means
towards realising the moral law ; consequently, I
cannot, without being indifferent to this realisation,
destroy a being ordained to do his part in effecting
it." — (Sittenlehre, p. 373.) (This scruple, be it ob-
served in passing, he might well overcome by the
hope of soon producing a new instrument of the moral
law, when once in possession of his beloved.) Or,
again, he may speak after the fashion of Wollaston :
" I considered that such an action would be the

208 THE BASIS OF MORALITY,

expression of a false tenet." Or like Hatcheson : " The
Moral Sense, whose perceptions, equally with those
of every other sense, admit of no final explanation,
forbade me to commit such a deed." Or like Adam
Smith : " I foresaw that my act would awaken no
sympathy with me in the minds of the spectators."
Or his language may be borrowed from Christian
Wolff : " I recognised that I should thereby advance
neither the work of making myself perfect, nor the
same process in any one else." Or from Spinoza :
" Homini nihil utilius komine : ergo hominem interimere
noluir (To man nothing is more useful than man :
therefore I was unwilling to destroy a man.) In
short, he may say what one pleases. But Titus,
whose explanation is supplied by myself, will speak
as follows : " When I came to make arrangements
for the work, and so, for the moment, had to occupy
myself not with my own passion, but with my rival ;
then for the first time I saw clearly what was going
to happen to him. But simultaneously I was seized
with compassion and pity; sorrow for him laid hold
upon me, and overmastered me : I could not strike the
blow." Now I ask every honest and unprejudiced
reader : Which of these two is the better man ? To
which would he prefer to entrust his own destiny?
Which is restrained by the purer motive? Conse-
quently, where does the basis of morality lie ?

(2) There is nothing that revolts our moral sense
so much as cruelty. Every other offence we can
pardon, but not cruelty. The reason is found in the
fact that cruelty is the exact opposite of Compassion.
When we hear of intensely cruel conduct, as, for

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 209

instance, the act, which has just been recorded in
the papers, of a mother, who murdered her little
son of five years, by pouring boiling oil into his
throat, and her younger child, by burying it alive ;
or what was recently reported from Algiers : how a
casual dispute between a Spaniard and an Algerine
ended in a fight ; and how the latter, having van-
quished the other, tore out the whole of his lower
jaw bone, and carried it off as a trophy, leaving his
adversary still alive ; — when we hear of cruelty like
this, we are seized with horror, and exclaim : " How
is it possible to do such a thing ? " Now, let me
ask what this question signifies. Does it mean :
" How is it possible to fear so little the punishments
of the future life ? " It is difficult to admit this
interpretation. Then perhaps it intends to say :
" How is it possible to act according to a principle
which is so absolutely unfitted to become a general
law for all rational beings ? " Certainly not. Or,
once more : " How is it possible to neglect so utterly
one's own perfection as well as that of another ? "
This is equally unimaginable. The sense of the
question is assuredly nothing but this : " How is
it possible to be so utterly bereft of compassion ? "
The conclusion is that when an action is characterised
by an extraordinary absence of compassion, it bears
the certain stamp of the deepest depravity and loath-
someness. Hence Compassion is the true moral
incentive.

(3) The ethical basis, or the original moral stimulus,
which I have disclosed, is the only one that can be
justly said to have a real and extended sphere of

14

210 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

effective influence. No one will surely venture to
maintain as much of all the other moral principles
that philosophers have set up ; for these are composed
of abstract, sometimes even of hair-splitting propo-
sitions, with no foundation other than an artificial
combination of ideas ; such that their application
to actual conduct would often incline to the comic.
A good action, inspired solely by Kant's Moral Prin-
ciple, would be at bottom the work of philosophic
pedantry ; or else would lead the doer into self-
deception, through his reason interpreting conduct,
which had other, perhaps nobler, incentives, as the
product of the Categorical Imperative, and of the
conception of Duty, which, as we have seen, rests
on nothing. But not only is it true that the philo-
sophic moral principles, purely theoretical as they
are, have seldom any operative power ; of those
established by religion, and expressly framed for
practical purposes, it is equally difficult to predicate
any marked efficiency. The chief evidence of this lies
in the fact that in spite of the great religious differ-
ences in the world, the amount of morality, or rather
of immorality, shows no corresponding variation, but
in essentials is pretty much the same everywhere.
Only it is important not to confound rudeness and
refinement with morality and immorality. The re-
ligion of Hellas had an exceedingly small moral
tendency, — it hardly went further than respect for
oaths. No dogma was taught, and no system of
Ethics publicly preached ; nevertheless, all things
considered, it does not appear that the Greeks were
morally inferior to the men of the Christian era. The

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 211

morality of Christianity is of a mnch higher kind than
that of any other religion which previously appeared
in Europe. But if any one should believe for this
reason that European morals have improved pro-
portionally, and that now at any rate they surpass
what obtains elsewhere, it would not be difficult to
demonstrate that among the Mohammedans, Guebres,
Hindus, and Buddhists, there is at least as much
honesty, fidelity, toleration, gentleness, beneficence,
nobleness, and self-denial as among Christian peoples.
Indeed, the scale will be found rather to turn unfavour-
ably for Christendom, when we put into the balance
the long list of inhuman cruelties which have con-
stantly been perpetrated within its limits and often
in its name. We need only recall for a moment the
numerous religious wars ; the crusades that nothing
can justify ; the extirpation of a large part of the
American aborigines, and the peopling of that con-
tinent by negroes, brought over from Africa, without
the shadow of a right, torn from their families, their
country, their hemisphere, and, as slaves, condemned
for life to forced labour ; the tireless persecution of
heretics ; the unspeakable atrocities of the Inquisition,
that cried aloud to heaven ; the Massacre of St.
Bartholomew ; the execution of 18,000 persons in
the Netherlands by the Duke of Alva ; and these are
but a few facts among many. Speaking generally,

^ According to Buxton {The African Slave-trade, 1839),
their number is even now yearly increased by about 150,000
freshly imported ; and to these more than 200,000 must be
added, who perish miserably at the time of their capture, or
on the voyage.

212 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

however, if we compare with the performances of its
followers the excellent morality which Christianity,
and, more or less, every creed preaches, and then
try to imagine how far theory would become practice,
if crime were not impeded by the secular arm of the
state ; nay more, what would probably happen, if, for
only one day all laws should be suspended ; we shall
be obliged to confess that the effect of the various
religions on Morals is in fact very small. This is
of course due to weakness of faith. Theoretically,
and so long as it is only a question of piety in the
abstract, every one supposes his belief to be firm
enough. Only the searching touch-stone of all our
convictions is — what we do. When the moment for
acting arrives, and our faith has to be tested by
great self-denial and heavy sacrifices, then its feeble-
ness becomes evident. If a man is seriously planning
some evil, he has already broken the bounds of true
and pure morality. Thenceforward the chief restraint
that checks him is invariably the dread of justice
and the police. Should he be so hopeful of escap-
ing detection as to cast such fears aside, the next
barrier that meets him is regard for his honour. If
this second rampart be crossed, there is very little
likelihood, after both these powerful hindrances are
withdrawn, that any religious dogma will appeal
to him strongly enough to keep him back from the
deed. For if he be not frightened by near and
immediate dangers, he will hardly be curbed by
terrors which are distant, and rest merely on belief.
Moreover, there is a positive objection that may be
brought against all good conduct proceeding solely from

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 213

religious conviction ; it is not purged of self-interest,
but done out of regard for reward and punishment, and
hence can have no purely moral value. This view we
find very clearly expressed in a letter of the celebrated
Grand-Duke of Weimar, Karl August, He writes :
" Baron Weyhers was himself of opinion that he, who
is good through religion, and not by natural inclina-
tion, must be a bad fellow at heart. In vino Veritas.''^ ^
— {Letters to J. H. Merck ; No. 229.) But now let us
turn to the moral incentive which I have disclosed.
Who ventures for a moment to deny that it displays
a marked and truly wonderful inlluence at all times,
among all peoples, in all circumstances of life ; even
when constitutional law is suspended, and the horrors
of revolutions and wars fill the air ; in small things
and in great, every day and every hour ? Who will
refuse to admit that it is constantly preventing much
wrong, and calling into existence many a good action,
often quite unexpectedly, and where there is no hope
of reward ? Is there any one who will gainsay the
fact that, where it and it alone has been operative,
we all with deep respect and emotion unreservedly
recognise the presence of genuine moral worth ?

(4) Boundless compassion for all living beings
is the surest and most certain guarantee of pure moral
conduct, and needs no casuistry. Whoever is filled
with it will assuredly injure no one, do harm to no
one, encroach on no man's rights ; he will rather have

* I.e., under the influence of wine one speaks the truth. Cf.
Pliny, Nat. Hist, xiv., chap. 22, § 28, 141, edit. Teubner ;
vvlgoque Veritas jam attrihuta vino est. Gk. olvos koi
akr]6fui. V. Paroemiographi, edit. Gaisford. — {Translator.)

214 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

regard for every one, forgive every one, help every
one as far as he can, and all his actions will bear the
stamp of justice and loving-kindness. On the other
hand, if we try to say : " This man is virtuous, but
he is a stranger to Compassion " ; or : " he is an
unjust and malicious man, yet. very compassionate ;"
the contradiction at once leaps to light. In former
times the English plays used to finish with a petition
for the King. The old Indian dramas close with
these words : " May all living beings be delivered
from pain." Tastes differ ; but in my opinion there
is no more beautiful prayer than this.

(5) Also from separate matters of detail it may
be inferred that the original stimulus of true morality
is Compassion. For instance, to make a man lose
a hundred thalers, by legal tricks involving no
danger, is equally unjust, whether he be rich or poor ;
but in the latter case the rapping of conscience is
much louder, the censure of disinterested witnesses
more emphatic. Aristotle was well aware of this,
and said : Beivorepov Be icrri rov drv^ovvra, rj rov
evTVxovvra, dSiKeiv. (It is worse to injure a man
in adversity than one who is prosperous.) — {Probl.
xxix. 2.) If the man have wealth, self-reproach is
proportionally faint, and grows still fainter, if it be
the treasury that has been overreached ; for state
coffers can form no object of Compassion. It thus
appears that the grounds for self-accusation as well
as for the spectators' blame are not furnished directly
by the infringement of the law, but chiefly by the
suffering thereby brought upon others. The violation
of right, by itself and as such, which is involved in

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE, 215

cheating the exchequer, (to take the above instance,)
will be disapproved by the conscience alike of actor
and witness ; but only because, and in so far as, the
rule of respecting every right, which forms the sine
qua non of all honourable conduct, is in consequence
broken. The stricture passed will, in fact, be in-
direct and limited. If, however, it be a confidential
employe in the service that commits the fraud, the
case assumes quite another aspect ; it then has all
the specific attributes of, and belongs to, that class
of actions described above, whose characteristic is
a double injustice. The analysis here given explains
why the worst charge which can ever be brought
against rapacious extortioners and legal sharpers is,
that they appropriate for themselves the goods of
widows and orphans. The reason appears in the
fact that the latter, more than others, owing to their
helplessness, might be expected to excite Compassion
in the most callous heart. Hence we conclude that
the entire absence of this sense is sufficient to lower
a man to the last degree of villainy.

(6) Compassion is the root no less of justice than
of loving-kindness ; but it is more clearly evidenced
in the latter than in the former. We never receive
proofs of genuine loving-kindness on the part of others,
so long as we are in all respects prosperous. The
happy man may, no doubt, often hear the words of
good- will on his relations' and friends' lips ; but
the expression of that pure, disinterested, objective
participation in the condition and lot of others, which
loving-kindness begets, is reserved for him who is
stricken with some sorrow or suffering, whatever

216 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

it be. For the fortunate as such we do not feel
sympathy ; unless they have some other claim on
us, they remain alien to our hearts : habeant sibi sua.
(They may keep their own affairs, pleasures, etc., to
themselves.) Nay, if a man has many advantages
over others, he will easily become an object of envy,
which is ready, should he once fall from his height
of prosperity, to turn into malignant joy. Neverthe-
less this menace is, for the most part, not fulfilled ;
the Sophoclean yeXaxrc S' ix^poi (his enemies laugh)
does not generally become an actual fact. As soon
as the day of ruin comes to one of fortune's spoiled
children, there usually takes place a great transforma-
tion in the minds of his acquaintances, which for us
in this connection is very instructive. In the first
place this change clearly reveals the real nature of
the interest that the friends of his happiness took
in him : diffugiunt cadis cum faece siccatis amici.
(When the casks are drained to the dregs, one's
friends run away.)^ On the other hand, the exultation
of those who envied his prosperity, the mocking laugh
of malicious satisfaction, which he feared more than
adversity itself, and the contemplation of which he
could not face, are things usually spared him. Jealousy
is appeased, and disappears with its cause ; while
Compassion which takes its place is the parent of
loving-kindness. Those who were envious of, and
hostile to, a man in the full tide of success, after his
downfall, have not seldom become his friends, ready
to protect, comfort, and help. Who has not, at least
in a small way, himself experienced something of the
' Hor., Garm., I., 35, 26. — (Translator.)

THE PROOF CONFIBMED BY EXPERIENCE. 217

sort ? Where is the man, who, when overtaken by
some calamity, of whatever nature, has not noticed
with surprise how the persons that previously had
displayed the greatest coldness, nay, ill-will towards
him, then came forward with unfeigned sympathy ?
For misfortune is the condition of Compassion, and
Compassion the source of loving-kindness. When our
wrath is kindled against a person, nothing quenches
it so quickly, even when it is righteous, as the words :
" He is an unfortunate man." And the reason is
obvious : Compassion is to anger as water to fire.
Therefore, whoever would fain have nothing to repent
of, let him listen to my advice. When he is inflamed
with rage, and meditates doing some one a grievous
injury, he should bring the thing vividly before his
mind, as a fait accompli ; he should clearly picture
to himself this other fellow-being tormented with
mental or bodily pain, or struggling with need and
misery ; so that he is forced to exclaim : " This is
my work ! " Such thoughts as these, if anything,
will avail to moderate his wrath. For Compassion
is the true antidote of anger ; and by practising on
oneself this artifice of the imagination, one awakes
beforehand, while there is yet time,

la pitie, dont la voix,
Alors qv!on est veng^, fait entendre ses lais}

— (Voltaire, Semiramis, V. 6.)

And in general, the hatred we may cherish for
others is overcome by nothing so easily as by our
taking a point of view whence they can appeal to our

' Compassion, who with no uncertain tone,
The work of vengeance done, her laws makes known.

218 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

Compassion. The reason indeed why parents, as a
rale, specially love the sickly one of their children
is because the sight of it perpetually stirs their
Compassion.

(7) There is another proof that the moral incentive
disclosed by me is the true one. I mean the fact
that animals also are included under its protecting
aegis. In the other European systems of Ethics no
place is found for them, — strange and inexcusable as
this may appear. It is asserted that beasts have
no rights ; the illusion is harboured that our conduct,
so far as they are concerned, has no moral significance,
or, as it is put in the language of these codes, that
" there are no duties to be fulfilled towards animals."
Such a view is one of revolting coarseness, a barbarism
of the West, whose source is Judaism. In philosophy,
however, it rests on the assumption, despite all
evidence to the contrary, of the radical difference
between man and beast,— a doctrine which, as is well
known, was proclaimed with more trenchant emphasis
by Descartes than by any one else : it was indeed the
necessary consequence of his mistakes. When Leibnitz
and Wolff, following out the Cartesian view, built up
out of abstract ideas their Rational Psychology, and
constructed a deathless anima rationalis (rational
soul) ; then the natural claims of the animal kingdom
visibly rose up against this exclusive privilege, this
human patent of immortality, and Nature, as always
in such circumstances, entered her silent protest.
Our philosophers, owing to the qualms of their
intellectual conscience, were soon forced to seek aid
for their Rational Psychology from the empirical

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 219

method ; they accordingly tried to reveal the exist-
ence of a vast chasm, an immeasurable gulf between
animals and men, in order to represent them, in the
teeth of opposing testimony, as existences essentially
different. These efforts did not escape the ridicule
of Boileau ; for we find him saying :

Le& cmxTnavx ont-ils des university ?
Voit-on fleurir chez eux des quatre factdt^s ? '

Such a supposition would end in animals being
pronounced incapable of distinguishing themselves
from the external world, and of having any self-
consciousness, any ego ! As answer to such absurd
tenets, it would only be necessary to point to the
boundless Egoism innate in every animal, even the
smallest and humblest ; this amply proves how
perfectly they are conscious of their self, as opposed
to the world, which lies outside it. If any one of the
Cartesian persuasion, with views like these in his
head, should find himself in the claws of a tiger,
he would be taught in the most forcible manner
what a sharp distinction such a beast draws between
his ego and the non-ego. Corresponding to these
philosophical fallacies we notice a peculiar sophism
in the speech of many peoples, especially the Germans.
For the commonest matters connected with the
processes of life, — for food, drink, conception, the
bringing forth of young ; for death, and the dead
body ; such languages have special words applicable
only to animals, not to men. In this way the

' Have beasts, forsooth, their universities,
Endowed, Uke ours, with all four faculties?

220 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

necessity of using the same terms for botli is avoided,
and the perfect identity of the thing concealed under
verbal differences. Now, since the ancient tongues
show no trace of such a dual mode of expression,
but frankly denote the same things by the same
words ; it follows that this miserable artifice is
beyond all doubt the work of European priestcraft,
which, in its profanity, knows no limit to its dis-
avowal of, and blasphemy against, the Eternal Reality
that lives in every animal. Thus was laid the founda-
tion of that harshness and cruelty towards beasts
which is customary in Europe, and on which a native
of the Asiatic uplands could not look without righteous
horror. In English this infamous invention is not to
be found ; assuredly because the Saxons, when they
conquered England, were not yet Christians. Neverthe-
less the English language shows something analogous
in the strange fact that it makes all animals of the
neuter gender, the pronoun " it " being employed
for them, just as if they were lifeless things. This
idiom has a very objectionable sound, especially in
the case of dogs, monkeys, and other Primates, and
is unmistakably a priestly trick, designed to reduce
beasts to the level of inanimate objects. The ancient
Egyptians, who dedicated all their days to religion,
were accustomed to place in the same vault with
a human mummy that of an ibis, a crocodile, etc.;
in Europe it is a crime, an abomination to bury a
faithful dog beside the resting-place of his master,
though it is there perhaps that he, with a fidelity
and attachment unknown to the sons of men, awaited
his own end. To a recognition of the identity, in all

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 221

essentials, of the phaenomena which we call " man "
and " beast," nothing leads more surely than the study
of zoology and anatomy. What shall we say then,
when in these days (1839) a canting dissector has
been found, who presumes to insist on an absolute
and radical dijBference between human beings and
animals, and who goes so far as to attack and
calumniate honest zoologists that keep aloof from
all priestly guile, eye-service, and hypocrisy, and dare
to follow the leading of nature and of truth ?

Those persons must indeed be totally blind, or
else completely chloroformed by the foetor Judaicus
(Jewish stench), who do not discern that the truly
essential and fundamental part in man and beast is
identically the same thing. That which distinguishes
the one from the other does not lie in the primary
and original principle, in the inner nature, in the
kernel of the two phaenomena (this kernel being
in both alike the Will of the individual) ; it is found
in what is secondary, in the intellect, in the degree of
perceptive capacity. It is true that the latter is incom-
parably higher in man, by reason of his added faculty
of abstract knowledge, called Reason ; nevertheless
this superiority is traceable solely to a greater cerebral
development, in other words, to the corporeal difference,
which is quantitative, not qualitative, of a single
part, the brain. In all other respects the similarity
between men and animals, both psychical and bodily,
is sufficiently striking. So that we must remind
our judaised friends in the West, who despise animals,
and idolise Reason, that if they were suckled by their
mothers, so also was the dog by Ms. Even Kant fell

222 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

into this common mistake of his age, and of his
country, and I have already administered the censure ^
which it is impossible to withhold. The fact that
Christian morality takes no thought for beasts is a
defect in the system which is better admitted than
perpetuated. One's astonishment is, however, all
the greater, because, with this exception, it shows
the closest agreement with the Ethics of Brahmanism
and Buddhism, being only less strongly expressed,
and not carried to the last consequences imposed by
logic. On the whole, there seems little room for
doubting that, in common with the idea of a god
become man, or Avatar,^ it has an Asiatic origin, and
probably came to Judaea by way of Egypt ; so that
Christianity would be a secondary reflection of the
primordial light that shone in India, which, falling
first on Egypt, was unhappily refracted from its
ruins upon Jewish soil. An apt symbol of the insen-
sibility of Christian Ethics to animals, while in other
points its similarity to the Indian is so great, may
be found in the circumstance that John the Baptist
comes before us in all respects like a Hindu
Sannyasin,' except that he is clothed in skins : a
thing which would be, as is well known, an abomina-
tion in the eyes of every follower of Brahmanism
or Buddhism. The Koyal Society of Calcutta only

» V. Part II., Chapter VI.

* Avatara (ava-tri to descend), descent of a deity from
heaven ; e.g., the ten incarnations of Vishnu. V. Monier
Williams' Somskrit Dictionary. — {Translator.)

* Sannyasin (one who lays down, or resigns), an ascetic ;
a religious mendicant, or Brahman of the fourth order. V.
Monier Williams' Sanskrit Dictionary. — {Translator.)

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 223

received their copy of the Vedas on their distinctly
promising that they would not have it bound in
leather, after European fashion. In silken binding,
therefore, it is now to be seen on the shelves of their
librar3^ Again : the Gospel story of Peter's draught
of fishes, which the Saviour blesses so signally that the
boats are overladen, and begin to sink {Luke v. 1-10),
forms a characteristic contrast to what is related of
Pythagoras. It is said that the latter, initiated as he
was in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, bought the
draught from the fishermen, while the net was still
under water, in order to at once set at liberty the captive
denizens of the sea. (Apuleius : Be Magia, p. 36 :
edit. Bipont.) ^ Compassion for animals is intimately
connected with goodness of character, and it may
be confidently asserted that he, who is cruel to living
creatures, cannot be a good man. Moreover, this
compassion manifestly flows from the same source
whence arise the virtues of justice and loving-
kindness towards men. Thus, for instance, people
of delicate sensitiveness, on realising that in a fit
of ill-humour, or anger, or under the influence of
wine, they punished their dog, their horse, their ape
undeservedly, or unnecessarily, or excessively, are
seized with the same remorse, feel the same dissatis-
faction with themselves, as when they are conscious

' V. Apuleius : Apologia sive De Magia Liber (Lipsiae,
Teubner, 1900 : page 41, chap, xxxi) : Pythagoram . . . memoriae
prodiderunt, cum animaduertisset proxime Metajxyntum in
litore Italiae sitae, quam subsiciuam Graeciam fecerat, a
quibusdam piscatoribtis eiierricvlum trahi, fortunam, iactus
eiiis emisse et pretio dato iussisse, ilico piscis eos qui capti
tenebantur solui retibits et reddi profundo. — {Translator.)

224 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

of having done some wrong to one of their fellows.
The only difference — a purely nominal one — is that
in the latter case this remorse, this dissatisfaction
is called the voice of conscience rising in rebuke.
I remember having read of an Englishman, who,
when hunting in India, had killed a monkey, that
he could not forget the dying look which the creature
cast on him ; so that he never fired at these animals
again. Another sportsman, William Harris by name,
a true Nimrod, has much the same story to tell.
During the years 1836-7 he travelled far into the heart
of Africa, merely to indulge his passion for the chase.
A passage in his book, published at Bombay in 1838,
describes how he shot his first elephant, a female.
Next morning on going to look for his game, he found
that all the elephants had fled from the neighbour-
hood, except a young one which had spent the night
beside its dead mother. Seeing the huntsmen, it
forgot all fear, and came to meet them, with the
clearest and most lively signs of disconsolate grief,
and put its tiny trunk about them, as if to beg
for help. " Then," says Harris, " I was filled with
"real remorse for what I had done, and felt as if I
had committed a murder."

The English nation, with its fine sensibility, is, in
fact, distinguished above all others for extraordinary
compassion towards animals, which appears at every
opportunity, and is so strong that, despite the " cold
superstition " which otherwise degrades them, these
Anglo-Saxons have been led through its operation to
fill up by legislation the lacuna that their religion
leaves in morality. For this gap is precisely the

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 225

reason why in Europe and America there is need
of societies for the protection of animals, which are
entirely dependent on the law for their efficiency. In
Asia the religions themselves suffice, consequently no
one there ever thinks of such associations. Meanwhile
Europeans are awakening more and more to a sense
that beasts have rights, in proportion as the strange
notion is being gradually overcome and outgrown,
that the animal kingdom came into existence solely
for the benefit and pleasure of man. This view, ^ with
the corollary that non- human living creatures are to be
regarded merely as things, is at the root of the rough
and altogether reckless treatment of them, which
obtains in the West. To the honour, then, of the
English be it said that they are the first people who
have, in downright earnest, extended the protecting
arm of the law to animals : in England the mis-
creant, that commits an outrage on beasts, has to
pay for it, equally whether they are his own or
not. Nor is this all. There exists in London the
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,
a corporate body voluntarily formed, which, without
state assistance, and at great cost, is of no small
service in lessening the tale of tortures inflicted on
animals. Its emissaries are ubiquitous, and keep
secret watch in order to inform against the tor-
mentors of dumb, sensitive creatures ; and such
persons have therefore good reason to stand in
fear of them.^ At all the steep bridges in London

' In Vol. II. of my Parerga, § 177, I have shown that its
origin can be traced to the Old Testament.

^ How seriously the matter is being taken up may be
seen from the following case which is quite recent. I quote

15

226 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

this Society stations a pair of horses, which without
any charge is attached to heavy freight-waggons.
Is not this admirable ? Does it not elicit our ap-
proval, as unfailingly as any beneficent action
towards men ? Also the Philanthropic Society of
London has done its part. In 1837 it offered a prize
of £30 for the best exposition of the moral reasons
which exist to keep men from torturing animals.
The line of argument, however, had to be taken almost
exclusively from Christianity, whereby the difficulty
of the task was, of course, increased ; but two years

from the Birmingham Journal of December, 1839. "Arrest
of a company of eighty-four abettors of dog-fights. — It had
come to the knowledge of the Society of Animals' Friends
that the Square in Fox Street, Birmingham, was yesterday
to be the scene of a dog- fight. Measures were accordingly
taken to secure the assistance of the police, and a strong
detachment of constables was sent to the spot. At the right
moment all the persons present were arrested. These precious
conspirators were then handcuffed together in pairs, and the
whole party was made fast by a long rope passing between
each couple. In this fashion they were marched off to the
Police Station, where mayor and magistrate were sitting in
readiness for them. The two ringleaders were condemned to
pay, each, a fine of £l, and 8s. 6(i. costs ; in default, to undergo
14 days' hard labour." The coxcombs whose habit is never
to miss noble sport of this sort, must have looked somewhat
crestfallen in the midst of the procession. But the Titnes
of April 6, 1855, p. 6, supplies a still more striking instance
from the present day ; and here we find the paper itself
assuming judicial functions, and imposing the right punish-
ment. It recounts the case of a very wealthy Scotch baronet's
daughter. The matter had been brought before the law, and
the evidence showed that the girl had used a cudgel and knife
on her horse with the greatest cruelty; for which she was
ordered to pay a fine of £5. But for one in her position
such a sum means nothing, and she would practically have

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 227

later, in 1839, Mr. Macnamara was the successfnl
competitor. At Philadelphia there is an Animals'
Friends' Society, having the same aims ; and it is
to the President of the latter that a book called
Philozoia ; or, Moral Rejections on the Actual Con-
dition of Animals, and the Means of Improving the
Same (Brussels, 1839), has been dedicated by its
author, T. Forster. It is original and well written.
Mr. Forster earnestly commends to his readers the
humane treatment of animals. As an Englishman he
naturally tries to strengthen his position by the
support of the Bible ; but he is on slippery ground,

got off scot-free, had not the Times intervened to inflict
on her a proper correction, such as she would really feel.
It twice mentions the young lady's name in full, printing
it in large type, and concludes as follows : " We cannot help
saying that a few months' imprisonment mth the addition of
an occasional whipping administered in private, but by the
most muscular woman in Hampshire, would have been a much
more suitable penalty for Miss M. N. A wretched being of
this sort has forfeited all the consideration and the privileges
that attach to her sex ; we cannot regard her any longer
as a woman." These newspaper paragraphs I would especially
recommend to the notice of the associations now formed in
Germany against cruelty to animals ; for they show what
hnes should be adopted, in order to reach some solid result.
At the same time I desire to express my cordial appreciation
of the praiseworthy zeal shown by Herrn Hofrath Perner, of
Munich, who has entirely devoted himself to this branch of
well-doing, and succeeded in arousing interest in it all over
the country. [It should be observed that the first portion of
this note belongs to the earliest edition of the work, published
September, 1840 ; the latter part was written for the second
edition, which appeared in August, 1860. This explains why
Schopenhauer says that the first instance, dated 1839, is " quite
recent," and that the second, dated 1855, is taken " from the
present day." — {Translate'.)]

228 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

and meets with such poor success that he ends by
catching at the following ingenious position : Jesus
Christ (he says) was born in a stable among oxen
and asses ; which was meant to indicate symbolically
that we ought to regard the beasts as our brothers,
and treat them accordingly. All that I have here
adduced sufficiently proves that the moral chord, of
which we are speaking, is now at length beginning
to vibrate also in the West. For the rest, we may
observe that compassion for sentient beings is not to
carry us to the length of abstaining from flesh, like
the Brahmans. This is because, by a natural law,
capacity for pain keeps pace with the intelligence ;
consequently men, by going without animal food,
especially in the North, would suffer more than
beasts do through a quick death, which is always
unforeseen ; although the latter ought to be made
still easier by means of chloroform. Indeed without
meat nourishment mankind would be quite unable
to withstand the rigours of the Northern climate.
The same reasoning explains, too, why we are right
in making animals work for us ; it is only when
they are subjected to an excessive amount of toil
that cruelty begins.

(8) It is perhaps not impossible to investigate and
explain metaphysically the ultimate cause of that
Compassion in which alone all non-egoistic conduct
can have its source ; but let us for the moment
put aside such inquiries, and consider the phaenome-
non in question, from the empirical point of view,
simply as a natural arrangement. Now if Nature's
intention was to soften as much as possible the

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 229

numberless sufferings of every sort, to which our
life is exposed, and which no one altogether escapes ;
if she wished to provide some counterbalance for the
burning Egoism, which fills all beings, and often
develops into malice ; it will at once strike every
one as obvious that she could not have chosen any
method more effectual than that of planting in the
human heart the wonderful disposition, which inclines
one man to share the pain of another, and from
which proceeds the voice that bids us, in tones strong
and unmistakable, take thought for our neighbour ;
calling, at one time, " Protect ! " at another, " Help ! "
Assuredly, from the mutual succour thus arising,
there was more to be hoped for, towards the attain-
ment of universal well-being, than from a stern Com-
mand of duty, couched in general, abstract terms, —
the product of certain reasoning processes, and of
artificial combinations of conceptions. From such an
Imperative, indeed, all the less result could be expected
because to the rough human unit general propositions
and abstract truths are unintelligible, the concrete
only having some meaning for him. And it should
be remembered that mankind in its entirety, a very
small part alone excepted, has always been rude,
and must remain so, since the large amount of bodily
toil, which for the race as a whole is inevitable, leaves
no time for mental culture. Whereas, in order to
awaken that sense, which has been proved to be the
sole source of disinterested action, and consequently
the true basis of Morals, there is no need of abstract
knowledge, but only of intuitive perception, of the
simple comprehension of a concrete case. To this

230 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

Compassion is at. once responsive, without the media-
tion of other thoughts.

(9) The following circumstance will be found in
complete accord with the last paragraph. The
foundation, which I have given to Ethics, leaves me
without a forerunner among the School Philosophers ;
indeed, my position is paradoxical, as far as their teach-
ing goes, and many of them, for instance, the Stoics
(Seneca, De dementia, II., 5), Spinoza (Et/iica, IV.,
prop. 50), and Kant {Kritik der Praktiscken Vernunft,
p. 213 ; R. p. 257) only notice the motive of t'om-
passion to utterly reject and contemn it. On the
other hand, my basis is supported by the authority
of the greatest moralist of modern times ; for such,
undoubtedly, J. J. Rousseau is, — that profound reader
of the human heart, who drew his wisdom not from
books, but from life, and intended his doctrine not
for the professorial chair, but for humanity ; he, the
foe of all prejudice, the foster-child of nature, whom
alone she endowed with the gift of being able to
moralise without tediousness, because he hit the truth
and stirred the heart. I shall therefore venture here
to cite some passages from his works in support of
my theory, observing that, so far, I have been as
sparing as possible with regard to quotations.

In the Discours sur VOrigine de VIncgalitc, p. 91
(edit. Bipont.), he says : 11 y a un autre principe,
que Hobbes n'a point apergu, et qui ayant 6te donne
a Vhortime pour adoucir, en certaines circonatances, la
ferocitS de son a^mour-propre, tempere Vardeur quil
a pour son bien-etre par un£ repugnance in nee a
VOIR SOUFFRIR SON SEMBLABLE. Je ne crois pas

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 231

avoir aucune contradiction a craindre en accordant a
Uhomme la seule vertu naturelle qu'ait ete force
de reconnaitre le detracteur le plus outrS des vertua
humaines. Je parle de la pitie, etc.}

P. 92 : Mandeville a bien senti qu'avec toute leur
TThorale les homines n'eussent jamais ete que des mon-
stres, si la nocture n£ leur eut donne la piti^ a I'appui
de la raison : mais il n'a jpas vu, que de cette seule

QUALITE DEGOULENT TOUTES LES VERTUS SOC TALES,

qu'il vent disputer aux hommes. En effet, qu'est-ce
que la generosite, la clemence, Vhumanite, sinon
LA PITIE, ajppliquee aux faibles, aux coupables, on a
Vespece humaine en gSTiSral? La bienveillance et
Vamitie Tneme sont, a le bien prendre, des productions
d\ine pitie constante, JlxSe sur un objet particulier;
car desirei' que quelqu'un ne souffre poird, qu'est-ce
autre chose, que desirer qu'il soit heureux? . . . La
commiseration sera d^auta^it plus eniergique, que
V ANIMAL SPEGTATEUR S'iDENTiFiERA plus intimement

avec V ANIMAL SOUFFRANT^

' There is another principle which Hobbes did not perceive
at all. It was implanted in man in order to soften, in certain
circumstances, the fierceness of his self-love, and it moderates
the ardour, which he feels for his own well-being, by producing
a certain innate aversion to the sight of a fellow-creature's
sufering. In attributing to man the onl]/ Tiatural virtue,
which even the most advanced scepticism has been forced to
recognise, I stand, assuredly, in no fear of any contradiction.
I allude to compassion, etc.

* Mandeville was right in thinking that with all their
systems of morality, men would never have been anything but
monsters, if nature had not given them compassion to support
their reason ; but he failed to see that from this one quality
spi'ing all the social virtues, which he was unwiUing to credit

232 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

P. 94 : II est done bien certain, que la pitie est
un sentiment naturel, qui, moderant dans chaque
individu Vamour de soi-meme, concourt a la conserva-
tion rautuelle de toute Vespece. C^est elle, qui dans
VMat de nature, tient lieu de lois, de moeurs, et de
vertus, avec cet avantage, que nul ne sera tente de
d^soh&ir a sa douce voix: c'est elle, qui detournera
tout sauvage rohuste d'enlever a un faible enfant, ou
a un vieillard infirme, sa subsistence acquise avec peine,
si lui rneme espere pouvoir trouver la sienne ailleurs :
c^est elle qui, au lieu de cette maxime sublime de
justice raisonnee : " Fais a autrui comm,e tu veux qu'on
te fasse ; " inspire a tous les hommes cette autre
maxime de bonte naturelle, bien moins parfaite, mais
plus utile peut-etre que la prScedente : " Fais ton
bien avec le moindre mal d'autrui qu'il est possible."
Cest, en un mot, dans ce sentiment naturel
plut6t, que dans les arguments subtils, qu'il
faut chercher la cause de la repugnance qu'eprouverait
tout homme a mal faire, meme independamment des
maximes de l'6ducation}

mankind with. In reality, what is generosity, clemency,
humanity, if not compassion, applied to the weak, to the
guilty, or to the human race, as a whole ? Even benevolence
and friendship, if we look at the matter rightly," are seen to
result from a constant compassion, directed upon a particular
object ; for to desire that some one should not suffer is nothing
else than to desire that he should be happy. . . The more closely
the living spectator identifies hiviself with the living sufferer,
the more active does pity become.

' It is, then, quite certain that compassion is a natural feeling,
which checking, as it does, the love of self in each individual,
helps by a reciprocal process to preserve the whole race. This
it is, which in the state of nature, takes the place of laws,

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 233

Let this be compared with what he says in Emile,
Bk. IV., pp. 115-120 (edit. Bipont.), where the follow-
ing passage occurs among others : —

En effet, comment nous laissons-nous 6mouvoir d la
pitie, si ce n'est en nous transportant hors de nous
et en nous identifiant avec v animal souffrant:
EN QuiTTANT, pouv ainsi dire, notre etre, pour
PRENDRE LE siEN? Nous ne souffvons qu^autant que
nous jugeons quHl souffre : CE nest pas dans nous,
CPEST DANS LUi, que nous souffrons . . . offrir au
jeune homme des objets, sur lesquels puisse agir la
force expansive de son coeur, qui le dilatent, qui
Vetendent sur les autres etres, qui le f assent partout
SE RETRouvER HORS DE LUI; barter avec soin ceux,
qui le resserrent, le concentrent, et tendent le ressort

DU MOI HUMAIN, etc.^

customs, and virtues, with the added advantage that no one
will be tempted to disobey its gentle voice ; this it is, which
will restrain every able-bodied savage, provided he hope to
find his own livelihood elsewhere, from robbing a weak child,
or depriving an infirm old man of the subsistence won by hard
toil ; this it is, which inspires all men, not indeed with that
sublime maxim of reasoned justice: "Do to others as you
would they should do unto you ; " but with another rule of
natural goodness, no doubt less perfect, but perhaps more
useful, namely : " Do what is good for yourself with the least
possible harm to others." In a word, it is in this natural
feeling rather than in subtle arguments that we must look
for the reason of the repugnance with which every one is
accustomed to view bad conduct, quite independently of the
principles laid down by education.

* In fact, how is it that we let ourselves be moved to pity,
if not by getting out of our own consciousness, and becoming
identified with the living stiferer ; by leaving, so to say, our
own being, and entenng into his ? We do not suffer, except

234 THE BASI8 OF MORALITY.

Inside the pale of the Schools, as above remarked,
there is not a single authority in favour of my posi-
tion ; but outside, I have other testimony to cite, in
addition to Rousseau's. The Chinese admit five
cardinal virtues (Tschang), of which the chief is
Compassion (Sin). The other four are : justice, courtesy,
wisdom, and sincerity.^ Similarly, among the Hindus,
we find that on the tablets placed to the memory
of dead chieftains, compassion for men and animals
takes the first place in the record of their virtues.
At Athens there was an altar to Compassion in the
Agora, as we know from Pausanias, I. 17 : 'AOrjvaiot^
Be ev rf} ayopa ecTTL ^EXiov /8&)/a6?, c5, fiaXiara deoiv
e? avOpooTTivov jSiov Kol fji,eTa^o\a<i irpay/xdrcov on u>-
<fie\,tfjbo<;, fWvoL ri/jLa'i 'EXktjvcov vefiovcnv ^Adrjudtot,.^

as we suppose he suffers ; it is not in us, it is in him, that we
suffer . . . offer a young man objects, on which the expansive
force of his heart can act ; objects such as may enlarge his
nature, and incline it to go out to other beings, in whom he
may everywhere find himself again. Keep carefully away
those things which narrow his view, and make him self-centred,
and which tighten the strings of the human ego. [Tendent le
ressort (stretch the spring) du moi humain : i.e., stimulate the
egoistic tendency. — (Translator.)]

' Journal Asiatique, Vol. ix., p. 62. Cf. Meng-Tseu (other-
wise called Mencius), edited by Stanislas Julien, 1824, Bk. 1,
§ 45 ; also Meng-Tseu in the Livres Sacres de VOrient, by
Panthier p. 281.

V. Dictionnaire Frangais — Latin — Chinois, par Paul Pemy
(Didot Frferes, Paris, 1869) ; where the five cardinal virtues
( ?r , ffi) are transliterated : oti chAng. V. also: A Syllabic
Dictionary of the Chinese Language ; by S. Wells Williams,
LL.B. (Shanghai: 1874); where Sin (Sin), i.e., humanity,
love of one's neighbour, is written Sin'. — {Translator.^

^ The Athenians have an altar in their Agora to Compassion ;

THE PROOF CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. 235

Lucian also mentions this altar in the Timon, § 99.^ A
phrase of Phocion, preserved by Stobaeus, describes
Compassion as the most sacred thing in human life :
0VT€ i^ lepov j3cofi6v, ovre eK t^? dvdpcoinvrj'i <f>v(Tea>^
a(f>aipeT€ov top ^Xeov.^ In the Sapientia Indorum,
the Greek translation of the Paiica-tantra, we read
(Section 3, p. 220) : Aeyerat yap, (09 Trpcorr] rwv
aperoiv 77 iXerjfioavvr).^ It is clear, then, that the
real source of morality has been distinctly recog-
nised at all times and in all countries ; Europe
alone excepted, owing to the/oeto?^ Judaicus (Jewish
stench), which here pervades everything, and is
the reason why the Western races require for the
object of their obedience a command of duty, a moral
law, an imperative, in short, an order and decree.
They remain wedded to this habit of thought, and

for this deity, they believe, is of all the gods the most helpful
in human life, and its vicissitudes. They are the only Greeks
who have instituted this cultus. — {Translator.)

^ V. Lucian, Tivion, chap. 42 (Ausgewahlte Schriften des
Lvjcian, edit. Julius Somnierbrodt ; Weidmann, Berlin, 1872,

p. 75) : (fjiXos fie ^ ^evos ^ iraipos fj 'EXfov fi(0(i6s vffkos noKvs.

V. also ApoUodorus (edit. J, Bekker) ; 2, 8, 1. 3, 7, 1. Dem.
(edit. Eeisk.), 57. Scholiast on Soph. Oed. Col., 258. —
{Translator.)

* A temple must not be despoiled of its altar, nor human
nature of compassion. V. Joannis Stobaei Anthologium,
edit. Curtius Wachsmuth et Otto Hense ; Weidmann, Berlin,
1894 ; Vol. III., p. 20, Nr. 52.— {Translator.)

^ The chief of virtues is said to be Compassion. The Panca-
tantra is a well-known collection of moral stories and fables
in five {pancan) books or chapters {tantra\ from which the
author of the Hitojxidesa drew a large portion of his materials.
F. Monier Williams' Sanskrit Dictionary. — {Translator.)

236 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

refuse to open their eyes to the fact that such a view
is, after all, based upon nothing but Egosim. Of
course, now and then, isolated individuals of fine
perception have felt the truth, and given it utterance :
such a one was Rousseau ; and such, Lessing. In a
letter written by the latter in 1756 we read : " The
best man, and the one most likely to excel in all
social virtues, in all forms of magnanimity, is he
who is most compassionate."

CHAPTER IX.

ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER.

There still remains a qnestion to be resolved, before
the basis which I have given to Ethics can be
presented in all its completeness. It is this. On
what does the great difference in the moral behaviour
of men rest ? If Compassion be the original incentive
of all true, that is, disinterested justice and loving-
kindness ; how comes it that some are, while others
are not, influenced thereby ? Are we to suppose
that Ethics, which discloses the moral stimulus, is
also capable of setting it in motion ? Can Ethics
fashion the hard-hearted man anew, so that he be-
comes compassionate, and, as a consequence, just
and humane ? Certainly not. The difference of
character is innate, and ineradicable. The wicked
man is born with his wickedness as much as the
serpent is with its poison-fangs and glands, nor can
the former change his nature a whit more than the
latter.^ Velle non discitur (to use one's will is
not a thing that can be taught) is a saying of Nero's
tutor. In the Meno, Plato minutely investigates

* Cf- Jeremiah xiii. 23. — (Translator.)
237

238 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

the nature of virtue, and inquires whether it can,
or cannot, be taught. He quotes a passage from
Theognis :

dXXa dibdaKcov
Ot/TTOTc Troii^(Tfis Tov KUKov uvbp dyadov,
(But thou wilt ne'er,
By teaching make the bad man virtuous.)

and finally reaches this conclusion : apeTr) av etr) ovre
(pvcrei,, oijTe ScBaKjov. aWa deia ^oipa irapaytyvofiePT],
avev vov, oh av TrapayiyvrjTai.^ Here the terms
^vaei and deca fjboCpa form a distinction, in my opinion,
much the same as that between " pliysical " and
" metaphysical." Socrates, the father of Ethics, if
we may trust Aristotle, declared that ovk i(f> y) p,lv
yevecrdai to airovhaiov^ eTvai, rj <^av\ois} (^Moralia
Magna, i. 9.) Moreover, Aristotle himself expresses
the same view : Traat yap BoKel eKucrra rcov rjdSiv
virdp^eiv <f>V(rei tto)?' /cat yap SUaioi, Kal acoippovtKol,
Ka\ ToXka e^ofiev €v6v<i e/c yeverij^i.^ {Et/i. Nicom.
vi. 13.) We find also a similar conviction very decidedly
expressed in the fragments attributed to the Pytha-

' Virtue would appear not to come naturally {i.e., through
the physical order of things), nor can it be taught; but in
whomsoever it dwells, there it is present, apart from the
intellect, under divine ordinance. [V. Platonis Opera, edit.
Didot, Paris, 1856 ; Vol. I. Meno, 96 and 99, ad fin.—
{Translator.)]
^ It is not in our power to be either good or bad. ■■^' i

^ For it appears that the different characters of all men
are in some way implanted in them by nature ; if we are just,
and temperate, and otherwise virtuous, we are so straightway
from our birth.

ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 239

gorean Arcliytas, and preserved by Stobaens in the
Florilegium (Chap. i. § 77).^ If not authentic, they are
certainly very old. Orelli gives them in his Opuscula
Graecorum Sententiosa et Moralia. There (Vol. II.,
p. 240) we read in the Dorian dialect as follows : —
Ta<i yap Xcr/ot^ Kol airohei^eaiv '7roTL')(p(ofMeva<i apeTa<i
Biov i7ricrTd/jui<i Trorayopevev, aperav Be, rav tjOikuv koI
^ekrla-rav e^tv rSi a\6<yoii fiipeo<i Td<; '\lrv)(^a<;^ Ka9^
av Kol TTOLoi TLve<i rifxev XeyofieOa Kara ro r}6o<i, olov
iXevdipioi, SUaioL Kal <T(o<^pove<i.^ On examining the
virtues and vices, as summarised by Aristotle in the De
Virtutibus et Vitiis, it will be found that all of tliem,
without exception, are not properly thinkable unless
assumed to be inborn qualities, and that only as such
can they be genuine. If, in consequence of reasoned
reflection, we take them as voluntary, they are then
seen to lose their reality, and pass into the region
of empty forms ; whence it immediately follows that
their permanence and resistance under the storm
and stress of circumstance could not be counted
on. And the same is true of the virtue of loving-
kindness, of which Aristotle, in common with all
the ancients, knows nothing. Montaigne keeps, of
course, his sceptical tone, but he practically agrees

' V. Joannis Stobaei Florilegium, edit. Meineke, publ.
Lipsiae, Teubner, 1855 ; Vol. I., p. 33, 1. 14, sqq. — (Translator.)

^ For the so-called virtues, that require reasoning and demon-
stration, ought to be called sciences. By the term " virtue "
we mean rather a certain moral and excellent disposition of
the sovTs unreasoning part. This disposition determines the
character which we show, and in accordance with which we
are called generous, just, or temperate.

240 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

with the venerable authorities above quoted, when
he says : Serait-il vrai, que pour etre bon tout a
fait, il nous le faille itre par occulte, naturelle et
universelle proprietc, sans loi, sans raison, sans
exemple?^ — (Liv. II., chap. 11.) Lichtenberg hits
the mark exactly in his Vermischte Schriften, (v.
Moralische Bermerkungen). He writes : " All virtue
arising from premeditation is not worth much.
What is wanted is feeling or habit." Lastly,
it should be noted that Christianity itself, in its
original teaching, recognises, and bears witness to
this inherent, immutable difference between character
and character. In the Sermon on the Mount we
find the allegory of the fruit which is determined
by the nature of the tree that bears it (^Luke
vi. 43, 44 ; cf. Matthew vii. 16-18) ; and then in
the following verse (Luke vi. 45), we read : 6 aya66<i
dvOpcoTTO^ CK Tov ayudov drjaavpov t?}? KapBia^ avrov
nrpo^epet to wyaOov koX 6 'iTov'qpo<i di>6p(07ro<; e/c tov
TTOvrjpoi) 6r)aavpov rrj<i Kaphiaf; aviov Trpocpepei Toirovr^pov^
(Of. Matthew xii. 35.)

But it was Kant who first completely cleared up
this important point through his profound doctrine
of the empirical and intelligible ^ character. He

' Are we to believe it true that we can only be thoroughly
good by virtue of a certain occult, natural, and universal
faculty, without law, without reason, without precedent?

^ The good man out of the good treasure of his heart
bringeth forth that which is good ; and the evil man out of
the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is
evil.

' V. Note on "intelligible," Part. XL, Chapter L—
{Translator.)

ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 241

showed that the empirical character, which manifests
itself in time and in multiplicity of action, is a
phaenomenon ; while the reality behind it is the
intelligible character, which, being the essential
constitution of the Thing in itself underlying the
phaenomenon, is independent of time, space, plurality,
and change. In this way alone can be explained what
is so astonishing, and yet so well known to all who
have learnt life's lessons, — the fixed nnchangeable-
ness of human character. There are certain ethical
writers, whose aim is the moral improvement of men,
and who talk of progress made in the path of virtue ;
but their assurances are always met and victoriously
confuted by the irrefragable facts of experience, which
prove that virtue is nature's work and cannot be
inculcated. The character is an original datum,
immutable, and incapable of any amelioration through
correction by the intellect. " Now, were this not so ;
and further : if (as the above-mentioned dull-headed
preachers maintain) an improvement of the character,
and hence " a constant advance towards the good "
were possible by means of moral instruction ; then,
unless we are prepared to suppose that all the various
religious institutions, and all the efforts of the
moralists fail in their purpose, we should certainly
expect to find that the older half of mankind, at least
on an average, is distinctly better than the younger.
This, however, is so far from being the case, that it
is not to the old, who have, as we see, grown worse
by experience, but to the young that we look for
something good. It may happen that in his old age
one man appears somewhat better, another worse,

16

242 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

than he was in his youth. But the reason is not
far to seek. It is simply because with length of days
the intelligence by constant correction becomes riper,
and hence the character stands out in purer and
clearer shape ; while early life is a prey to ignorance,
mistakes, and chimeras, which now present false
motives, and now veil the real. For a fuller explana-
tion I would refer the reader to the principles laid
down in Chapter III. of the preceding Essay, on " The
Freedom of the Will." ^ It is true that among convicts
the young have a large majority ; but this is because,
when a tendency to crime exists in the character, it
soon finds a way of expressing itself in acts, and of
reaching its goal — the galleys, or the gibbet ; while
he, whom all the inducements to wrong doing, which
a long life offers, have failed to lead astray, is not
likely to fall at the eleventh hour. Hence the
respect paid to age is, in my opinion, due to the
fact that the old are considered to have passed
through a test of sixty or seventy years, and kept
their integrity unsullied ; for this of course is the
sine qua non of the honour accorded them. These
things are too well known for any one, in real life,
to be misled by the promises of the moralists we
have spoken of. He who has once been proved guilty
of evil-doing, is never again trusted, just as the noble
nature, of which a man has once given evidence,
is always confidently believed in, whatever else may

* Die Freiheit des Willens and the present treatise were
published by Schopenhauer together, under the title of Die
Beiden Grundprohleme der Ethik. V. Introduction, p. xv.,
note. — {TroMslator.)

ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 243

have changed. Operari sequitur esse (what one
does follows from what one is) forms, as we have
seen in Part II., Chapter YIII., a pregnant tenet
of the Schoolmen. Everything in the world works
according to the unchangeable constitution of which
its being, its essentia is composed. And man is no
exception. As the individual is, so will he, so must
he, act : and the liberum arhitrium indifferentiae
(free and indifferent choice) is an invention of
philosophy in her childhood, long since exploded ;
although there are some old women, in doctor's
academicals, who still like to drag it about with them.
The three fundamental springs of human action —
Egoism, Malice, Compassion — are inherent in every
one in different and strangely unequal proportions.
Their combination in any given case determines the
weight of the motives that present themselves, and
shapes the resulting line of conduct. To an egoistic
character egoistic motives alone appeal, and those,
which suggest either compassion or malice, have no
appreciable effect. Thus, a man of this type will
sacrifice his interests as little to take vengeance on
his foes, as to help his friends. Another, whose
nature is highly susceptible to malicious motives,
will not shrink from doing great harm to himself, so
only he may injure his neighbour. For there are char-
acters which take such delight in working mischief
on others, that they forget their own loss, which is
perhaps, equal to what they inflict. One may say of
such : Dum alteri noceat sui negligens ^ (disregarding
himself so long as he injures the other). These are
* Seneca, De Ira, I. 1.

244 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

the people that plunge with passionate joy into the
battle in which they expect to receive quite as many
wounds as they deal ; indeed, experience not seldom
testifies that they are ready deliberately, first to
kill the man who thwarts their purposes, and then
themselves, in order to escape the penalty of the law.
On the other hand, goodness of heart consists of a
deeply felt, all-embracing Compassion for everything
that has breath, and especially for man ; because, in
proportion as the intelligence develops, capacity for
pain increases ; and hence, the countless sufferings
of human beings, in mind and body, have a much
stronger claim to Compassion than those of animals,
which are only physical, and in any case less acute.
This goodness of heart, therefore, in the first place
restrains a man from doing any sort of harm to
others, and, next, it bids him give succour whenever
and wherever he sees distress. And the path of
Compassion may lead as far in one direction as Malice
does in the other. Certain rare characters of fine
sensibility take to heart the calamities of others more
than their own, so that they make sacrifices, which,
it may be, entail on themselves a greater amount of
sufiering than that removed from those they benefit.
Nay, in cases where several, or, perhaps, a large
number of persons, at one time, can be helped in this
way, such men do not, if need be, flinch from absolute
self-effacement. Arnold von Winkelried was one
of these. So was Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, in the
fifth century, when the Vandals crossed over from
Africa and invaded Italy. Of him we read in Johann
von Miiller's Weltgeschichte (Bk. X., chap. 10)

ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 245

that " in order to ransom some of the prisoners,
he had already disposed of all the church plate,
his own and his friends' private property. Then, on
seeing the anguish of a widow, whose only son
was being carried off, he offered himself for servitude
in the other's stead. For whoever was of suitable
age, and had not fallen by the sword, was taken
captive to Carthage."

There is, then, an enormous difference between
character and character. Being original and innate,
it measures the responsiveness of the individual to
this or that motive, and those alone, to which he
is specially sensitive, will appeal to him with any-
thing like compelling force. As in chemistry, with
unchangeable certainty, one substance reacts only
upon acids., another only upon alkalies, so, with equal
invariablenes^, different natures respond to different
stimuli. The motives suggesting loving-kindness,
which stir so deeply a good disposition, can, of them-
selves, effect nothing in a heart that listens only to
the promptings of Egoism. If it be wished to induce
the egoist to act with beneficence and humanity, this
can be done but in one way : he must be made
to believe that the assuaging of others' suffering
will, somehow or other, surely turn out to his own
advantage. What, indeed, are most moral systems
but attempts of different kinds in this direction ?
But such procedure only misleads, does not better,
the will. To make a real improvement, it would
be necessary to transform the entire nature of the
individual's susceptibility for motives. Thus, from
one we should have to remove his indifference to the

246 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

suffering of others as such ; from another, the delight
which he feels in causing pain ; from a third, the
natural tendency which makes him regard the smallest
increase of his own well-being as so far outweighing
all other motives, that the latter become as dust in
the balance. Only it is far easier to change lead into
gold than to accomplish such a task. For it means
the turning round, so to say, of a man's heart in his
body, the remoulding of his very being. In point
of fact, all that can be done is to clear the intellect,
correct the judgment, and so bring him to a better
comprehension of the objective realities and actual
relations of life. This effected, the only result gained
is that his will reveals itself more logically, distinctly,
and decidedly, with no false ring in its utterance.
It should be noted that just as many a good act rests
at bottom on false motives, on well-meant, yet illusory
representations of an advantage to be obtained thereby
in this, or another, world ; so not a few misdeeds are
due solely to an imperfect understanding of the con-
ditions of human life. It is on this latter truth that
the American penitentiary system is based. Here
the aim is not, to improve the heart, but simply,
to educate the head of the criminal, so that he may
intellectually come to perceive that prosperity is more
surely, indeed more easily, reached by work and
honesty than by idleness and knavery.

By the proper presentment of motives legality may
be secured, but not morality. It is possible to remodel
what one does, but not what one wills to do ; and
it is to the will alone that real moral worth belongs.
It is not possible to change the goal which the will

ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 247

strives after, but only the path expected to lead
thither. Instruction may alter the selection of means,
but not the choice of the ultimate object which the
individual keeps before him in all he does ; tliis is
determined by his will in accordance with its original
nature. It is true that the egoist may be brought
to understand that, if he gives up certain small
advantages, he will gain greater ; and the malicious
man may be taught that by injuring others he will
injure himself still more. But Egoism itself, and
Malice itself, will never be argued out of a person ;
as little as a cat can be talked out of her inclination
for mice. Similarly with goodness of heart. If the
judgment be trained, if the relations and conditions
of life become understood, in a word, if the intellect
be enlightened ; the character dominated by loving-
kindness will be led to express itself more consistently
and completely than it otherwise could. This happens
when we perceive the remoter consequences which
our conduct has for others : the sufferings, perhaps,
that overtake them indirectly, and only after lapse
of time, through one act or another of ours, which
we had no idea was so harmful. It occurs, too, when
we come to discern the evil results of many a well-
meant action, as, for instance, the screening of a
criminal ; and it is especially true when we realise
that the Neminem laede (injure no one) has in all
cases precedence over the Omnes juva (help all men).
In this sense there is undoubtedly such a thing as
a moral education, an ethical training capable of
making men better. But it goes only as far as I
have indicated, and its limits are quickly discovered.

248 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

The head is filled with the light of knowledge ; the
heart remains unimproved. The fundamental and
determining element, in things moral, no less than
in things intellectual, and things physical, is that
which is inborn. Art is always subordinate, and can
only lend a helping hand. Each man is, what he
is, as it were, " by the grace of God," jure divino,
Oela fioipa (by divine dispensation).

Du hist am Unde—WAS du bist.

Setz' dir Perriicken auf von Millionen LocJcen,

Setz' deinen Fuss auf ellenhohe Socken :

Du BLEIBST DOCH IMMER WAS DU BIST}

But the reader, I am sure, has long been wishing to
put the question : Where, then, does blame and merit
come in ? The answer is fully contained in Part II.,
(Chapter VIII., to which I therefore beg to call
particular attention. It is there tliat the explanation,
which otherwise would now follow, found a natural
place ; because the matter is closely connected with
Kant's doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and
Necessity. Our investigation led to the conclusion
that, once the motives are brought into play, the
Operari (what is done) is a thing of absolute
necessity ; consequently, Freedom, the existence of
which is betokened solely by the sense of responsi-
bility, cannot but belong to the Esse (what one is).
No doubt the reproaches of conscience have to do,

' In spite of all, thou art still — wliat thou art.
Though "wigs with countless curls thy head-gear be,
Though shoes an ell in height adorn thy feet :
JJndiancfd thou eer remainest what thou art.

V. Goethe's Faust, Part I., Studirzimmer. — (Translator.)

ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 249

in the first place, and ostensibly, with our acts, but
through these they, in reality, reach down to what
we are ; for what we do is the only indisputable
index of what we are, and reflects our character just
as faithfully as symptoms betray the malady. Hence
it is to this Esse, to what we are, that blame and
merit must ultimately be attributed. Whatever we
esteem and love, or else despise and hate, in others,
is not a changeable, transient appearance, but some-
thing constant, stable, and persistent ; it is that
which they are. If we find reason to alter our first
opinion about any one, we do not suppose that he
is changed, but that we have been mistaken in him.
In like manner, when we are pleased or displeased
with our own conduct, we say that we are satisfied
or dissatisfied with ourselves, meaning, in reality,
with that which we are, and are unalterably, irre-
versibly ; and the same is true with regard to our
intellectual qualities, nay, it even applies to the
physiognomy. How is it possible, then, for blame
and merit to lie otherwise than in what we are ? As
we saw in Part II., Chapter VII., Conscience is that
register of our acts, which is always growing longer,
and therefore that acquaintance with ourselves which
every day becomes more complete. Conscience con-
cerns itself directly with all that we do ; when, at
one time, actuated by Egoism, or perhaps Malice,
we turn a deaf ear to Compassion, which bids us at
least refrain from harming others, if we will not
afford them help and protection ; or when again, at
another time, we overcome the first two incentives,
and listen to the voice of the third. Both cases

250 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

measure the distinction we draw between ourselves
and others. And on this distinction depends in tlie
last resort the degree of our morality or immorality,
that is, of our justice and loving-kindness, or the
reverse. Little by little the number of those
actions, whose testimony is significant on this point,
accumulates in the storehouse of our memory ; and
thus the lineaments of our character are depicted
with ever greater clearness, and a true knowledge of
ourselves is nearer attainment. And out of such
knowledge there springs a sense of satisfaction, or
dissatisfaction with ourselves, with that which we
are, according as we have been ruled by Egoism,
by Malice, or else by Compassion ; in other words,
according as the difference we have made between
ourselves and others is greater or smaller. And
when we look outside ourselves, it is by the same
standard that we judge those about us ; and we be-
come acquainted with their character — less perfectly
indeed — yet by the same empirical method as we
employ with reference to our own. In this case our
feelings take the form of praise, approval, respect, or,
on the other hand, of reproach, displeasure, contempt,
and they are the objective translation, so to say,
of the subjective satisfaction or dissatisfaction (the
latter deepening perhaps into remorse), which arises
in us when we sit in judgment on ourselves. Lastly,
there is the evidence of language. We find certain
constantly occurring forms of speech which bear
eloquent testimony to the fact that the blame we
cast upon others is in reality directed against their
unchangeable character, touching but superficially

ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 251

what tliey do ; that virtue and vice are practically,
if tacitly, regarded as inherent unalterable qualities.
The following are some of these expressions : Jetzt
sehe ich, wie du bist ! (Now I know your nature !)
In dir habe ich mich geirrt. (I was mistaken
in you.) " Now I see what you are ! " Voild
donCj comme tu es ! (This, then, is what you are 1)
So bin ich nicht ! (I am not a person of that
sort !) Ich bin nicht der Mann, der fdhig ware,
Sie zu hintergehen. (I am not the man to impose
upon you.) Also : les Ames bien n^es (persons' well-
born, i.e., noble-minded), the Spanish bien nacido ;
€vy€VTJ<; (properly " well-born "), evyiveca (properly
" nobility of birth ") used for " virtuous " and
" virtue " ; generosioris animi amicus (a friend of
lofty mind. Generosus : lit. " of noble birth "), etc.

Reason is a necessary condition for conscience,
but only because without the former a clear and
connected recollection is impossible. From its very
nature conscience does not speak till after the act ;
hence we talk of being arraigned before its bar.
Strictly speaking, it is improper to say that con-
science speaks beforehand ; for it can only do so
indirectly ; that is, when the remembrance of par-
ticular cases in the past leads us, through reflection,
to disapprove of some analogous course of action,
while yet in embryo.

Such is the ethical fact as delivered by conscious-
ness. It forms of itself a metaphysical problem,
which does not directly belong to the present question,
but which will be touched on in the last part.

Conscience, then, is nothing else than the acquaint-

252 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

ance we make with our own changeless character
through the instrumentality of our acts. A little
consideration will show that this definition har-
monises perfectly with, and hence receives additional
confirmation from, what I have here specially em-
phasised : namely, the fact that susceptibility for the
motives of Egoism, of Malice, and of Compassion,
which is so widely dissimilar in different individuals,
and on which the whole moral value of a man
depends, cannot be interpreted by anything else,
nor be gained, or removed, by instruction, as if it
were something born in time, and therefore variable,
and subject to chance. On the contrary, we have
seen that it is innate and fixed, an ultimate datum,
admitting of no farther explanation. Thus an entire
life, with the whole of its manifold activity, may
be likened to a clock-dial, that marks every move-
ment of the internal works, as they were made once
for all ; or it resembles a mirror, wherein alone,
with the eye of his intellect, each person sees re-
flected the . essential nature of his own Will, that
is, the core of his being.

Whoever takes the trouble to thoroughly think
out what has been put forward here, and in Part. II.,
Chapter VIII., will discover in the foundation given by
me to Ethics a logical consecution, a rounded com-
pleteness, wanting to all other theories ; to say
nothing of the consonance of my view with the facts
of experience, — a consonance which he will look for
in vain elsewhere. For only the truth can uniformly
and consistently agree with itself and with nature ;
while all false principles are internally at variance with

ON THE ETHICAL DHfFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 253

themselves, and externally contradict the testimony
of experience, which at every step records its silent
protest.

I am perfectly aware that the truths advanced
in this Essay, and particularly here at the close,
strike directly at many deeply rooted prejudices and
mistakes, and especially at those attaching to a certain
rudimentary system of morals, now much in vogqe,
and suitable for elementary schools. But I cannot
own to feeling any penitence or regret. For, in the
first place, I am addressing neither children, nor the
profanum vulgus, but an Academy of light and
learning. Their inquiry is a purely theoretical one,
concerned with the ultimate fundamental verities
of Ethics ; and to a most serious question a serious
answer is undoubtedly expected. And secondly, in
my opinion, there can be no such thing as harmless
mistakes, still less privileged or useful ones. On
the contrary, every error works infinitely more evil
than good. If, however, it is wished to make existing
prepossessions the standard of truth, or the boundary
beyond which its investigation is not to go, then
it would be more honest to abolish philosophical
Faculties and Academies altogether. For where no
reality exists, there also no semblance of it should be.

part IV.

ON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANA-
TION OE THE PEIMAL ETHICAL
PHAENOMENON.

CHAPTER I.

HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD.

In the foregoing pages the moral incentive (Com-
passion) has been established as a fact, and I have
shown that from it alone can proceed unselfish justice
and genuine loving-kindness, and that on these two
cardinal v-irtnes all the rest depend. Now, for the
purpose of supplying Ethics with a foundation, this
is sufficient, in a certain sense ; that is, in so far
as Moral Science necessarily requires to be supported
by some actual and demonstrable basis, whether
existing in the external world, or in the consciousness.
The only alternative is to tread in the footsteps that
so many of my predecessors have left, in other words,
to choose arbitrarily some proposition or other, — some
bare and abstract formula — and make it the source
of all that morality prescribes ; or, like Kant, to
sublimate a mere idea, that of law, into the key-stone
of the ethical arch. But, dismissing this method
for the reasons discussed above, in the Second Part,
the investigation proposed by the Royal Society
appears to me now completed. For their question,
as it stands, deals only with the foundation of Ethics ;
as to a possible metaphysical explanation of this
foundation nothing whatever is asked. Nevertheless,

257 17

258 THE BASIS OF MORALITY,

at the point we have reached, I am very sensible
that the human spirit can find no abiding satisfaction,
no real repose. As in all branches of practical
research, so also in Ethical Science, when all is
said, man is inevitably confronted with an ultimate
phaenomenon, which while it renders an account of
everything that it includes, and everything deduc-
ible from it, remains itself an unexplained riddle.
So that here, as elsewhere, the want is felt of a
final interpretation (which, obviously, cannot but be
metaphysical) of the ultimate data, as such, and
through these, — if they be taken in their entirety —
of the world. And here, too, this want finds utterance
in the question : How is it that, what is present to
our senses, and grasped by our intellect, is as it is,
and not otherwise ? And how does the character
of the phaenomenon, as manifest to us, shape itself
out of the essential nature of things ? Indeed, in
Moral Science the need of a metaphysical basis is
more urgent than in any other, because all systems,
philosophical no less than religious, are at one in
persistently attaching to conduct not only an ethical,
but also a metaphysical significance, which, passing
beyond the mere appearance of things, transcends
every possibility of experience, and therefore stands
in the closest connection with human destiny and
with the whole cosmic process. For if life (it is
averred) have a meaning, then the supreme goal
to which it points is undoubtedly ethical. Nor is
this view a bare unsupported theory ; it is sufficiently
established by the undeniable fact that, as death
draws nigh, the thoughts of each individual assume

HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. 259

a moral trend, equally whether he be credulous of
religions dogmas, or not ; he is manifestly anxious
to wind up the affairs of his life, now verging to
its end, entirely from the moral standpoint. In
this particular the testimony of the ancients is of
special value, standing, as they do, outside the pale
of Christian influence. I shall therefore here quote
a remarkable passage preserved by Stobaeus, in his
Florilegium (chap. 44, §. 20). It has been attri-
buted to the earliest Hellenic lawgiver, Zaleucus,
though, according to Bentley and Heyne, its source
is Pythagorean. The language is graphic and un-
mistakable. Ael Ttdeadat irpo ofx/jbaTcov rov Kaipov
TovTov, iv (p 'yl'yveraL ro re\o<i eKacrTw r^? aTraXXaT^?
Tov t,y)v. Ildai yap ifnrLTTTei fierafxeXeia Tot<i /MeXXovcrt
reXevrdv, fji€p.P7]/Jbeuoi<i oiv rjhLKrjKacn, koX opfjurj rov
^ov\e<j6ai trdvra 'rreirpdyOai SiKalox; avTol<i}

Furthermore, to come to an historical personage,
we find Pericles, on his death-bed, unwilling to
hear anything about his great achievements, and
only anxious to know that he had never brought
trouble on a citizen. (Plutarch, Life of Pericles.)
Turning to modern times, if a very different case
may be placed beside the preceding, I remember
having noticed in a report of depositions made

' We ought to realise as if before our eyes that moment
of time when the end comes to each one for deliverance from
living. Because all who are about to die are seized with
repentance, remembering, as they do, their unjust deeds, and
being filled with the wish that they had always acted justly. —
'AiraXXayi] = EHlisung. V. Joannes Stobeaus, Florilegium,
edit. Meineke ; publ. Lipsiae : Teubner, 1855. Vol. ii., p.
164, 1. 7 sqq. — {Translator.)

260 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

before an English jury the following occurrence. A
rongh negro lad, fifteen years old, had been mortally
injured in some brawl on board a ship. As he was
dying, he eagerly begged that all his companions
might be fetched in haste : he wanted to ask if he
had ever vexed or insulted any one of them, and
after hearing that he had not, his mind appeared
greatly relieved. It is indeed the uniform teaching
of experience that those near death wish to be
reconciled with every one before they pass away.

But there is evidence of another kind that Ethics
can only be finally explained by Metaphysics. It is
well known that, while the author of an intellectual
performance, — even should it be a supreme master-
piece — is quite willing to take whatever remuneration
he can get, those, on the other hand, who have done
something morally excellent, almost without exception,
refuse compensation for it. The latter fact is specially
observable where conduct rises to the heroic. For
instance, when a man at the risk of his life has
saved another, or perhaps many, from destruction, as
a rule, he simply declines all reward, poor though
he may be ; because he instinctively feels that the
metaphysical value of his act would be thereby
impaired. At the end of Biirger's song, " The Brave
Man," we find a poetical presentment of this psycho-
logical process. Nor does the reality, for the most
part, diifer at all from the ideal, as I have frequently
noticed in English papers. Conduct of this kind
occurs in every part of the world, and independently
of all religious difierences. In human beings there is
an undeniable ethical tendency, rooted (however uncon-

HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. 261

sciously) in Metaphysics, and without an explanation
of life on these lines, no religion could gain standing-
ground ; for it is by virtue of their ethical side that
they all alike keep their hold on the mind. Every
religion makes its body of dogmas the basis of the
moral incentive which each man feels, but which he
does not, on that account, understand ; and it unites
the two so closely, that they appear to be inseparable.
Indeed the priests take special pains to proclaim
unbelief and immorality as one and the same thing.
The reason is thus apparent, why believers regard
unbelievers as ideutical with the vicious, and why ex-
pressions such as "godless," "atheistic," "unchristian,"
" heretic," etc., are used as synonymes for moral
depravity. The religions have, in fact, a sufficiently
easy task. Faith is the principle they start from.
Hence they are in a position to simply insist on
its application to their dogmas, and this, even to
the point of employing threats. But philosophy
has no such convenient instrument ready to hand. If
the different systems be examined, it will be found
that the situation is beset with difficulties, both as
regards the foundation to be provided for Ethics, and
in relation to the point of connection discoverable in
any such foundation with the given metaphysical theory.
And yet, — as I have emphasised in the introduction,
with an appeal to the authority of Wolff and Kant —
we are under the stringent necessity of obtaining
from Metaphysics a support for Moral Science.

Now, of all the problems that the human intellect
has to grapple with, that of Metaphysics is by far
the hardest ; so much so that it is regarded by many

262 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

thinkers as absolutely insoluble. Apart from this,
in the present case, I labour under the special dis-
advantage which the form of a detached monograph
involves. In other words, I am not at liberty to start
from some definite metaphysical system, of which I
may be an adherent ; because, if I did, either it would
have to be expounded in detail, which would take
too much space ; or else there would be the necessity
of supposing it granted and unquestioned, — an exceed-
ingly precarious proceeding. The consequence is that
I am as little able to use the synthetic method here
as in the foregoing Part. Analysis alone is possible :
that is, I must work backwards from the effects
to their cause, and not vice versa. This stern obliga-
tion, however, of having at the outset no previous
hypothesis, no standpoint other than the commonly
accepted one, made the discovery of the ethical basis
so laborious that, as I look back upon the task, I
seem to have accomplished some wondrous feat of
dexterity, not unlike that of a man who executes with
subtlest skill in mid air what otherwise is only done
on a solid support. But now that we have come to
the question whether there can be given a metaphysical
explanation of the foundation obtained, the difficulty
of proceeding without any assumption becomes so
enormous, that but one course appears to me open,
namely, to attempt nothing beyond a general sketch
of the subject. I shall, therefore, indicate rather
than elaborate the line of thought : I shall point
out the way leading to the goal, but not follow it
thither ; in short, I shall present but a very small
part of what, under other circumstances, could be

HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD. 263

adduced. In adopting this attitude for the reasons
stated, 1 wish, before beginning, to emphatically
remark, that in any case the actual problem put for-
ward has now been solved ; consequently, that what
I here add is an opus supererogationis, an appendix
to be given and taken entirely at will.

CHAPTER IL'

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK.

So far all our steps have been supported by the firm
rock of experience. But at this point it fails us, and
the solid earth sinks from under our feet, as we
press forward in our search after a final theoretical
satisfaction, there, where no experience can ever by
any possibility penetrate ; and happy shall we be,
if perchance we gain one hint, one transient gleam,
that may bring us a certain measure of content.
What, however, shall not desert us is the honesty
that has hitherto attended onr procedure. We sball
not make shift with dreams, and serve up fairy tales,
after the fashion of the so-called post-Kantian
philosophers ; nor shall we, like them, seek, by a
wordy exuberance, to impose upon the reader, and
cast dust in his eyes. A little is all we promise ;
but that little will be presented in perfect sincerity.

The principle, which we discovered to be the final
explanation of Ethics, now in turn itself requires
explaining ; so that our present problem has to deal
with that natural Compassion, which in every man
is innate and indestructible, and which has been
shown to be the sole source of non-egoistic conduct,
this kind alone being of real moral worth. Now

264

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 265

many modern thinkers treat the conceptions of Good
and Bad as simple, that is, as neither needing, nor
admitting any elucidation, and then they go on, for
the most part, to talk very mysteriously and devoutly
of an " Idea of the Good," out of which they make
a pedestal for their moral system, or at least a cloak
for their poverty.^ Hence I am obliged in this
connection to point out parenthetically, that these
conceptions are anything but simple, much less a
priori ; that they in fact express a relation, and are
derived from the commonest daily experience. What-
ever is in conformity with the desires of any individual
will, is, relatively to it, termed good ; for instance,
good food, good roads, a good omen ; the contrary is
called bad, and, in the case of living beings, malicious.
And so one, who by virtue of his character, has no
wish to oppose what others strive after, but rather,
as far as he reasonably may, shows himself favourable
and helpful to them ; one, who, instead of injuring,
assists his neighbours, and promotes their interests,
when he can ; is named by the latter, in respect to
themselves, a good man ; the term good being applied
to him in the sense of the above definition, and from
•their own point of view, which is thus relative,

* The conception of the Good^ in its purity, is an vltimate
one, " an absolute Idea, whose substance loses itseK in
infinity." — (Bouterweck : Praktische Ajihorismen, p. 54.)

It is obvious that this writer Avould hke to transform the
familiar, nay, trivial conception " Good " into a sort of AtiVtrj;?,
to be set up as an idol in his temple. [AtiVerrfs- lit., *' fallen
from Zeus " ; and so " heaven-sent," " a thing of divine origin."
Cf. Hom., II. XVI., 174 ; Od. IV. 477. Eur., Bacch., 1268.—
{Translator.y]

266 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

empirical, and centred in the passive subject. Now,
if we examine the nature of such a man, not only
as it affects others, but as it is in itself, we are
enabled by the foregoing exposition to perceive that
the virtues of justice and loving-kindness, which he
practises, are due to a direct participation in weal
and woe external to himself ; and we have learnt
that the source of such participation is Compassion.
If, further, we pause to consider what is the essential
part in this type of character, we shall certainly find
it to lie in the fact that such a person draws less dis-
tinction between himself and others than is usually done.
In the eyes of the malicious individual this
difference is so great that he takes direct delight
in the spectacle of suffering, — a delight, which he
accordingly seeks without thought of any other benefit
to himself, nay, sometimes, even to his own hurt.
From the egoist's point of view the same difference is
still large enough to make him bring much trouble on
his neighbours, in order to obtain a small personal
advantage. Hence for both of these, between the
ego, which is limited to their own persons, and the
non-ego, which includes all the rest of the world,
there is fixed a great gulf, a mighty abyss : Pereat
mundus, dum ego salvus sim (the world may perish,
provided I be safe), is their maxim. For the good
man, on the contrary, this distinction is by no means
so pronounced ; indeed, in the case of magnanimous
deeds, it appears to become a vanishing quantity, be-
cause then the weal of another is advanced at the cost
of the benefactor, the self of another placed on an
equality with his own. And when it is a question of

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 267

saving a number of fellow-beings, total self-obliteration
may be developed, the one giving his life for many.

The inquiry now presents itself, whether the latter
way of looking at the relation subsisting between
the ego and the non-ego, which forms the mainspring
of a good man's conduct, is mistaken and due to an
illusion ; or whether the error does not rather attach
to the opposite view, on which Egoism and Malice
are based.

No doubt the theory lying at the root of Egoism
is, from the empirical standpoint, perfectly justified.
From the testimony of experience, the distinction
between one's own person and that of another appears
to be absolute. I do not occupy the same space as
my neighbour, and this difference, which separates
me from him physically, separates me also from his
weal and woe. But in the first place, it should be
observed that the knowledge we have of our own
selves is by no means exhaustive and transparent to
its depths. By means of the intuition, which the
brain constructs out of the data supplied by the
senses, that is to say, in an indirect manner, we
recognise our body as an object in space ; through
an inward perception, we are aware of the continuous
series of our desires, of our volitions, which arise
through the agency of external motives ; and finally,
we come to discern the manifold movements, now
stronger, now weaker, of our will itself, to which
all feelings from within are ultimately traceable.
And that is all : for the perceiving faculty is not in
its turn perceived. On the contrary, the real sub-
stratum of our whole phaenomenal nature, our inmost

268 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

essence in itself, that which wills and perceives, is
not accessible to us. We see only the outward side
of the ego ; its inward part is veiled in darkness.
Consequently, the knowledge we possess of ourselves
is in no sort radical and complete, but rather very
superficial. The larger and more important part of
our being remains unknown, and forms a riddle to
speculate about ; or, as Kant puts it : " The ego
knows itself only as a phaenomenon ; of its real
essence, whatever that may be, it has no knowledge."
Now, as regards that side of the self which falls
within our ken, we are, undoubtedly, sharply dis-
tinguished, each from the other ; but it does not
follow therefrom that the same is trne of the re-
mainder, which, shrouded in impenetrable obscurity,
is yet, in fact, the very substance of which we consist.
There remains at least the possibility that the latter
is in all men uniform and identical.

What is the explanation of all plurality, of all
numerical diversity of existence ? Time and Space.
Indeed it is only through the latter that the former
is possible : because the concept " many " inevitably
connotes the idea either of succession (time), or of
relative position (space). Now, since a homogeneous
plurality is composed of Individuals, I call Space and
Time, as being the conditions of multiplicity, the
principium individuationis (the principle of individua-
tion) ; and I do not here pause to consider whether this
expression was exactly so employed by the Schoolmen.

If in the disclosures which Kant's wonderful
acumen gave to the world there is anything true
beyond the shadow of a doubt, this is to be found

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 269

in the Transcendental Aesthetics, that is to say,
in his doctrine of the ideality of Space and Time.
On snch solid foundations is the stractnre built that
no one has been able to raise even an apparent
objection. It is Kant's triumph, and belongs to
the very small number of metaphysical theories which
may be regarded as really proved, and as actual
conquests in that field of research. It teaches us
that Space and Time are the forms of our own
faculty of intuition, to which they consequently
belong, and not to the objects thereby perceived ;
and further, that they can in no way be a condition
of things in themselves, but rather attach only to
their mode of appearing, such as is alone possible
for us who have a consciousness of the external
world determined by strictly physiological limits.
Now, if to the Thing in itself, that is, to the Reality
underlying the kosmos, as we perceive it. Time and
Space are foreign ; so also must multiplicity be.
Consequently that which is objectivated in the count-
less phaenomena of this world of the senses cannot
but be a unity, a single indivisible entity, manifested
in each and all of them. And conversely, the web
of plurality, woven in the loom of Time and Space,
is not the Thing in itself, but only its appearance-
form. Externally to the thinking subject, this appear-
ance-form, as such, has no existence ; it is merely
an attribute of our consciousness, bounded, as the
latter is, by manifold conditions, indeed, depending
on an organic function.

The view of things as above stated, — that all
plurality is only apparent, that in the endless series

270 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

of individuals, passing simultaneously and successively
into and out of life, generation after generation,
age after age, there is but one and the same entity
really existing, which is present and identical in all
alike ; — this theory, I say, was of course known
long before Kant ; indeed, it may be carried back
to the remotest antiquity. It is the alpha and
omega of the oldest book in the world, the sacred
Vedas, whose dogmatic part, or ratlier esoteric
teaching, is found in the Upanishads.^ There, in
almost every page this profound doctrine lies

' The genineness of the Oupnek'hat has been disputed on
the ground of certain marginal glosses which were added by
Mohammedan copyists, and then interpolated in the text.
It has, however, been fully established by the Sanskrit scholar,
F. H. H. Windischmann (junior) in his Sancara, sive de
TJceologumenis Vedanticorum, 1833, p. xix ; and also by
Bochinger in his book De la Vie Contemplalive chez les
Indous, 1831, p. 12. The reader though ignorant of Sanskrit,
may yet convince himself that Anquctil Duperron's word
for word Latin translation of the Persian version of the
Upanishads made by the martyr of this creed, the Sultan
D&rd-Shukoh, is based on a thorough and exact knowledge
of the language. He has only to compare it with recent
translations of some of the Upanishads by Rammohun Koy,
by Foley, and especially with that of Colebrooke, as also
with Roer's, (the latest). These writers are obviously
groping in obscurity, and driven to make shift with hazy
conjectures, so that without doubt their work is much less
accurate. More will be found on this subject in Vol. II. of
the /'arer(7a, chap. 16, § 184. [F. The Upanishads, translated
by Max Miiller, in The Sacred Books of the East, Vols. I. and
XV. Cf. also Max Miiller, The Science of Language, Vol. I.,
p. 171, Now that an adequate translation of the original
exists, the Oupnek'hat has only an historical interest.
The value which Schopenhauer attached to the Upanishads
is very clearly expressed also in the Welt als Wille and

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 271

enshrined ; with tireless repetition, in countless
adaptations, by many varied parables and similes
it is expounded and inculcated. That such was, more-
over, the fount whence Pythagoras drew his wisdom,
cannot be doubted, despite the scanty knowledge we
possess of what he taught. That it formed practically
the central point in the whole philosophy of the
Eleatic School, is likewise a familiar fact. Later
on, the New Platonists were steeped in the same,
one of their chief tenets being : Bia ttjv evorrjTa
airavTcov •jrdaaf} '>^v')(a<i fjLiav elvat. (All souls are
one, because all things form a unity.) In the ninth
century we find it unexpectedly appearing in Europe.
It kindles the spirit of no less a divine than Joliannes
Scotus Erigena, who endeavours to clothe it witli the
forms and terminology of the Christian religion.
Among the Mohammedans we detect it again in the
rapt mysticism of the Stifi.^ In the West Giordano
Bruno cannot resist the impulse to utter it aloud ;
but his reward is a death of shame and torture.
And at the same time we find the Christian Mystics
losing themselves in it, against their own will and

Vorstellung, Preface to the first Edition ; and in the Parerga,
II., chap, xvi., § \M.— {Translator. )]

' For the Slifi, more correctly Suf iy a sect which ap-
peared already in the first century of the Hijrah, the reader is
referred to : Tholuck's Bliithensammlung aus der Morgen-
laiuUschen Mystih (Berlin, 1825) ; Tholuck's Sdfisvius, sive
Theosoj)hia Persarum Pantheistica (Berlin, 1821); Kremer's
Oeschichte der Hefi^rscheivden Ideen des Isldms (Leipzig, 1868) ;
Palmer's Onental Mysticism (London, 1867) ; Gobineau's Les
Religions et les Philosophies dans VAsie Centrale (2nd edit.
Paris, 1866) ; A Dictionary of Islam, by T. P. Hughes (London,
1885), p. 608 ^({({.—{Translator.)

272 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

intention, whenever and wherever we read of them ! ^
Spinoza's name is identified with it. Lastly, in onr own
days, after Kant had annihilated the old dogmatism,
and the world stood aghast at its smoking ruins,
the same teaching was revived in Schelling's eclectic
philosophy. The latter took all the systems of
Plotinus, Spinoza, Kant, and Jacob Boehm, and
mixing them together with the results of modern
Natural Science, speedily served up a dish sufficient
to satisfy for the moment the pressing needs of his
contemporaries ; and then proceeded to perform a
series of variations on the original theme. The con-
sequence is that in the learned circles of Germany
this line of thought has come to be generally ac-
cepted ; indeed even among people of ordinary ednca-
tion, it is almost universally diffused.^ A solitary
exception is formed by the University philosophers
of the present day. They have the hard task of
fighting what is called Pantheism, Being brought

' This is too well-known to need verification by references.
The Gantico del Sole by St. Francis of Assist sounds almost like
a passage from the Upanishadsor the Bhagavadgit^.
— (^Translator.)

^ Onpeut assez long temps, chez notre esp^ce,
Fermer la porte a la liaison.

Mais, des qvJelle entre avec adresse,
Elle reste dans la maison,

Et hientot elle en est maitresse.

— (Voltaire.)

(We men may, doubtless, all our lives

To Reason bar the door.
But if to enter she contrives,

The house she leaves no more,
And soon as mistress there presides.)

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 273

throngh the stress of battle into great embarrassment
and difficulty, they anxiously catch now at the most
pitiful sophisms, now at phrases of choicest bombast,
so only they may patch together some sort of re-
spectable disguise, wherein to dress up the favourite
petticoat Philosophy, that has duly received official
sanction. In a word, the '^Ev koI ttcLv ^ has been in
all ages the laughing-stock of fools, for the wise a
subject of perpetual meditation. Nevertheless, the
strict demonstration of this theory is only to be
obtained from the Kantian teaching, as I have just
shown. Kant himself did not carry it out ; after
the fashion of clever orators, he only gave the
premises, leaving to his hearers the pleasure of
drawing the conclusion.

Now if plurality and difference belong only to the
appearance-form; if there is but one and the same
Entity manifested in all living things : it follows that,
when we obliterate the distinction between the ego
and the non-ego, we are not the sport of an illusion.
Rather are we so, when we maintain the reality of
individuation, — a thing the Hindus call May&,^ that
is, a deceptive vision, a phantasma. The former
theory we have found to be the actual source of the
phaenomenon of Compassion ; indeed Compassion is
nothing but its translation into definite expression.
This, therefore, is what I should regard as the
metaphysical foundation of Ethics, and should describe

' To ti/ = the eternal Reality outside Time and Space
To nap = the phaenomenal universe. — {Translator.)

*M%^ is "the delusive reflection of the true eternal
Entity"— (Translator.)

18

274 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

it as the sense which identifies the ego with the
non-ego, so that the individual directly recognises
in another his own self, his true and very being.
From this standpoint the profoundest teaching of
theory pushed to its furthest limits may be shown
in the end to harmonise perfectly with the rules
of justice and loving-kindness, as exercised ; and
conversely, it will be clear that practical philosophers,
that is, the upright, the beneficent, the magnanimous,
do but declare through their acts the same truth
as the man of speculation wins by laborious research,
by the loftiest flights of intellect. Meanwhile moral
excellence stands higher than all theoretical sapience.
The latter is at best nothing but a very unfinished
and partial structure, and only by the circuitous path
of reasoning attains the goal which the former reaches
in one step. He who is morally noble, however
deficient in mental penetration, reveals by his conduct
the deepest insight, the truest wisdom ; and puts to
shame the most accomplished and learned genius, if the
Mter's acts betray that his heart is yet a stranger to
this great principle, — the metaphysical unity of life.

" Individuation is real. The principium individua-
tionis, with the consequent distinction of individuals,
is the order of things in themselves. Each living
unit is an entity radically difierent from all others.
In my own self alone I have my true being ; every-
thing outside it belongs to the non-ego, and is foreign
to me." This is the creed to the truth of which flesh
and bone bear witness : which is at the root of all
egoism, and which finds its objective expression in
every loveless, unjust, or malicious act.

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 275

" Individuation is merely an appearance, born of
Space and Time ; the latter being nothing else than
the forms under which the external world necessarily
manifests itself to me, conditioned as they are by
my brain's faculty of perception. Hence also the
plurality and difference of individuals is but a
phaenomenon, that is, exists only as my mental
picture. My true inmost being subsists in every
living thing, just as really, as directly as in my own
consciousness it is evidenced only to myself."
This is the higher knowledge : for which there is
in Sanskrit the standing formula, tat tvam asi, " that
art thou."^ Out of the depths of human nature it
wells up in the shape of Compassion, and is therefore
the source of all genuine, that is, disinterested
virtue, being, so to say, incarnate in every good
deed. It is this which in the last resort is invoked,
whenever we appeal to gentleness, to loving-kindness ;
whenever we pray for mercy instead of justice. For
such appeal, such prayer is in reality the effort to re-
mind a fellow-being of the ultimate truth that we are
all one and the same entity. On the other hand.
Egoism and its derivatives, envy, hatred, the spirit of
persecution, hardness of heart, revenge, pleasure at the
sight of suffering, and cruelty, all claim support from
the other view of things, and seek their justification in
it. The emotion and joy we experience when we hear
of, still more, when we see, and most of all, when

' This expression is used in the Brahmanical philosophy
to denote the relation between the world-fiction as a whole
and its individualised parts. V. A. E. Gough, Philosophy of
the Upanishads, 1882. — (Translator.)

276 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

we ourselves do, a noble act, are at bottom traceable
to tbe feeling of certainty such a deed gives, that,
beyond all plurality and distinction of individuals,
which the principium individuationis, like a kaleido-
scope, shows us in ever-shifting evanescent forms,
there is an underlying unity, not only truly existing,
but actually accessible to us ; for lo ! in tangible,
objective form, it stands before our sight.

Of these two mental attitudes, according as the
one or the other is adopted, so the ^CkCa (Love) or the
velKO'i (Hatred) of Empedocles appears between man
and man. If any one, who is animated by vecKO';, could
forcibly break in upon his most detested foe, and
compel him to lay bare the inmost recesses of his
heart ; to his surprise, he would find again in the
latter his very self. For just as in dreams, all the
persons that appear to us are but the masked images
of ourselves ; so in the dream of our waking life, it
is our own being which looks on us from out our
neighbours' eyes, — though this is not equally easy
to discern. Nevertheless, tat tvam asi.

The preponderance of either mode of viewing life
not only determines single acts ; it shapes a man's
whole nature and temperament. Hence the radical
difference of mental habit between the good character
and the bad. The latter feels everywhere that a
thick wall of partition hedges him off from all others.
For him the world is an absolute non-ego, and his
relation to it an essentially hostile one ; consequently,
the key-note of his disposition is hatred, suspicion,
envy, and pleasure in seeing distress. The good
character, on the other hand, lives in an external

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 277

world homogeneous with his own being ; the rest of
mankind is not in his eyes a non-ego ; he thinks of it
rather as " myself once more." He therefore stands
on an essentially amicable footing with every one :
he is conscious of being, in his inmost nature, akin
to the whole human race,^ takes direct interest in
their weal and woe, and confidently assumes in their
case the same interest in him. This is the source
of his deep inward peace, and of that happy, calm,
contented manner, which goes out on those around
him, and is as the "presence of a good diffused."
Whereas the bad character in time of trouble has
no trust in the help of his fellow-creatures. If he
invokes aid, he does so without confidence : obtained,
he feels no real gratitude for it ; because he can
hardly discern therein anything but the effect of
others' folly. For he is simply incapable of recognis-
ing his own self in some one else ; and this, even
after it has furnished the most incontestible signs
of existence in that other person : on which fact the
repulsive nature of all unthankfulness in reality de-
pends. The moral isolation, which thus naturally
and inevitably encompasses the bad man, is often the
cause of his becoming the victim of despair. The
good man, on the contrary, will appeal to his neigh-
bours for assistance, with an assurance equal to the
consciousness he has of being ready himself to help
them. As I have said : to the one type, humanity is
a non-ego ; to the other, " myself once more." The
magnanimous character, who forgives his enemy,

• Homo sum : humani nil a me alienum puto. Terence,
Heaut., I. 1, "ib.— {Translator.)

278 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

and returns good for evil, rises to the sublime, and
receives the highest meed of praise ; because he
recognises his real self even there where it is most
conspicuously disowned.

Every purely beneficent act all help entirely and
genuinely unselfish, being, as such, exclusively inspired
by another's distress, is, in fact, if we probe the
matter to the bottom, a dark enigma, a piece of
mysticism put into practice ; inasmuch as it springs
out of, and finds its only true explanation in, the
same higher knowledge that constitutes the essence
of whatever is mystical.

For how, otherwise than metaphysically, are we
to account for even the smallest offering of alms made
with absolutely no other object than that of lessening
the want which afliicts a fellow-creatare ? Such an
act is only conceivable, only possible, in so far as
the giver knows that it is his very self which stands
before him, clad in the garments of suffering ; in
other words, so far as he recognises the essential part
of his own being, under a form not his own.i It now
becomes apparent, why in the foregoing part I have
called Compassion the great mystery of Ethics.

He, who goes to meet death for his fatherland, has
freed himself from the illusion which limits a man's
existence to his own person. Such a one has broken
the fetters of the principium individuationis. In his

' It is probable that many, perhaps, most cases of truly
disinterested Compassion — when they really occur — are due
not to any conscious knowledge of this sort, but to an
unconscious impulse springing from the ultimate unity of all
living things, and acting, so to say, automatically. — {Translator:)

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 279

widened, enlightened nature he embraces all hia
conntrymen, and in them lives on and on. Nay, he
reaches forward to, and merges himself in the genera-
tions yet unborn, for whom he works ; and he regards
death as a wink of the eyelids, so momentary that
it does not interrupt the sight.

We may here sum up the characteristics of the
two human types above indicated. To the Egoist all
other people are uniformly and intrinsically strangers.
In point of fact, he considers nothing to be truly real,
except his own person, and regards the rest of man-
kind practically as troops of phantoms, to whom he
assigns merely a relative existence, so far as they
may be instruments to serve, or barriers to obstruct,
his purposes ; the result being an immeasurable diflfer-
ence, a vast gulf between his ego on the one side, and
the non-ego on the other. In a word, he lives ex-
clusively centred in his own individuality, and on his
death-day he sees all reality, indeed the whole world,
coming to an end along with himself.^ Whereas the
Altruist discerns in all other persons, nay, in every
living thing, his own entity, and feels therefore that
his being is commingled, is identical with the being
of whatever is alive. By death he loses only a small
part of himself. Patting off the narrow limitations
of the individual, he passes into the larger life of all
mankind, in whom he always recognised, and, recog-
nising, loved, his very self; and the illusion of Time
and Space, which separated his consciousness from
that of others, vanishes. These two opposite modes

' Cf . Richard Wagner : Jes%is von Nazareth ; pp. 79-90. —
{Translator.)

280 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

of viewing the world are probably the chief, though
not indeed the sole cause of the difference we find
between very good and exceptionally bad men, as to
the manner in which they meet their last hour.

In all ages Truth, poor thing, has been put to
shame for being paradoxical ; and yet it is not her
fault. She cannot assume the form of Error seated
on his throne of world-wide sovereignty. So then,
with a sigh, she looks up to her tutelary god,
Time, who nods assurance to her of future victory and
glory, but whose wings beat the air so slowly with
their mighty strokes, that the individual perishes
or ever the day of triumph be come. Hence I,
too, am perfectly aware of the paradox which this
metaphysical explanation of the ultimate ethical
phaenomenon must present to Western minds, accus-
tomed, as they are, to very different methods of
providing Morals with a basis. Nevertheless, I cannot
offer violence to the truth. All that is possible
for me to do, out of consideration for European
blindness, is to assert once more, and demonstrate
by actual quotation, that the Metaphysics of Ethics,
which I have here suggested, was thousands of years
ago the fundamental princii)le of Indian wisdom.
And to this wisdom I point back, as Copernicus did
to the Pythagorean cosmic system, which was sup-
pressed by Aristotle and Ptolemaeus. In the
Bhagavadglta (Lectio XIII. ; 27, 28), according to
A. W. von Schlegel's translation, we find the following
passage : Eunclem in omnibus animantibus consis-
temtem summum dominum, istis pereuntibus haud
pereuntem qui cernit, is vere cernit. Eundem vero

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK. 281

cernens ubique praesentem dominum, non violat semei
ipsum sua ipsius culpa : exinde pergit ad summum
iter}

With these hints towards the elaboration of a
metaphysical basis for Ethics I must close, although
an important step still remains to be taken. The
latter would presuppose a further advance in Moral
Science itself ; and this can hardly be made, because
in the West the highest aim of Ethics is reached
in the theory of justice and virtue. What lies
beyond is unknown, or at any rate ignored. The
omission, therefore, is unavoidable ; and the reader

* That man is endowed with true insight who sees that the
same ruling power is inherent in all things, and that when
these perish, it perishes not. For if he discerns the same
ruling power everywhere present, he does not degrade himself
by his own fault : thence he passes to the highest path. — For
the £hagavadf/itd the reader is referred to Vol. VIII. of The
Sacred Books of the East (Oxford : Clarendon Press), where
(p. 105) this passage is translated as follows : — " He sees
(truly) who sees the supreme lord abiding alike in all entities,
and not destroyed though they are destroyed. For he who
sees the lord abiding everywhere alike, does not destroy him-
self * by himself, and then reaches the highest goal."

* "Not to have true knowledge, is equivalent to self-
destruction."

Cf. Fauche : Le Maha-Bharata : Paris, 1867 ; Vol. VII., p.
128:—

" Celui-lk possfede une vue nette des choses, qui voit ce
principe souverain en tous les etres d'une manifere 6gale, et
leur survivre, quand ils p^rissent. II ne se fait aucum tort
k soi-nieme par cette vue d'un principe qui subsiste egalement
partout : puis, aprfes cette vie, il entre dans la voie superieure."

The obscurity of Schlegel's Latin in the second sentence
is sufficiently removed by these more recent translations. —
{Translator.)

282 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

need feel no surprise, if the above slight outline of
the Metaphysics of Ethics does not bring into view —
even remotely — the corner-stone of the whole meta-
physical edifice, nor reveal the connection of all
the parts composing the Divina Commedia. Such
a presentment, moreover, is involved neither in the
question set, nor in my own plan. A man cannot
say everything in one day, and should not answer
more than he is asked.

He who tries to promote human knowledge and
insight is destined to always encounter the opposition
of his age, which is like the dead weight of some
mass that has to be dragged along : there on the
ground it lies, a huge inert deformity, defying all
efforts to quicken its shape with new life. But such
a one must take comfort from the certainty that,
although prejudices beset his patli, yet the truth is
with him. And Truth does but wait for her ally,
Time, to join her ; once he is at her side, she is
perfectly sure of victory, which, if to-day delayed,
will be won to-morrow.

JUDICIUM

REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS.

QuABSTioNEM auno 1837 propositam, '''' utrum philo-
sophiae moralis fons et fundamentum in idea morali-
tatis, quae immediate conscientia contineatur^ et ceteris
notionibus fundamentalibus, quae ex ilia prodeant,
explicandis quaerenda sint, an in alio cognoscendi
principio^'' unus tantum scriptor explicare conatus
est, cujus commentationem, germanico sermone com-
positam, et his terbis notatam : " Moral predigen
1ST LEicHT, Moral begrunden ist schwer," praemio
dignam judicare nequivimus. Omisso enim eo, quod
potissimum postulabatur, hoc expeti putavit, ut princi-
pium aliquod ethicae conderetur, itaque earn partem
commentationis suae, in qua principii ethicae a se
propositi et metaphysicae suae nexum exponit, appen-
dicis loco habuit, in qua plus quam postulatum esset
praestaret, quum tamen ipsum thema ejusmodi disputa-
tionemjiagitaretyin qua velpraecipuo loco metaphysicae
et ethicae nexu^ consider aretur. Quod autem scriptor
in sympathia fundamentum ethicae constituere conatus
est, neque ipsa disserendi forma nobis satisfecit, neque
reapse, hoc fundamentum sufficere, evicit ; quin ipse
contra esse confteri coactus est. Neque reticendum
videtur, plures recentioris aetatis summos philosophos

283

284 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

tarn indecenter commemorari, ut justam et gravem
offensionem habeat.

JUDGMENT OF THE DANISH EOYAL SOCIETY OF
SCIENCES.

In 1837 the following question was set as subject for
a Prize Essay : " Is the fountain and basis of Morals
to be sought for in an idea of morality which lies
directly in the consciousness (or conscience), and in
the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions
which arise from it ? Or is it to be found in some
other source of knowledge ? " There was only one
competitor ; but his dissertation, written in German,
and bearing the motto : "7b preach Morality is easy^
to found it is difficult,^'' ^ we cannot adjudge worthy
of the Prize. He has omitted to deal with the
essential part of the question, apparently thinking
that he was asked to establish some fundamental
principle of Ethics. Consequently, that part of the
treatise, which explains how the moral basis he
proposes is related to his system of metaphysics,
we find relegated to an appendix, as an " opus
supererogationis,'^ although it was precisely the con-
nection between Metaphysics and Ethics that our
question required to be put in the first and foremost

' The Academy has been good enough to insert the second
" is " on its own account, by way of proving the truth of
Longinus' theory ( V. De Suhlimitate : chap. 39, ad Jin.), that
the addition or subtraction of a single syllable is sufficient
to destroy the whole force of a sentence. [ V. Longinus : De
Suhlimitate Lihellus ; edit. Joannes Vahlen, Bonnae, 1887. —
{Translator.')]

REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS. 285

place. The writer attempts to show that compassion
is the ultimate source of morality ; but neither does
his mode of discussion appear satisfactory to us, nor
has he, in point of fact, succeeded in proving that
such a foundation is adequate. Indeed he himself
is obliged to admit that it is not.^ Lastly, the Society
cannot pass over in silence the fact that he mentions
several recent philosophers of the highest standing
in an unseemly manner, such as to justly occasion
serious offence.

* I suppose this is the meaning of contra esse conjiteri. —
{Translator.)

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